A Certified Staff is a Powerful Weapon

Time to Design a Deliberate Staff Certification Process

Staff products feed, drive, run, and track battlefield operations. Those products have a direct impact on soldiers (see figure 1). Effective staff products correlate with conducting command and control, which in-turn produces better situational awareness at echelon. If the outputs of the staff processes hold that much impact, who certifies staffs to ensure they are ready to perform? Units need an outlined process for staff certification. Staff certification increases staff confidence, enables better staff synchronization, expedites the operations process, reduces friction, and provides a venue to solidify processes and procedures unique for staff atmospherics.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1-2 SBCT, 7th ID, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wa., tactically maneuver during Decisive Action Rotation 20-05 at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., Mar. 10, 2020. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Rosio Najera, Operations Group, National Training Center)

Defending the Air Base

In the middle of the night, on September 14th, 2012, a team of Taliban fighters broke through the perimeter of Camp Bastion and began attacking the base. Bastion, later called Camp Shorabak, was located northwest of Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and housed Marine Corps Harrier Jump Jets. Marines and Royal Air Force personnel bravely defended their base and killed the Taliban intruders after a six-hour firefight. Over a dozen friendly personnel died or sustained wounds, and the enemy destroyed or damaged eight aircraft. The attack severely degraded Bastion’s ability to project combat power and support friendly ground forces. The Taliban gambled, correctly, that the best way to strike back against coalition airpower advantage was to attack the aircrafts in their most vulnerable state; on the ground.

An airman maintains watch with his weapon as he wears his Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) suit on Jan. 16, 2013, during the Beverly Midnight exercise at Osan Air Base, South Korea.

Winning the Maintenance Fight at Pace

Operations Group, The National Training Center

When preparing for a major operation such as a deployment or a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, the volume of tasks that need to be accomplished to standard in a short amount of time can amaze the best commanders. Prior to, during and after deployment, many commanders find that maintenance consumes a disproportionately large amount of time. Even as the Commander of Operations Group, I often find myself more focused on maintenance and sustainment more than many other areas. Why? The answer is simple: An insufficient maintenance program can grind any brigade combat team (BCT) to a halt, even more so than an opposing force. You can’t fix it after first contact. Once you’re in the middle of a fight, it’s too late.

2-16 Armor Basic Officer Leader Course conducts Platoon STX training at Good Hope Maneuver Training Area. Photo retrieved from 2-16 Armor Facebook Page.

A Peak Behind the Curtains

Leveraging Interagency at the JRTC for Successful Real-World Engagement

Secretary of State Michael Pompeo recently remarked on the interdependence of defense and diplomacy during an address at Texas A&M University noting that “Neither diplomacy nor the military can succeed at delivering for presidents and for our country without the other.” A key element of “delivering for our presidents and for our country” is projecting influence overseas in accordance with United States foreign policy priorities. There are two principal means for doing so: through diplomatic suasion and military force. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and other agencies of the U.S. government (USG), such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the intelligence community, comprise some of the most important members of the complex bureaucratic structure within which most U.S. foreign policy is formulated and decisions are made about policy implementation. This bureaucratic structure, the interagency (IA), is led by the President in Washington, D.C., and under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) abroad (usually the U.S. Ambassador) and through combatant commanders.

Capt. Christopher Young, a combat advisor team leader assigned to the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade speaks with simulated Afghan locals during rotation 18-03 at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Jan. 15, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Sierra A. Melendez, 50th Public Affairs Detachment, 3rd Infantry Division Public Affairs)

Offensive Operations for the Field Artillery Battalion and Below

The purpose of this paper is to provide a context for Field Artillery (FA) units executing offensive operations in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). The specific unit of focus for this paper is the Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT), Direct Support (DS) Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. The primary audiences for this paper are Fires Battalion Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, Battery and Forward Support Company Commanders, and First Sergeants. This paper is a collaboration of Key Developmental billet complete Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts) with an aggregate of ~100 rotations of experience at the National Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, CA. 

