The scout platoon’s fundamental role is to conduct forceful or stealthy reconnaissance that satisfies information requirements to set conditions for successful operations of the supported unit. Scout platoons are the primary collection asset in the cavalry troop, and the organic reconnaissance unit available to infantry and armor battalions. This article highlights a narrative of a concept developed to maximize success at NTC and the discussion of how to utilize scouts and snipers for future force designs, and a way to cut out redundancy that plagues our institutional courses within the Army.
The following is a narrative of SSG Chris Smith’s National Training Center (NTC) rotation in March of 2021. SSG Smith is a Sniper Section leader with HHC 3rd BN 161 IN. For this rotation however, he was assigned as the Recon Platoon leader. This narrative discusses how he employed a SBCT Recon Platoon to counter the scenario that NTC replicated; a conflict with a peer threat.
“I was assigned as a sniper section leader. But, I was serving as the recon platoon leader with an E7 Platoon Sergeant (PSG) due to no available officers. Our platoon was not a standard MTOE task organization. We were exercising a concept developed by our battalion commander. Our battalion dynamically task organized a standard scout platoon combined sniper section, making it an infantry recon platoon. We had one ICV (Infantry Carrier Vehicle), three Stryker RVs (Reconnaissance Vehicle) and a HMMWV for the platoon sergeant. We had two, 4-man sniper teams and two, 3-man dismount teams comprised of 19Ds with an NCO Team Leader, an M240 gunner, and a Javelin gunner for each team.
For this narrative, I’ll focus on the sniper team employment. Conceptually the sniper teams were designated LRS (long-range reconnaissance and surveillance) teams and were equipped with two M110A1 DMR rifles and two M110 SASS rifles.
For optics, we used M151 spotting scopes with a STORM LRF and PVS-30, and a Laser Target Locator Modulator II (LTLM 2) thermal ranger finder. Our communications equipment was the ASIP radio and 152 Harris radios. We found that terrain, weather and other factors made it so neither platform was the ‘go-to.’ Consequently, each team carried both to provide both HF and VHF bands capability.
Teams reported great success with the LTLM, utilizing its thermal capability and LRF/GPS function. They were able to get 12 digit grids on targets from over 13 km away. The optics were battery intensive so teams paired a M151 optic with the thermal.
We positioned teams anywhere from 5-15km ahead of the task force forward line of troops (FLOT) but they always had at least one Stryker vehicle within radio contact. Each Stryker took battlefield information from LRS teams and plot targets via JBC-P (Joint Battlefield Command – Platform, the next generation blue force tracker). The chat capability allowed teams to call IDF and CAS missions on targets with the Stryker vehicle commander relaying real-time battlefield info.
It took some development with the fires cell as well as battalion mortars, attached M777 batteries, and JTACs coordinating air. But this led to numerous successful strikes on enemy targets, including the discovery and destruction of the Blackhorse TOC. In this case, each section had two Strykers and one 4-man LRS team. They had a robust firepower capability with an M240, Javelin, and Stinger missile launcher. This provided a counter to enemy vehicles. These teams successfully employed their stingers against several enemy rotary wing aircraft that were inserting OP teams.
Our primary mission for the recon platoon was to insert LRS teams forward of the main body in both offensive and defensive operations. I typically received PIR and NAIs from the S2 and S3, and deployed anywhere from six to twenty-four hours ahead of the main body. The TF Commander stipulated that LRS teams always stayed within the range of our IDF assets. Route reconnaissance was essential to establishing vehicle drop-off (VDO) points and then maintaining a position of cover and concealment that wouldn’t compromise the LRS team. As a result, we placed camouflage netting on the Strykers with the front of the vehicle placed facing the terrain to reduce the thermal signature from the engine exhaust. Lastly, we always conducted local reconnaissance to ensure our emplacement sites weren’t near enemy OP or re-trans sites.”
Some recommendations for Scout and Sniper units to train for in preparation of LSCO are:
- Leverage your organic capabilities/enablers to counter enemy threats
- Be proficient in employing heavy weapons, anti-tank (AT) munitions, and CFF/CAS
- Weigh the benefit of high mobility against the risk of lack of sustainment during the operations process
- Deploy small tactical reconnaissance team prior to main body to answer Priority Intelligence Requirements
- Soldiers need to know how to identify enemy threat systems, understand their capabilities, and how they’re arrayed
- Having access to COTS drones that can provide eyes on the objective prior to infil
The Army needs to look at DOTMLPF-P solutions, specifically to doctrine and organization, that combine our reconnaissance and sniper elements. This would create dedicated recon platoons that can support the Army’s next fight in large scale ground combat. Likewise, the institutional Army Infantry and Armor schools should look to what they can do to help eliminate redundancy.
Take these three Fort Benning Schools for example:
- The U.S. Army Sniper Course
- The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Course
- The Scout Leader Course
A side-by-side comparison of their POI (program of instruction) reveals remarkable similarity. Furthermore, the Advanced Situational Awareness Course and the Small Unmanned Aircraft System Master Trainer Course run separate POIs. And again, they have similarities with the three aforementioned schoolhouses. As budget cuts loom, is there a way to absorb schools and combine them?
Circle back to Staff Sgt. Smith’s narrative. He trained his reconnaissance platoon to be proficient in their doctrinal tasks. This included dismounted reconnaissance operations, communicating battlefield information, and employing supporting assets while maneuvering a scout platoon in a combined arms formation. But, the Army continues to hollow out reconnaissance formations across the force.
Reach out to the Infantry and Armor School Commandants. Ask for a review of their courses and to find ways to make a more robust and standardized reconnaissance pipeline in your unit. Additionally, you can do this for your scouts and snipers. It will provide your commanders with a formation that can conduct reconnaissance and sniper tasks in a hyperactive battlefield. Finally, your formation will have soldiers, guided by evolving doctrine, serving as sensors, communicators, and human weapon systems on the future battlefield.
Sgt. 1st Class Christopher M. Rance has 17 years of professional experience in the realm of precision shooting; having served in a variety of sniper positions within the U.S. Army. During his tenure as an Army Sniper Instructor and Team Sergeant, he trained hundreds of Soldiers, to include elements of Air Force Combat Controllers, Air Force Special Reconnaissance Airmen, 75th Ranger Regiment, Law Enforcement and Foreign Allies. He is the author of Training Circular 3-22.10, Sniper, which is the governing doctrine of all U.S. Army Snipers and served as a Military Field Consultant for Kestrel Ballistics.
Staff Sgt. Chris Smith is a Sniper Section Leader in the Washington National Guard. He began his military career on the active duty side as commissioned officer deploying as an Infantry Platoon leader in Iraq in 2005-2007 as well as a Company Commander in 2010-2011. Chris left active duty service and was an overseas security contractor in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and Syria. He is a graduate of Ranger School, Airborne School, Sere C and the Army National Guard Sniper School. Chris currently serves as a Police Officer in his home town.