In today’s operating environment, we are challenging leaders with more complex scenarios that exercise the implementation of additional enablers across all warfighting functions. Bringing these enablers and internal assets to bear at a decisive point on the battlefield is the training objective, and failure is not an option. In most cases, this the first time these challenges are presented and expectations are high. Great units and leaders achieve success, and that is expected. Success breeds success, but what if, just what if, we changed our thought process and implementation of lessons learned throughout our careers? What if in fact failure breeds success and this thought process changes our perception of what makes a great unit or great leader. What if failure IS an option?
Commander’s Decisions
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One of the eight elements of combat power, leadership, can turn the tide of the complex battles in simulated combat operations at the National Training Center (NTC). Commanders have been groomed their entire careers with the leadership attributes and competencies to enhance their unit combat effectiveness in this crucible training environment. One important facet of a commander’s leadership are the decisions that he or she makes to best posture the formation. Below are three recommendations that commanders can include in their personal practices observed at NTC to help enable success.
Indirect Influence
Considerations for Organizational Leadership
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Commanders at all echelons must be experts at providing Indirect Leadership across their formations. They must visualize how they want to fight and instill their intent directly into their subordinate commanders and indirectly into their entire formation. ADP 6-22 states that indirect leadership and methods are essential for organizational leaders although it does not explicitly define the term Indirect Leadership. I propose that many leaders are unprepared for this reality despite untold resources spent on Professional Military Education (PME), Combat Training Centers (CTCs), Operational Deployments and self-development. We fail when we overestimate our personal ability to control our unit and inadvertently disempower our subordinate leaders.
Leadership of the Brigade Combat Team Joint Fires Enterprise
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One can confidently assume that all organizational leaders at as some point, especially during a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, have experienced and observed the frustrations of deliberate or undeliberate selective compliance on noncompliance of actions and orders by individuals or groups. Numerous times at National Training Center (NTC), I have witnessed organizational leaders, specifically the BCT Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) in frustration state, “I told them to do that; we discussed or talked about that; I don’t understand why it didn’t happen; why didn’t they report that; I don’t understand why that happened, AGAIN!”
From Where Does the Task Force Aviation Commander Fight?
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During the continuous operations an aviation task force will encounter at the National Training Center, many task force commanders struggle with where they will be most effective fighting their organization from. The Eagle Team OC-Ts will see commanders at echelon ask themselves the same questions rotation after rotation. How well have I trained my subordinates to handle the pace of operations and multitude of tasks required of my unit? And, where can I be the most effective commander right now and where will I fight from?
The TACP
A Lesson in Incorporating Enablers
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The Joint Fires Enterprise, and honestly, the Joint environment as a whole, recognizes the skillsets that the TACP brings. The rank structure (rightfully instituted) can be a limiting factor, especially for the SMEs. Oftentimes, the E-4/E-5 TACP has a deep seated mentality that thinks outside the box to combat typical maneuver warfare and how best to pummel the enemy. In my years of experience and 9 deployments, I have witnessed a general dismissal of an enlisted member that is a subject matter expert due in large part to a cultural mindset that differs in each Service. As an Enabler, the TACP has a wide-ranging capability that suits not just conventional but Special Operations as well. Quite a few senior enlisted have spent time on both sides and have a very unique view on the wars that we have been a part of for over 20 years and have garnered valuable lessons learned that have been glossed over by our Army brethren.
Make your C2 Enterprise Facilitate your Leadership
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What should Commanders focus on with regards to Command and Control systems that the S6 should be closely supervising and managing for the commander? Often times we see commanders ignore C2 systems and then arrive at the National Training Center without ever directly understanding his or her full communication capabilities. Once the team is on the ground at NTC it is too late for commanders to pay attention to what the S6 has or has not been doing in garrison and unfortunately, many units go into the box handicapped from a C2 perspective.
The Intelligence Warfighting Function
Battlefield Leadership of a Team of Teams
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Almost every Intelligence Warfighting Function leader at some point has asked some version of the following question: “What are the keys to success for an S2 (or other IWfF leader) during a Combat Training Center rotation?” Collectively as an Army, we have the experience of hundreds of rotations over the 40-year history of the National Training Center (and the other CTCs), countless lessons shared from experienced leaders through LPDs, articles, and even social media engagements. The question generates many responses: a well-established Intel architecture, thoroughly rehearsed processes and SOPs, integrated teams, effective transitions, etc. These topics are among many that any Intel leader desiring to be successful should give due diligence. But this particular paper won’t delve into staff processes, effective architecture, or SOPs. Its purpose is to tackle a topic that is on its surface much simpler, but in practice requires a much greater up-front investment than any of those to get right– effective battlefield leadership.
A Training Relationship
How Sustainment Leaders and Units are Developed
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While combat arms battalion commanders and company commanders maneuver their units to accomplish battalion level objectives, the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Commander and his or her company commanders must maneuver their units to enable the breadth and depth of the entire Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) operation. The BCT’s maneuver battalions fight to achieve BCT tactical objectives, and the Fires Battalion and Engineer Battalion shape for the maneuver battalions. Only the BSB, however, continually supports all seven organic battalions within a BCT.
Company Command Climate
Continuing the Mission After Civil Disturbance Response
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In response to uprisings following the murder of George Floyd, the Minnesota governor activated thousands of Soldiers across the state. My company spent seven days on state active duty supporting civil authorities in Minneapolis. Much of our time was spent escorting police, fire, and EMS teams, but I am most proud of the small positive impact we were able to make in the community. My soldiers donated their own supplies to pop-up food banks, walked the streets handing out food and water, and connected with community leaders who requested us to patrol certain neighborhoods at night where a trusted security presence was badly needed.