1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division fires an artillery round from an M777 Howitzer while conducting calibration during Decisive Action Rotation 20-05 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif, Mar. 05, 2020. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Kamryn Guthrie, Operations Group, National Training Center.)

Defense of the Cajun Bayou

Choose Your Course of Action

Brigades that come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) will fight a brigade fight. Every unit, regardless of echelons or component, from the squad through the battalion, from infantry to military police to transportation to aviation, will leave better than they arrived after enduring the crucible training event here in Louisiana. However, small unit training can occur anywhere. The swamps and humid head of Fort Polk offer a unique opportunity. Through rational design and Observer Coach Trainer coaching, brigades can focus on their role in shaping deep, synchronizing maneuver, allocating resources, and setting conditions necessary for battalions to succeed in both the offense and defense. This book is an effort to reach units prior to their arrival in Louisiana by giving them realistic scenarios to think about while following the Cajun Brigade through the planning and execution of a defense.

Soldiers with 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, take movement guidance Nov. 12, 2017, during the brigade’s rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. (Photo by Joint Readiness Training Center Public Affairs Office)

Objective Rhino (IBCT PLT Attack)

The Company Leader TDG 20-03

You press your hands deeper into your pockets, hoping they find warmth. “What the hell did this place do to piss off God?” You want a pinch of Copenhagen, but it’s too damned cold to pull your hands out to get one. Your platoon has been in its patrol base for six hours, but you haven’t slept. In just fourty-five minutes you can rotate out to the D Company vehicle that is in a security position. They might not let you run the heat, but maybe you can find some relief from the wind. ”Hey, you awake?” your squad leader says as he shoves you. “Get your team up and moving, Red Warrior 6 just called into the CO. We got a mission. WARNORD brief in 5 minutes.”

Photo retreived from 1-12 IN from their 2019 PLT LFX. Image by Capt. Chelsea Hall.

It’s Not Me; It’s You

How to Speak Commander

It’s the middle of the training meeting. Two company commanders need the same range to qualify their companies. Unfortunately, there was a mix-up, and there’s only enough ammunition and range time for one company. Capt. Smith launches into an impassioned argument, explaining to Lt. Col. Jones why his company should get the range, how hard they’ve worked to plan it, and how it will just wreck his training progression if he has to shoot a month from now.  He sits down confident he made his case… only to see the range go to Capt. Thomas’s company instead.

Improving Company Performance in Offensive Operations

The U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) form the core of the Armored Brigade Combat Team’s (ABCT) striking power. They include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 120mm mortars, and infantry squads. This impressive grouping of combat platforms and soldiers requires the company commander to skillfully employ and integrate platoons. Company commanders enable the CAB commander to rapidly combine arms. Based on observations of CABs executing offensive operations at the National Training Center (NTC), numerous shortfalls exist at the company level that impact the CAB’s ability to maintain momentum and extend operational reach. Units that can’t perform fundamental company and platoon-level tasks during the plan, prepare and execute phases of an operation will stall the CAB commander’s efforts to synchronize actions and achieve desired effects against enemy formations. To minimize this degradation in combat power, armor and mechanized infantry company commanders should consider the following best practices.

The Science of Control

Synchronizing Current Operations

The current operations (CUOPS) cell is essential to translating plans to orders and eventually the execution of combat operations. The CUOPS integrating cell “is the focal point for controlling the execution of operations. It “involves assessing the current situation while regulating forces and warfighting functions in accordance with the mission, commanders intent, and operations.” (ATP 6-0.5) CUOPS synchronizes operations, sustains the common operational picture (COP) and mitigates risk to the mission. In the operations process, the CUOPS cell is the commander’s most prominent tool to understand, describe, visualize, and direct operations. Because of the cell’s importance, the CUOPS teams must organize and train personnel, information systems, and processes to enable the commander to make a decision base on understanding rather than data points.

Currently, main command posts, commonly known as TOCs, still must be housed in tents until the U.S. Army can make the mission command systems smaller and mobile. Photographer SGM Thomas Murphy