One can confidently assume that all organizational leaders at as some point, especially during a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, have experienced and observed the frustrations of deliberate or undeliberate selective compliance on noncompliance of actions and orders by individuals or groups.  Numerous times at National Training Center (NTC), I have witnessed organizational leaders, specifically the BCT Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) in frustration state, “I told them to do that; we discussed or talked about that; I don’t understand why it didn’t happen; why didn’t they report that; I don’t understand why that happened, AGAIN!”

The purpose of this article is to provide a Fire Support leader’s testament to the application of the tenets of Mission Command (Competence, Mutual Trust, Shared Understanding, Commander’s Intent, Disciplined Initiative, Risk Acceptance) within a Brigade Combat Team’s Joint Fires Enterprise. The content is themed on circumstantial employment of the principles of Mission Command, and elements of Command (Authority, Responsibility, Decision Making, Leadership) and Control (Direction, Feedback, Information, Communication) at echelon in order to achieve or exceed the Commander’s Intent. As a former Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commander (DS FA BN CDR) / ABCT FSCOORD, and NTC Senior Fire Support Trainer (Wolf 07), I have experienced and observed the Fires Community’s challenges of leaders at echelons ability to understanding how to appropriately communicate capabilities, limitations, constraints, and achievable options with their formations within their respective areas of operation and collective BCT operational environments. 

References:

• FM 3-09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations 30 April 2020
• ADP 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces 31 July 2019
• ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession 31 July 2019

FSCOORD Reflections

Reflection upon my time as a DS FA BN CDR and ABCT FSCOORD brings to mind my unique relationship with my Maneuver Brigade Commander. I distinctly remember his guidance during my initial counseling just “one” week after my assumption of battalion command and approximately “ten” days prior to us deploying to our Decisive Action NTC Rotation. He completely understood that I was only a weeks in command and that I did not have the context of my organization from their home station training in order to transition to our NTC rotation.  With a basic mutual understanding of my reality and the mission at hand he simply ended my counseling with following statement, “You are my FSCOORD and Fires is a hard and complicated endeavor that I do not completely understand, but I know it is your job to make it work and I trust you to do your job to meet my intent.” In retrospect that is all I needed to hear from my BCT Commander because him saying the word “trust” both charged and empowered me to control the BCT Joint Fires Enterprise narrative and employent with confidence. I was empowered to generate relevant dialogue with him and fellow commanders in the proper employment of fires at echelon (organic mortars to FA Cannon to Echelon Above Brigade rockets) to meet the Commander’s desired end state. 

During my time as the NTC Senior Fire Support Trainer, I have summarized this endeavor into the following problem statement that identifies effective fires as holistic brigade team problem.

“How do Brigade Combat Teams establish, maintain, and transition a “Permissive Joint Fires Environment” at echelon within a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) in support in order to shape the BCT Deep fight and mass effects in the Close Fights in support of tactical and operational objectives.”

The Science and Art of Fire Support

One of the first principals that a Fire Supporter is taught at the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma is the role of the Field Artillery on the battlefield. The fundamental principles of achieving our role is executed through the Science and Art of Fire Support. The delivery of indirect Fires via cannon, rocket, and missile fire in accordance with the Five Requirements for Accurate Predictive Fires (FRAPF) equates to the “Science.” Fire Support in the aspects of Fires planning, targeting process (Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess: D3A), Observer Post planning, and sensor integration/ employment at echelon is considered the “Art.”  I have a level of confidence after observing over 20 NTC active duty and National Guard that our ability to consistently accomplish the science of Fire Support is, for the most part, certain.  This assurance comes through the disciplined execution of crew drills and mandated regimen of section, platoon, battery, and battalion gunnery table certifications.  The art of Fire Support and discipline required to accomplish the science is paired with a leader’s ability to affectively lead and influence their organizations at echelon.

