General James Mattis USMC once said, “The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears.” If you have people under your charge, then you are duty-bound to think—to make well-considered decisions based on a studied knowledge base. Military leadership is unique because ill-considered decisions send soldiers to their deaths. Leaders cannot blindly follow instructions or even orders.
If ordered to advance, a leader must meticulously plan, consider the terrain, and issue maneuver orders that are easy to understand, simple to execute, and account for the unknowns. If ordered to withdraw, a leader must still plan meticulously, and issue orders with both precision and urgency so that the withdrawal does not turn into a rout.
Stemming from this first and most fundamental duty is a requirement of competency. You have to know your role or job or function. If you are leading a rifle platoon, then you have to know how to shoot, maneuver, and communicate—fair enough—but who wants to serve under a Lieutenant who cannot run a compass? Or does not know how to call for close air support? Or gets his artillery coordinates mixed up from time to time?
Can you perform all of your duties in a blizzard in near-whiteout conditions? What if your radioman dies? Do you know how to maintain comms with higher echelons of support?
The Korean War’s Battle of Chosin Reservoir brings these basic qualities of leadership into focus.
Following an amphibious landing at Inchon masterminded by General Douglas MacArthur, the First Marine Division under MajGen O.P. Smith was ordered to rapidly advance. General MacArthur ordered US, Korean, and UN Allied Forces to chase the retreating North Korean Communists all the way to the Yalu River (the Chinese border). US 8th Army was to advance northward on the western side of the impassible Taebaek Mountain Range, which runs north to south along the spine of Korea. X Corps and the Korean I Corps were to advance on the other side of the mountain range along the eastern coast.
MajGen Smith set the standard for division command during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. He was suspicious of the activity and atmospherics that his Marines were reporting from the front lines. The locals seemed to think that there was a battle coming, and there were isolated reports of Chinese activity in the area.
General MacArthur’s intelligence chiefs were adamant that China had not and would not enter the war, but MajGen Smith took stock of his own Forces’ disposition. First Marine Division was alone, far removed from the 8th Army in the West, and way out in front of the X Corps advance. Their only company was the Army’s 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT), protecting their right flank.
Smith’s immediate superior, LTG Almond of X Corps, was so insistent on a rapid advance that MajGen Smith thought he’d be relieved, but bordering on insubordination, Smith decided first to establish a secure line of withdrawal. All along the road, First Marine Division set up strong-points with fuel and ammunition and even built an airstrip at one of these strongpoints so that casualties could be rapidly evacuated.
Unknown to MacArthur’s intelligence chiefs or Corps commanders, communist leader Mao Zedong had ordered a massive invasion of Korea. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 58th, 59th, 60th, 79th, and 89th Divisions had all been given explicit orders to send a message to the United States by utterly destroying First Marine Division. The 76th, 77th, and 80th Divisions were given orders to cut off and destroy the Army 31st RCT.
On 27 November 1950, the PLA 79th and 89th Divisions initiated an assault on the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments of First Marine Division at Yudam-ni. The PLA 58th, 59th, and 60th Division simultaneously assaulted strong points along the line of withdrawal back to the First Marine Division HQ and staging area at Hagaru-ri. Meanwhile, PLA 80th Division besieged the Army 31st RCT and the 76th and 77th Division cut off their line of retreat to join the Marines.
Over the next 17 days, a bloody battle was waged in sub-freezing temperatures. The Army 31st RCT was wiped out – the first full regiment to be destroyed in combat since Colonel Custer at the Little Big Horn.
Faithfully executing his first duty, MajGen Smith had successfully prepared his Marines for contact with a numerically superior force. The Marines first used small patrols to feel out enemy positions and disposition. Then Smith ordered the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments to execute a meticulously planned tactical withdrawal, using a flanking battalion to protect the vehicle convoy, as well as aerial reconnaissance to identify roadblocks and ambushes. The Marines further screened their movement with registered artillery and stacked close air support.
Smith’s subordinate officers at the regimental, battalion, company, and platoon levels demonstrated excellence in the basics – command and control, reconnaissance, fire support, communications, and logistics. Each man knew his job inside and out, and as casualties continued to mount (US Forces suffered a total of 1,029 killed; 4,582 wounded; 4,894 missing), Marine officers and NCOs revealed that they had been trained to cover down on vacancies left by the dead. No unit of the First Marine Division relied on a singular individual to perform a vital task.
This is what is expected of a leader. He must have the moral courage to think independently; the wherewithal to plan for the unknown; the intelligence to build a knowledge base regarding the mission and operational environment; the discipline to master all of the skills, tasks, and trades adjacent to his function.
As the withdrawing 5th and 7th Marine Regiments arrived at MajGen Smith’s Division HQ (collocated with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment at Hagaru-ri), they marched into the fortifications singing the Marine Hymn. Even in the presence of over 1,000 honored dead, the leadership so aptly demonstrated by so many filled these Marines with pride—and even joy—knowing that by skill, determination, and discipline they had cheated death.
On the other hand, it was estimated that the PLA 9th Army had suffered catastrophic 21,000+ combat casualties, including over 7,300 killed. The 9th Army also suffered another 30,700 cold-weather casualties. Marines returned home with stories of discovering Chinese soldiers frozen to death in their foxholes from malnutrition and poor clothing. By 31 December 1950, the 9th Army had reduced its order of battle from 30 full divisions to just 18. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir had cost the 9th Army more than a third of its combat strength.
Both the First Marine Division and the 31st RCT put up one hell of a fight.
If you found this as fascinating of a study and exercise as I did, then you would likely enjoy reading my in-depth analysis of several Russian incursions and acts of war in my recently published book, Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict.
In it, I cover the history of the Russian way of war from the Napoleonic era to the current conflict in Ukraine, and how Russia’s methods evolved over the decades and centuries. If you observed valuable lessons of leadership in the above, then you’ll gain invaluable insights from the Russian approach to conflict and leadership.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Curtis L. Fox is the author of the recently published book Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict. Despite being accepted to the graduate engineering program at Virginia Tech, Curtis chose to enlist in the Army, where he learned to speak Russian and earned his Green Beret. After completing his in service, Curtis studied at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, earning a Master’s of Business Administration.
Check out Curtis Fox’s Author Page HERE. and check out his newest book HERE.
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