No one warned us that Russia would invade Ukraine in February 2022. As a response to the ongoing effort to defend Europe against Russian aggression, Operation Assure, Deter, and Reinforce was introduced to bring to the EUCOM Theater 2 Armored Brigade Combat Teams, 1 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and 1st Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) Force Package comprised of twenty teams. The operational and support framework of an SFAB maneuver advisor team in a theater can serve as a strategic combat multiplier in the region.
Each SFAB is aligned to a specific combatant command (COCOM). For example, our team, Team 3331, was aligned to CENTCOM and scheduled to deploy with TF Xyston out of Fort Hood, Texas, at the beginning of Spring 2022. Our team and two other maneuver advisor teams (MAT) from the 3rd SFAB realigned to the 4th SFAB as part of the request for forces (RFF). In addition, Security Forces Assistance Command (SFAC) was the proponent of this RFF to meet the expedited timeline of having 4th SFAB teams deploy earlier than expected to counter the Russian threat within the conflict stage in the EUCOM theater. These are some of the specific challenges, opportunities, and recommended courses of action for future teams or those interested in implementing change.
Prepare to Deploy – Take Aways from NTC
We received word during our National Training Center (NTC) rotation 22-04 with 2 Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) 1st Infantry Division (ID) that some of the teams would go to support an RFF in EUCOM. Our team was partnered with Tomahawk Troop (Tanks) 5th Squadron 4th Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Riley, Kansas. Our mission at NTC was tailored towards advising in the conflict phase of warfare. Fortunately, our time there allowed us to test all our integrated telecommunication networks (ITN) in different terrain and weather.
The rotation also prepared us to be highly expeditionary and depend on no one for support. Overall, we had a positive relationship and an exceptional outcome from our partner force. CPT Horace Peek, the former T TRP 5-4 CAV commander, commanded his troop with distinction and took guidance from our team when applicable. In summary, there were three main takeaways we gathered from our NTC rotation with our 5-4 CAV counterparts.
Advisory Burn-out
First, you can get tired of being overly advised in a persistent advisory capacity. We overcame this by setting up touch-points daily to ensure we were all on the same page. These engagements had time limits and did not extend past a prescribed time that our team had established based on the threat and the need to be mobile. The commander allowed our team to be integrated into their plan. In addition, we were to help him and his troop to identify friction points within each phase of the operation by war-fighting functions.
You’re Still a Soldier
Second, you cannot advise if you do not survive. The Troop Commander and our team clearly understood our disengagement criteria and a retrograde position. 5-4 CAV, as the host nation force, provided security and sustainment for our team. If they did not meet those two criteria, our team would fall back to episodic or over-the-horizon advising.
Disciplined Initiative – A Side Dish, not the Main Course
Our final take-away from T TRP, 5-4 CAV mirrored many of our counterparts in Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We learned that not all subordinate leaders can act on their discipline initiative. This can come from a myriad of reasons. First, it may come down to higher echelon commanders lacking trust in subordinate commanders due to experience. Second, a general observation is that some commanders or subordinates are not aligned with specific political parties or ethnic groups. We understand that this is not the case for 5-4 CAV. However, commanders at the higher echelon must view options from all sides before conducting any operation. The high levels of inaction during this rotation frustrated the Troop Commander and our team.
Transitioning from CTC to Deployment
We were expected to deploy within two weeks after our orders arrived. Consequently, the team leader was still signing property to our home station mission command (HSMC) element in TX. Our unit movement officer was pushing the rest of the force package out to the CENTCOM theater. He was also preparing to push our team to the EUCOM theater. In addition, our team was responsible for shipping containers forward to both theaters of operations. This included sensitive items and hazmat material. We couldn’t have accomplished this without the 3rd and 4th SFAB staff and the forward support element in EUCOM.
Our MAT was aligned with the 282nd Armored Brigade 2nd Infantry Division in the Romanian Land Forces (RoLF). Our main objective for our mission was to continue to build a strategic partnership. We did this by fostering a persistent presence with the RoLF and to assess their interoperability with NATO allies. The term assessment to the RoLF seems a bit taboo. Also, it gives off a perception that we are better than you. We avoided this terminology and utilized observation notes and reporting criteria instead.
