Drones have become more prevalent among small-unit tactics recently, specifically nano-unmanned aerial vehicles (NUAV) such as the FLIR Black Hornet. The Black Hornets, or Hornets, are intended to be a Soldier-borne sensor (SBS) for Infantry units that can be deployed faster than a Raven or Shadow and quieter than both UAVs. We used the Hornets with success during a defense training exercise and an offensive company-level live fire exercise (LFX). There are limitations, as with any piece of equipment, but the benefits out-weighed limitations in both cases.
Black Hornets in the Defense
The drones were excellent for providing constant surveillance around key terrain, obstacles, dead space, and or forward elements. Hornets take less time to prepare and launch than their much larger counterparts. The Hornets can also be attached to a soldier’s individual MOLLE gear.
The drones became an essential part of our company’s defense from start to finish. Their capabilities are applicable to every part of the sequence of the defense. They will continue to grow in relevance as units become more comfortable flying them. Their simplistic operation and quiet flight make soldiers more inclined to fly them than other small unit UAVs.
Light, Transportable, and Quiet
First, the drones are light, easily transportable, and quiet, making them ideal for battalion scouts conducting reconnaissance and surveillance before the main body moves into positions. They can assist scouts with checking suitability of templated hide sites and surveilling dead space within NAIs. The Hornets become even more useful once units occupy their battle positions.
During occupation and preparation, the Hornets provide a constant view of the battlefield. We used them in two ways during our preparations. The drones provided observation while platoons occupied battle positions so leaders could focus on emplacement and sectors of fire. The company is unable to push out patrols during initial occupation and loses the ability to provide early warning of enemy recon elements. Our Hornets filled that void by flying along avenues of approach identified during planning and checking dead space ahead of our positions.
Image retrieved from flir.com
However, there is always a need for the human eye to verify certain information. The Hornet’s light-weight design complimented dismounted reconnaissance. Our patrols carried the drones with them and pushed them out past their front-line trace to serve as additional security for the patrol.
Extending the Reach of an OP
Observation Post (OPs) were also able to extend their observation beyond their line of sight with the Hornets. Hornets launched from OPs allowed us to identify the OPFOR’s approach and thus initiate indirect fire missions in support of protective obstacles. Then, the drones continued providing observation for IDF and obstacles once the OP met its displacement criteria and withdrew from its position.
Additionally, the OP-launched drones provided early warning that triggered more Hornets to take flight. We issued Hornet kits to each platoon, so when we realized the OPFOR’s main attack was approaching, the rest of our platoons would launch a Hornet within their area to begin searching for dismounted OPFOR. Once the main attack arrived, the company command post (CP) took over observation while the platoons fought.
Added C2
Our company maintained an operator in the CP, which took on the primary responsibility of flying the drones during the main attack. This allowed the CP to maintain observation of the attack in real time and feed additional information to the commander throughout the fight. As units withdrew to subsequent battle positions, the CP could see the OPFOR’s progress, relay to the commander, and allow him to make decisions to maneuver friendly forces appropriately.
Black Hornets in the Offense
In the offense the Hornet’s utility depends on tempo. The faster a unit moves, the harder it can be to maintain control of the drones. The two methods to employ operators are either with a maneuver element or with a CP element in close enough vicinity of the objective. The feedback is quicker with an operator in the maneuver element, but that operator sacrifices combat power. A CP operator does not pull a Soldier out of the fight, but the CP must then relay all information to the respective maneuver element.
The Hornets were used primarily to confirm the planned breach site, scan for the enemy on the objective, and then identify targets during a counterattack.
Drawbacks
Like any piece of equipment, the Hornets have their drawbacks. These are the key issues we noticed.
Range
The Hornets reach approximately 1.5 – 1.8 kilometers from the controller. This made pushing the drones to each platoon crucial, as the platoons operating ahead of the company CP could reach out further. This was also just enough range for our dismounted patrols to check areas beyond their route.
Flight Time
Hornets can fly for about 25-30 minutes, including the warmup and recovery time. This requires several drones if units intend to maintain constant surveillance. There are two Hornets per kit, but you would have to use multiple kits to maintain observation. It also takes a few minutes to recover the drones. This requires extra consideration for use during time-sensitive operations.
Terrain and Weather
The Hornets cannot fly in winds over 15 knots. Significant cloud cover can block satellite signals and prevent drones from picking up a signal to provide their grid location. Additionally, while the drones are smaller and easier to maneuver in the woods, they are still vulnerable to even smaller branches. Flying the Hornets anywhere besides open fields or along roads requires skilled operators.
Recommended TTPs
Despite these drawbacks our company came up with several tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to maximize efficiency.
Identify Company NAIs
The Hornet’s short range and flight time prevented its use to recon battalion NAIs that were not in close vicinity or our company’s area of operation. We identified NAIs for the company to help prioritize how the Hornets were flown. NAIs were based on templated obstacle locations, suspected enemy avenues of approach, and dead space This allowed platoons to quickly push out a Hornet with minimal further guidance.
Platoon-level Operators
The Hornet’s short range limits its utility for a company-level operator alone working alongside the commander like the Raven. A company CP will be behind platoon battle positions during a defense, and Hornets pushed out at the platoon level extended the company’s reach. Platoons responsible for executing patrols or manning OPs can also use the Hornets to provide additional observation and early warning of enemy movement.
Maximize Operators
Companies must certify as many operators as possible. Raven operators require a week-long certification process with hands-on and written testing, and operators must maintain a record of flight hours with follow up flights to maintain certification. Hornet operators, on the other hand, require a single day of training to certify and do not require a flight log. This allows for numerous Soldiers to certify as operators, which helps with constant personnel turnover and casualties sustained during operations.
Track Hornet Flights at the Company CP
Decentralized Hornet flights across platoons were effective to maximize usage across more of the company’s AO. However, flights should still be coordinated and tracked at the company level to synchronize efforts. This ensures that flights are synchronized across platoons and there is not a mass of flights followed by a gap in observation. The company CP can also ensure flights over company-level NAIs in accordance with dismounted patrol routes or likely enemy movement times.
Company CP Control During the Fight
Once the enemy initiates the main assault, the company CP should retain control of Hornet flights. This control could look like a single operator within the company CP that will survey platoon battle positions during the enemy assault.
Conclusion
Our company was successful using NUAVs during offensive and defensive exercises, at least by our own metrics. Their specific use has yet to be codified by doctrine, so our self-made TTPs complimented other tactical tasks during each exercise. Decentralized operators with centralized intelligence collection at the company CP brought about the most success during the defense, while more centralized control during the offense enabled maneuver elements to focus on the fight without detracting from combat power. NUAV TTPs will continue to enable maneuver elements as successes and failures are shared to improve their overall utilization.
Capt. Andrew Bordelon is the Replacement Company Commander for the 101st ABN DIV (AASLT). As an Infantry officer, he has served as a platoon leader, executive officer, and Ranger Instructor. He previously served as an Infantry company commander in 3 BCT, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT).
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