From Where Does the Task Force Aviation Commander Fight?

During the continuous operations an aviation task force will encounter at the National Training Center, many task force commanders struggle with where they will be most effective fighting their organization from.  The Eagle Team OC-Ts will see commanders at echelon ask themselves the same questions rotation after rotation. How well have I trained my subordinates to handle the pace of operations and multitude of tasks required of my unit?  And, where can I be the most effective commander right now and where will I fight from?  

U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Justin Ashaw.

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These two questions are only a fraction of what aviation commanders must think about as they prepare to execute operations in a decisive action training environment preparing their unit for large scale combat operations.  Like many complex questions; the answer(s) is/are often just as complex, or potentially, lead to additional questions.  Aviation Company/Troop and Task Force commanders need to identify the pros and cons of where he/she chooses to fight from.  Specifically, when the aviation task force commander is making that decision he/she has three options, (1) an aircraft, (2) the tactical command post (TAC), or (3) the main command post (CP).  All viable and all with separate variables to consider when making the decision of where to fight an aviation task force and execute command and control.

The aviation task force commander must clearly communicate how he/she envisions their formation executing an achievable and progressive training strategy at echelon.  Commander’s dialogue, in the planning process with senior leaders and company/troop commanders is paramount in the decision of where he/she will fight from.  The vision of the commander should take their formation from individual through collective training at the battalion/task force level.  Air Mission Commanders and pilots-in-command must be developed and trained.  Platoon leaders need the repetitions and sets to maneuver their platoons and company commanders need to maneuver companies under load and stress, culminating with the aviation task force commander maneuvering multiple companies.  All of these repetitions need to be supported with the appropriate maintenance and sustainment enablers.  Multi-echelon training repetitions at each leadership level from squad leader to company commander will allow the required staff training opportunities and repetitions to afford the task force level commander the opportunity to identify where he/she needs to fight from during the various missions they will encounter at the National Training Center.  

The aviation task force commander must continually assess his/her leaders throughout their training glide path.  Identify company commander strengths and weaknesses at maneuvering their formations and direct retraining when required.  The commander must also determine if the forward support company commander can execute multiple FARPs simultaneously.  If your home station training plan doesn’t include attachments, is your distribution platoon trained and prepared to establish multi-mission design series FARPs?  What training events afforded the operations officer the repetitions to identify the correct members of the staff to move forward in a TAC?   Has the staff executed command and control iterations from both the TAC and Main CP at pace?  Does the XO have the repetitions in the main CP when the S3 is absent at the TAC?

The trust built within the team during multiple training repetitions at home station and the team’s ability to gain shared understanding of the commander’s intent through multiple iterations will allow the commander to move about the battlefield, trusting his subordinates will act and make decisions in accordance with his guidance.   Clear commander’s intent/guidance and well thought out commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) that defines when/how to notify the command of pending decisions are critical to allow a commander the freedom of movement to attend the various briefs/mission rehearsals they will encounter or be required to attend.  If the CCIR or commander’s guidance is too verbose, unclear, or restrictive, the task force commander will spend just as much time directing the next action versus commanding the formation as a whole.  On the contrary, too much guidance or too many key tasks stymies initiative.  When subordinate commanders and leaders are trained and understand intent, their ability to lead their formations will allow the aviation task force commander options to lead his/her formation.

At the National Training Center, the Eagle Team has seen battalion task force commanders choose several different locations to fight from, each with their own list of advantages and disadvantages.  Oftentimes, commanders will send the S3 forward to fight from a TAC co-located with a jump-forward Arming and refueling point (J-FARP) while the commander flies and fights in support of the current operation.

Fighting from an aircraft allows the commander to rapidly gain situational awareness, communicate with higher and adjacent units, and be present on the battlefield, allowing him/her to make timely decisions.  During planning, the staff needs to ensure the pace of operations, terrain flight, and potentially long distances between the mission area and other command nodes does not limit the commanders ability to communicate.  Aircraft positioning is vital in determining if the commander will fight from the air.  Options include, but are not limited to:

  • Positioning the commander’s aircraft in a holding area where either line of sight, digital, or over-the-horizon commination is possible
  • In the vicinity of a higher or adjacent headquarters Main CP or TAC, to ease communications between organizations, or
  • In between company commanders forward in an air assault or attack by fire position with communication to the operations officer in the TAC – serving as the vital link between the intelligence triggers for aviation employment  

This scenario allows the commander to more clearly understand what tactical decisions are being made forward, still communicate with the vital staff WfFs in the TAC, and make informed decisions with respect to fires, intelligence etc.  Fighting from an aircraft may be the most advantageous allocation of battalion task force leadership for larger company (+) or battalion level missions.  However, having the commander fight from an aircraft, the operations officer dislocated from the main CP, and the executive officer running the main CP stretches an organization thin and could be considered the ‘sprint’ of command and control.  At some point, the unit will have to consolidate and continue to plan for future operations.

When the task force commander chooses to fight from the main CP, he/she needs to identify what types of missions require immediate decisions.   The commander most likely doesn’t need to be on established resupply missions or platoon level attack or reconnaissance missions.  The commander’s time may be better spent providing planning guidance and intent for larger company (+) or battalion missions in the next 24-72 hours.  By allowing trusted company commanders, the operations officer, or senior battle captain to exercise command and control over ongoing operations, the battalion senior leaders can properly focus the future operations.  If it is determined that fighting from the main CP is feasible, advantages often include the availability of redundant communications and the ability for the commander to surround him/herself with the subject matter experts.  Clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the command and control nodes will also allow the commander to have access to immediate intelligence updates, sustainment operations etc.  

A less exercised course of action is for the task force commander to fight from the aviation TAC.  Separate from spending time co-located with the TAC in an aircraft waiting for refuel, the commander’s time can be better spent in the main CP or forward in an aircraft.  This is not to say there is not a time when the commander may have to be at the TAC.  Perhaps the TAC is serving as a control node for a holding area and the commander can use the resources available in the TAC to monitor a battle and time the launch for an air assault or deliberate attack without exposing aircraft to the enemy by managing aircraft REDCON status.  

The ability for aviation commanders to move about the battlefield means there may be specific locations for specific phases of the operation for the commander and not a ‘one-size-fits-all’.  There is no single or simple answer to where the commander should fight from.  An organization’s repetitions and sets gained during home station training allow for shared understanding at echelon of commander’s intent, allowing leaders to decide where to fight from.  A commander in the correct location, with the appropriate PACE plan, enables communication and decision making throughout the formation and decreases risk to both force and mission.

This is part of a series of posts focused on Leader Development in Contact. Click HERE for the rest of the series. Footnotes are annotated in the PDF version found on the Series homepage.

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