Observed Expectations of Fire Support By Those Within The BCT

Since the inception of modularization the Field Artillery Battalion has become a direct support asset to the BCT with the expectations of: 

• Responsive preplanned and dynamic Fire Support within the BCT Area of Operations with effects beyond the Coordinated Fire Line (CFL), specifically in support of the Calvary Squadron’s reconnaissance objectives and designated unit with Priority of Fires.
• Processing of Fire Missions Sensor to Shooter via digital Fires Network (Frequency Modulation and / or Upper Tactical Internet).
• Provide timely and accurate delivery of conventional killer munitions (High Explosive and Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) in accordance with the defined High Payoff Target List (HPTL).
• Provide responsive organic and EAB Counter Fires.
• Provide timely and accurate delivery special munition fires (Obscuration, Screening Smoke, Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM).
• Provide timely and accurate delivery of precision guided munitions. 
• Suppression of enemy Air Defense systems.
• Maintain the Five Requirements for Accurate Predictive Fire. 

The Challenge of the FSCOORD

The challenge I faced as the BCT’s defined “Chief of Fires” was, “How do I as an organizational leader accomplish the aforementioned Joint Fires problem statement via the science and art of Fire Support, achieve the above expectations for fires and convey that same trusting sentiment I received throughout the BCT Joint Fires Enterprise based on my defined span of control” 

Span of Control

I had to balance and maintain my two roles as the as the BCT Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commander and BCT Fire Support Coordinator.  These two roles found me with a defined and necessitated span of control of “~27 Leaders” that are networked and woven in the BCT, with some easily assessable and others not so assessable due extended lines of communications. *Note the number of leaders had the potential to increase based on points of friction and levels of competency. 

In my role as the BCT Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commander I defined my minimal span of control as the following 8 x Leaders:

1. Battalion Command Sergeants Major
2. Battalion Executive Officer
3. Battalion Operations Officer S-3
4. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery Commander
5. Alpha Battery Commander
6. Bravo Battery Commander
7. Charlie Batter Commander
8. Forward Support Company Commander 

In my role as the BCT Fire Support Coordinator I defined my minimal span of control as the following 12 x Leaders:

1. BCT Fire Support Officer
2. Brigade Aviation Officer “BAO”
3. Brigade Air Defense Officer “ADAM Cell”
4. Brigade Aviation Liaison Officer “ALO”
5. BCT Lethal Targeting Officer
6. BCT Non-Lethal Targeting Officer
7. Field Artillery Intelligence Officer
8. Cavalry Squadron Fire Support Officer
9. Maneuver Task Force#1 Fire Support Officer
10. Maneuver Task Force #2 Fire Support Officer
11. Maneuver Task Force #3 Fire Support Officer
12. Combat Aviation Battalion Fire Support Officer   

As the BCT Fire Support Coordinator I also beholden a responsibility to influence the BCT Staff fundamentally due to the required attendees to the BCT Targeting Working Group requisite of the following 7 x Leaders:

1. BCT Executive Officer “BCT Chief of Staff”
2. BCT Operations Officer S-3
3. BCT Intelligence Officer S-2
4. BCT Information Collection Manager
5. BCT Electronic Warfare Officer 
6. BCT Staff Judge Advocate “Lawyer” 
7. BCT Signal Officer S-6 “SIGO”

As it is doctrinal that a lower headquarters should know and understand the mission of the higher headquarters two levels up, I deemed it as important that we needed to consistently maintain access, dialogue, and shared understanding at least two levels down.

Organizational Leadership

 I also demanded that my subordinate commanders and leaders do the same with the intent of every Fire Support related soldier was properly informed to execute and react appropriately. I expected all of the aforementioned 27 Leaders along with their NCO counterparts, FA BN Staff to include special staff, Platoon Leaders, and Platoon Sergeants to fully understand my and the BCT Commander’s Intent. I authored my own Commander’s Intent for every mission and demanded that it be translated into a direct leadership scope with “task and purpose for every section chief and 10 level soldier. When out conducting battlefield circulation I would engage leaders and 10 level soldiers and gauge their understanding of my intent and the mission at hand. Any complete ignorance, lack of understanding, or situational awareness immediately triggered me to engage their supervisors. 