The Defense Attaché and the Office of Defense of Cooperation (ODC) became significant assets for our team. We were able to brief them on specific tasks we were working on and feasible objectives. These meshed with the Country Campaign Plan FY 23. The Romanian Land forces then allowed our team to begin gathering observations throughout the 282nd Armored Brigade. Our engagement began to spread throughout the southern portion of Romania, encompassing our aligned maneuver battalions within the brigade.
Lines of Effort
Based on the guidance from V Corp, we set conditions across four broad lines of effort (LOE). The focus was assure, deter, and reinforce.
LOE 1: Setting the Theater
Setting the theater means understanding how the sustainment piece works in theater. We had multiple advisors go to the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase. They established and networked with various agencies to develop a relationship and scheme for extending our operational reach in Romania. We also gained access to multiple installations. This allowed us to gather site survey assessments for the division LNO from the 101st Airborne Division.
LOE 2: Present Combat Capable Forces
We liased and partnered with 1-26 IN, 2nd IBCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 282nd Armored Brigade. We provided multinational training opportunities (Operation Zimbrul 22 Smardan Training Area and Justice Sword 22 Cincu Training Area). With this, came providing housing within the Brigade’s installation. Also, our team hosted a short-range training calendar sync and working group. We did this with the Smardan Training Area staff and all 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operations Officers. This was essential to facilitate training between US and Romanian Forces. It aligned the interoperability piece between two different countries within a short-allotted time and not an extensive training area.
LOE 3: Transform the Force
We had a chance to work with the FMS team in the ODC. As a former Armor Instructor, the ODC requested that we conduct a site survey. The survey included a DOTMLPF-P assessment of the 284th Armored Battalion within the 282nd Armored Brigade. The ODC wanted us to determine when the brigade and battalion will be ready to receive the new tanks. We were able to answer this question and accomplish this task within two weeks. This informed the discussion between US stakeholders and the Romanian parliament’s potential authorization of the M1Abrams version R fielding (2023-2026).
LOE 4: Increase Capability and Interoperability of Allies and Partners
We tailored this effort toward enhancing the Brigade’s medical platoon. Our medical advisor, SSG Frank McIntosh, was nothing short of incredible during our deployment. He supported and advised several tactical combat casualty care classes and assisted in creating a battalion’s standard operating procedures within the large-scale combat operations, not counterinsurgency focused. In addition, he could gather essential information that can potentially affect soldiers’ healthcare within the RoLF and liaise that information higher.
If We Can Talk – We Can Win
We also took time to understand the communications architecture within the unit and gather three different facts. Secondly, sharing digital reports and data, especially on a system with only “intranet” capabilities, is generally non-existent between conventional RoLF and US allies. Thirdly, our team’s tactical communications equipment work with the RoLF Harris Radios and other models when connected with a tactical voice bridge. Finally, many tactical routers and auxiliary equipment needing to send and receive digital reports are discontinued or do not have repair parts. The RoLF is looking to modernize its communication measures and ensure that all units at each echelon have the same type of radios to have interoperability in both the technical and procedural domains.
Problem Identification to Problem Solving
The challenge that comes with identifying friction points is getting to the truth. No allied force wants to admit they need help or struggle with certain warfighting functions. Our team was fortunate enough to gain trust from within the Brigade before acquiring all the information and coordinating instructions.
As we were preparing to redeploy, we had another deployment opportunity to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main task of our mission was to serve alongside the NATO monitoring and evaluation team as observers. As observers, we gathered information on how to conduct a NATO evaluation level 2 and share any captivating information and potential partnership opportunities for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Light Infantry Battlegroup (AFBiH LiBG).
Advisors as Force Multipliers
Working alongside the Office of Defense Cooperation and the Defense Attaché in BiH, we entered Bosnia and Herzegovina with six advisors. We left three to remain with the RoLF to facilitate a persistent presence with the 282nd Armored Brigade and 1-26th INF 2 BCT 101st ABN DIV. In addition, we embedded our team with the on-the-ground evaluators and the LiBG battalion staff from BiH.
