Come in Fighting (ABN PLT Attack)

The Company Leader TDG 20-04

Looking around your C-17 and the paratroopers heavy laden with gear and a parachute, you would never known they all had just been laying in their own beds  only a week ago. When the missiles fell and our airbases in Atropia were overrun, they mobilized the 82nd Airborne Division to seize key airfields. That much you knew was possible when volunteering for an airborne assignment; the 80lbs ruck and Carl Gustav gunner to your right crushing you was not as well advertised. As the aircraft pitches into its evasive maneuvers you know you must be getting close to the drop zone. Heart pounding, they give the jump commands and you give yourself to the darkness with a vigorous up 6 and out 36.

U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, participate in an airborne operation in northeastern Italy, Aug. 8, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Henry Villarama)

A Certified Staff is a Powerful Weapon

Time to Design a Deliberate Staff Certification Process

Staff products feed, drive, run, and track battlefield operations. Those products have a direct impact on soldiers (see figure 1). Effective staff products correlate with conducting command and control, which in-turn produces better situational awareness at echelon. If the outputs of the staff processes hold that much impact, who certifies staffs to ensure they are ready to perform? Units need an outlined process for staff certification. Staff certification increases staff confidence, enables better staff synchronization, expedites the operations process, reduces friction, and provides a venue to solidify processes and procedures unique for staff atmospherics.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1-2 SBCT, 7th ID, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wa., tactically maneuver during Decisive Action Rotation 20-05 at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., Mar. 10, 2020. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Rosio Najera, Operations Group, National Training Center)

Defending the Air Base

In the middle of the night, on September 14th, 2012, a team of Taliban fighters broke through the perimeter of Camp Bastion and began attacking the base. Bastion, later called Camp Shorabak, was located northwest of Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and housed Marine Corps Harrier Jump Jets. Marines and Royal Air Force personnel bravely defended their base and killed the Taliban intruders after a six-hour firefight. Over a dozen friendly personnel died or sustained wounds, and the enemy destroyed or damaged eight aircraft. The attack severely degraded Bastion’s ability to project combat power and support friendly ground forces. The Taliban gambled, correctly, that the best way to strike back against coalition airpower advantage was to attack the aircrafts in their most vulnerable state; on the ground.

An airman maintains watch with his weapon as he wears his Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) suit on Jan. 16, 2013, during the Beverly Midnight exercise at Osan Air Base, South Korea.

Winning the Maintenance Fight at Pace

Operations Group, The National Training Center

When preparing for a major operation such as a deployment or a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, the volume of tasks that need to be accomplished to standard in a short amount of time can amaze the best commanders. Prior to, during and after deployment, many commanders find that maintenance consumes a disproportionately large amount of time. Even as the Commander of Operations Group, I often find myself more focused on maintenance and sustainment more than many other areas. Why? The answer is simple: An insufficient maintenance program can grind any brigade combat team (BCT) to a halt, even more so than an opposing force. You can’t fix it after first contact. Once you’re in the middle of a fight, it’s too late.

2-16 Armor Basic Officer Leader Course conducts Platoon STX training at Good Hope Maneuver Training Area. Photo retrieved from 2-16 Armor Facebook Page.

A Peak Behind the Curtains

Leveraging Interagency at the JRTC for Successful Real-World Engagement

Secretary of State Michael Pompeo recently remarked on the interdependence of defense and diplomacy during an address at Texas A&M University noting that “Neither diplomacy nor the military can succeed at delivering for presidents and for our country without the other.” A key element of “delivering for our presidents and for our country” is projecting influence overseas in accordance with United States foreign policy priorities. There are two principal means for doing so: through diplomatic suasion and military force. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and other agencies of the U.S. government (USG), such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the intelligence community, comprise some of the most important members of the complex bureaucratic structure within which most U.S. foreign policy is formulated and decisions are made about policy implementation. This bureaucratic structure, the interagency (IA), is led by the President in Washington, D.C., and under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) abroad (usually the U.S. Ambassador) and through combatant commanders.