Direct Leadership 

If I had to offer one takeaway from this article it will be the “culture” of your organization matters and culture starts with those at the top.  Understanding this we needed to collectively create a culture in Field Artillery Battalion and BCT Joint Fires Enterprise that a relentless “GIVE A DAMN FACTOR” was going to gain us the success we desired as a team.  I strongly believe stakeholders in a mutual goal are gained through empowerment of how every member of the team fully understands how they play a part in the big picture of our success and failure.  The simple failure of a 10 Level task(s) not being performed or performed to standard can bring a BCT to a halt or commit it to undesired actions in response.  

My desire was that identification, accountability, critical thinking, problem solving, and achievable options be generated at the lowest level at the point(s) of friction.  I wanted every soldier to feel a sense of disappointment when they were not able to perform their defined task and purpose with quantifiable results and feedback in order to improve.   I also wanted leaders who took their example from myself, understanding that-

• You have to earn respect and confidence every day you wear the uniform and fulfill your assigned duties.
• The privilege to rest in any capacity is earned as well.
• Decisions are informed and not made based on your emotional state, convenience, or comfort. There is no fault given for making informed decisions within your scope. 
• Make the BCT’s problems your problems or the HHQ’s problems your problems.
• Don’t walk away from a problem or situation that you can offer “any” assistance or accountability to.
• Don’t be afraid to act, speak, and report honestly due to the threat of displeasing others.
• Soldiers at all levels will respect you in the end for pushing them to do better and fulfill their potential.
• EVERYBODY matters and does each teammate know that?

Getting After It

In the Fires Community (sensor to shooter) we are challenged in our abilities to operationalize the following requirements at echelon to maintain a stance that is factual or advisory, in order to be properly employed by the HHQs-

• The Targeting Process:  Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A)
• Trigger, Location, Observer, Delivery System, Attack Guidance, Communication (TTLODAC)
• Five Requirements for Accurate Predictive Fires:
  1. Target Location
  2. Firing Unit Location
  3. Ammunition Data
  4. Metrological Data
  5. Computational Procedures

I found myself challenged as a DS FA BN CDR and FSCOORD in my ability to provide real time options to the BCT CDR. Options that equate to decisions outside of the prescribed Decision Support Matrix that could capitalize on a permissive tempo that gives the enemy multiple dilemmas and exploit advantages. I approached this challenge from a “Science” stance with the belief that there are not many real time options that a FA Battalion can provide to a BCT Commander that are outside of an expected stance of being in the right place, at the right time, with the right ammunition, with the right optics, and being able to talk FM Voice and Digital. I wanted to ensure that we maintained the best deliberate stance upon LD and transition to another deliberate stance when triggers were met.

In pursuit of this stance my teammates and I had to answer the following questions about our organization’s cultural in order to influence the realms of executing the art of Fire Support and the discipline (organizational and direct leadership) required to accomplish the science. * The answers to these questioned constantly changed IAW METT-C at a minimum. 