We did this so we could plan to observe where the major incidences would occur based on the main events list/main incidents list (MEL/MIL). NATO and the AFBiH exercise design team agreed upon this list before the exercise.
Combined Arms Maneuver
We observed the integration of mechanized vehicles with a light infantry company, TOC operations, multiple actions on contact, a deliberate offense, and several COIN-centric tactics, techniques, and procedures. Our focus was observations on the lack of equipment and capabilities. What the AFBiH LiBG do not have in equipment, they make up for it by being present, eager, and committed to the cause.
Therefore, we assessed that our future partnership between AFBiH and the SFAB could blossom into a more persistent presence alongside the Maryland National Guard State Partnership Program.
Exercise Lessons Learned
At the culmination of the exercise, we discussed with the EUCOM security office as they tried to understand how to replicate another exercise like Operation Combined Endeavor (AFBiH NEL-2) and improve the execution of the field training. Also, we described three specific ways to improve a NATO combat readiness evaluation exercise.
Use of Simulation Equipment
The use of simulation equipment and training aids add to the realism of the training. For example, the lack of blank ammunition and the Multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) to elicit both auditory and visual cues will deny the Soldier’s ability to have a potential fight or flight response.
COIN to LSCO
Moving the scenario from counterinsurgency operations to large-scale combat operations is a must. As the LiBG becomes a NATO ally, it will need to augment a force more significant than its own. We want to observe how the AFBiH LiBG integrates with those they will work with.
O/Cs Make the Difference
We needed to have observers and controllers throughout the entirety of the operation. Our MAT was one of the only entities present throughout the NEL-2 field exercise portion. We were not intrusive but rather observant, positioning ourselves to find things that will affect the human domain regarding interoperability within the AFBiH. We sent the observation up to the ODC and Defense Attaché. It explained the degree of severity when it comes to multiple ethnic groups working within the same company and area of operations. This was a big priority intelligence requirement for us.
Unique opportunities did occur from this experience as well. For example, our team conducted a cultural exchange day with the NATO evaluation and monitoring team within the small town of Jajce. Jajce was a decisive terrain defensive position during the Bosnian War in 1992. The evaluation director in the NATO team was one of a few commanders that defended his battalion against the Army of Republika Srpska in October 1992.
Overall, the AFBiH seems eager to partner with the SFAB. We can tailor our expertise to specific units. The SFAB is flexible in travel arrangements. Our team had autonomy, and it ensured mission success by higher stating specific requests for information and critical points of contact within the region.
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Working with a specific country’s ODC and the Defense Attaché, we could focus on advising, supporting, liaising, and assessing operations. In a few short months, we can support new equipment fielding and training tailored into a partnered or allied nation’s training glidepath. Our signal advisors can assess the host nation force’s actual levels of interoperability with technical and procedure objectives. Lastly, our team leader and operations NCO can advise a battalion staff on integrating what they previously learned from COIN into Large Scale Combat Operations within the Multi Domain Battlefield. In summary, the SFAB team brings more to the table in a smaller package and can strategically impact a partner or ally nation’s armed forces. We are the tool to enhance combat readiness, improve interoperability, build sustainable processes, and increase lethality.
Capt. Nathan Sitterley is the adviser team leader for Team 3331 C Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade, Fort Hood, TX. He recently deployed with the 4th SFAB as part of the request for forces for Operation Assure, Deter, and Reinforce to posture against Russian aggression. Previous assignments include commander, HHC, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; commander, Troop A, 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st SBCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson; commander, Troop H, 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning, GA; instructor/writer for Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course (ABOLC), 2-16 Cavalry, 199th Infantry Brigade, MCoE, Fort Benning; and platoon leader/executive officer, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. CPT Sitterley’s military education includes Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Maneuver Leader’s Maintenance Course, Common Faculty Developmental Program Instructor Course, ABOLC, Airborne School and Pathfinder Course. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in marketing from Salisbury University. CPT Sitterley’s awards and honors include the Meritorious Service Medal and the Order of Saint George Bronze Medallion.
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