Capt. Christopher Young, a combat advisor team leader assigned to the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade speaks with simulated Afghan locals during rotation 18-03 at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Jan. 15, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Sierra A. Melendez, 50th Public Affairs Detachment, 3rd Infantry Division Public Affairs)

Defense of the Cajun Bayou

Choose Your Course of Action

Brigades that come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) will fight a brigade fight. Every unit, regardless of echelons or component, from the squad through the battalion, from infantry to military police to transportation to aviation, will leave better than they arrived after enduring the crucible training event here in Louisiana. However, small unit training can occur anywhere. The swamps and humid head of Fort Polk offer a unique opportunity. Through rational design and Observer Coach Trainer coaching, brigades can focus on their role in shaping deep, synchronizing maneuver, allocating resources, and setting conditions necessary for battalions to succeed in both the offense and defense. This book is an effort to reach units prior to their arrival in Louisiana by giving them realistic scenarios to think about while following the Cajun Brigade through the planning and execution of a defense.

Soldiers with 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, take movement guidance Nov. 12, 2017, during the brigade’s rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. (Photo by Joint Readiness Training Center Public Affairs Office)

Objective Rhino (IBCT PLT Attack)

The Company Leader TDG 20-03

You press your hands deeper into your pockets, hoping they find warmth. “What the hell did this place do to piss off God?” You want a pinch of Copenhagen, but it’s too damned cold to pull your hands out to get one. Your platoon has been in its patrol base for six hours, but you haven’t slept. In just fourty-five minutes you can rotate out to the D Company vehicle that is in a security position. They might not let you run the heat, but maybe you can find some relief from the wind. ”Hey, you awake?” your squad leader says as he shoves you. “Get your team up and moving, Red Warrior 6 just called into the CO. We got a mission. WARNORD brief in 5 minutes.”

Photo retreived from 1-12 IN from their 2019 PLT LFX. Image by Capt. Chelsea Hall.

Improving Company Performance in Offensive Operations

The U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) form the core of the Armored Brigade Combat Team’s (ABCT) striking power. They include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 120mm mortars, and infantry squads. This impressive grouping of combat platforms and soldiers requires the company commander to skillfully employ and integrate platoons. Company commanders enable the CAB commander to rapidly combine arms. Based on observations of CABs executing offensive operations at the National Training Center (NTC), numerous shortfalls exist at the company level that impact the CAB’s ability to maintain momentum and extend operational reach. Units that can’t perform fundamental company and platoon-level tasks during the plan, prepare and execute phases of an operation will stall the CAB commander’s efforts to synchronize actions and achieve desired effects against enemy formations. To minimize this degradation in combat power, armor and mechanized infantry company commanders should consider the following best practices.

Assuming Risk to Save Lives

Placement of the Battalion Aid Station During LSCO

Long-gone are the days of wide area security operations from static, built-up locations. The changing nature of war will reward flexibility and an expeditionary mindset, and punish conformists. Commanders and units have become comfortable with medical plans that assume very little risk regarding placement of the Battalion Aid Station (BAS). With the Army’s renewed focus on large scale combat operations (LSCO), leaders must consider employing the BAS and medical platoon in ways that have largely went untrained and unpracticed. To save as many lives as possible, commanders and leaders must consider placement of the BAS as far forward as tactically feasible.

Set the Trap (IBCT PLT Ambush)

The Company Leader TDG 20-02

You have never been quite this tired, wet, and this cold in your entire life. You could have sworn that Atropia was primarily a desert. But no, your unit  – Task Force 1-28 Infantry – had to deploy to the other side of Atropia. No sweeping landscape and warm winters for you. And here you sit – a different day, a different puddle. You are in the middle of your platoon’s patrol base, next to your RTO,  while your squad leaders ensure security is set. “Ma’am – Crusher Main says there is intelligence that enemy forces are moving in our AO. They will be traveling to a resupply point along RTE ORION in the morning. CRUSHER 6 says we need to set an ambush.”

Image Retrieved from Task Force 1-28 Infantry, Black Lions Facebook Page.