1. Where and when does the FSCOORD best place them self on the battlefield to influence Fires?
2. Where and when do Task Force (TF), Company and Troop FSOs place themselves on the battlefield?
3. How are each respective Fires Support Element incorporated into the BCT and TF TOCs and TACs?
4. How are the Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) incorporated into the BCT and TF TOC and TACs?
5. Who facilitates the Fires/Intelligence Collection Rehearsal, Fires Technical Rehearsals, and Targeting Working Groups?
6. Who attends the Fires/Intelligence Collection Rehearsal, why, and are they invested in the process and see it as a compliment to MDMP and Six TOC Functions?
7. Does our organization set conditions to ensure that every rehearsal and working group is one of “Quality?”
8. How does our organization define “Quality” and who ensures it?
9. Who has release authority for precision strikes and re-tasking of EAB assets?
10. How germane is the traffic on the Fires Voice Network; how do we gauge the quality of collaboration; how often do the TF FSOs have dialogue with the FSCOORD?
11. Do TF, Company and Troop FSOs have a good rapport with their Maneuver CDR’s and Field Grades? Do they feel empowered to communicate any issues to the FSCOORD that deal with unachievable expectations or opportunities?
12. How do Fire Direction Officers, Platoon Leaders, Battery and Company Commanders make decisions and do they provide options to the higher echelon leaders?
13. Has our organization defined pacing items at echelon with the Joint Fires Enterprise beyond Howitzers and BFIST, i.e. radios, AFATDS, TACLINKs, antennas, optics, data cables?
14. Does our team fundamental understanding reporting expectations of designated or unidentified Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), specifically Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR)? That when not properly processed through the Six TOC Functions cannot be effectively incorporated into deliberate or situational decision making IAW Command and Control of Warfighting Functions. This FFIR should be expanded to our ability to maintain the aforementioned “Observed Expectations of Fire Support by those within the BCT” specifically a seamless Fires network P.A.C.E Plan digital and voice and the Five Requirements for Accurate Predictive Fire. 

Things Only the DS FA BN CDR/BCT FSCOORD Can/Must Do

1. Advise the BCT Commander on their intent for Fires. The BCT Commander’s intent for Fires sets the tone, sets expectations, and enables the entire BCT Joint Fires Enterprise.
2. Speak candidly and advise the BCT Commander and fellow TF Commanders on the capabilities, limitations, and constraints of the BCT Joint Fires Enterprise to include the employment of TF level sensors and deliver systems (mortars). 
3. Write “your own” Commander’s Intent. Define what risk(s) you are willing to assume and not assume.
4. Adamantly define the decision that only you can and want to make.
5. Force your staff, Battery/Company Commanders, and TF FSO to provide you with options.
6. Ensure every rehearsal Fires/IC, Fires Technical, and FA Tactical are of “Quality.” Examples: All attendees are present prepared with the proper Fighting Products, the rehearsals begin and end on time, and provide relevant injects that identify and fill plan gaps.
7. Empower the BCT FSO in order to be credible and respected by the BCT Staff (CUOPS and FUOPS). Also to ensure the Fires Plan is fought to expectations IAW the High Payoff Target List, Target Selection Standards, and Attack Guidance Matrix. 
8. Instill confidence in the BCT Joint Fires Enterprise Community by owning and engaging every Fires venue at least two levels down.
9. In person inspections of Fires ISO Defensive Operations Engagement Area (EA) Development. Visit each EA and have the respective TF FSO brief their Fire Support plan to you.
10. Define and enforce mandated rehearsals, PCCs and PCIs based on previous shortcomings, and defined risk to force and mission.  

Conclusion

The word “Enterprise” is defined as = A project or undertaking, typically one that is difficult

or requires effort. The BCT Joint Fires “Enterprise” is no exception to this definition and the level of shared understanding of how to accomplish a deliberate lethal stance must be properly communicated for appropriate application, constantly. Necessary tasks within the Joint Fires Enterprise do not solely happen because we have identified, planned, tasked and ordered accordingly. The BCT Joint Fires Enterprise must establish and maintain the confidence of the BCT. Confidence is easily lost if we cannot perform the expected functions of Fires and if we create a perception that every lack of capability is rooted in excuses, inability to properly manage expectations, and complement opportunities. A culture must be established and fostered throughout the enterprise at the top to lowest echelons.  The DS FA BN CDR / BCT FSCOORD sets the tone he or she is responsible for visualizing, describing, and directing the efforts required to achieve success in the difficult and meticulous pursuit of fires. They are the steward of the “GIVE A DAMN FACTOR!”  Perfection in any endeavor of warfighting is unachievable, instead the desire should be an organization that is uniformly self-aware and purposeful. 

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This is part of a series of posts focused on Leader Development in Contact. Click HERE for the rest of the series. Footnotes are annotated in the PDF version found on the Series homepage.

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