The opening years of the Second Punic War were disastrous for Rome. Hannibal rampaged undeterred throughout Italy, capturing cities and laying waste to every army that challenged him. It came to the point that the Romans brought a massive force to bear. This army, despite outnumbering him nearly 2:1, was annihilated near the small town of Cannae. The war, started to ensure Carthaginian supremacy, seemed to be nearing its conclusion. Rather than admitting defeat, Rome fought on for years. They eventually defeated Carthage and became the undisputed rulers of the Mediterranean world. How were they able to win a war against such an unstoppable opponent? They were never able to stop Hannibal in Italy, so what hope did they have of winning the war?
This is the fourth in a series of essays devoted to examining ancient warfare and its relevance to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of today. You can find Parts I, II, and III HERE, HERE, and HERE – respectively. The historical events examined here are necessarily simplified in order to better serve the discussion and to make them more accessible. The historical background serves as context for the corresponding discussion at hand; it is not the focus of discussion. Readers should use the questions at the end for personal reflection or to fuel discussion within their own formations.
The Fabian Strategy
After their disastrous defeat at Cannae, the Roman dictator Quintus Fabius instituted the now famous Fabian Strategy. Recognizing Hannibal’s genius, Fabius ordered that no Roman force was to engage him directly. Instead, they were to practice a scorched earth policy–destroying the land that fed Hannibal’s army–while maintaining constant close engagement and harassing Hannibal’s army. The move prevented both armies from living off of the land, and forced them to rely on supply lines. This gave the Romans a clear advantage. Simultaneously, he sent out detachments of soldiers to attack Hannibal’s lieutenants in recently conquered cities and remove support he had gained from traitorous Roman allies.
What followed were years of sieges and raids across the width and breadth of the peninsula. Hannibal’s army needed resources;the cities he forced into submission became his lifeline. He also lacked the manpower to fully invade and occupy. So, he had to keep moving in an attempt to beat the Roman people into submission while simultaneously trying to outmaneuver Fabius’ constant pursuit. Hannibal still had the bulk of his army, and emerged victorious in every battle in which he fought. For some 14 years, a pattern repeated itself: Hannibal would take a town or region gaining time and supplies, and a Roman commander would simply take it back soon thereafter.
Build a Coalition
As the war became a stalemate in Italy, Rome turned its attention to the larger Mediterranean World. The struggle spilled over onto the open sea and satellite states such as Greece were drawn into a conflict that threatened to engulf the known world. In 211 BC, a detachment of soldiers embarked on what was considered a suicide mission to take the Iberian Peninsula from Carthaginian control. Their commander, a young man named Scipio, had fought with the Roman army from the beginning, including the slaughter at Cannae. There, he had a key role in rallying the survivors.
Scipio recognized that he lacked the strength he needed to wage an effective campaign alone. Thusly, his first actions focused on winning over the local tribes. He reportedly rescued a chieftain’s fiancé and returned her to him, securing both his and his allies’ support. He continued in this manner, moving south and into the interior of the peninsula, fighting small-scale battles, and slowly gathering his strength while subduing the tribes loyal to Carthage. The strategy worked, and despite fielding several armies larger than his own, Nova Carthago (New Carthage) was sacked and burned in 209 BC.
Prepare for the Moment to Come
As he prepared to invade Africa, political rivals in the senate tried to slow his rise to power. They placed him in charge of the garrison in Sicily. Sicily, the focus of the First Punic War, was ignored by Hannibal. They posted him there and intended to slow his rise to power. However, Sicily also housed the garrison for the disgraced survivors of Cannae. He did not challenge his political opponents, nor did he have his own allies in the senate push for more armies and material support. Instead, he rallied, drilled, and recruited among the locals. The survivors were eager for redemption. Before long, Scipio raised a disciplined core of loyal soldiers. Without support from Rome, he launched into Africa and took the fight to Carthage itself.
Do it Again
In northern Africa, he repeated his Iberian strategy of undermining his enemies while increasing his own support. He replaced the Numidian King, an ally of Carthage, with a man loyal to Rome. With local cavalry and logistical support, Scipio faced off against the newly recalled Hannibal. On a plain near the town of Zama, Hannibal attacked Scipio’s army of nearly 30,000 Romans with approximately 50,000 Africans and 100 elephants. An elephant charge is devastating against close-order infantry, often breaking the formation, demoralizing the men, and making them vulnerable to exploitation by Carthaginian Infantry. Hannibal leaned into this advantage, and his plan was uncharacteristically simple: charge.
In contrast, Scipio placed his men into columns with wide spaces between them. It would have failed against an infantry charge, but the elephants, terrified by loud horn blasts and javelins, ran through the open channels to safety behind the Roman lines. What should have been a devastating charge was not only avoided, but even proved detrimental to the Carthaginians: Some of the elephants, wounded and confused, turned and charged their own lines. Hannibal’s cavalry, panicked by the rampaging beasts, were disrupted. The combined Roman and Numidian cavalry exploited the confusion, routing them.
Seize the Moment
The reformed Roman infantry charged and fought Hannibal’s own army to a standstill. Then, in a sort of poetic mirror, the Roman cavalry returned and attacked Hannibal’s rear, completing a double envelopment not unlike Cannae. Rome turned the stalemate into a one-sided slaughter, and captured or killed approximately 40,000 of Hannibal’s soldiers.
This Roman victory, which ended the Second Punic War, was not brought about by pure strength, manpower, or force of will. On the contrary, it took the patience and vision of far-seeing commanders like Fabius and Scipio to entirely alter the Roman manner of warfare. Until this battle, Hannibal had proven irresistible, and direct Roman confrontation had only ended in slaughter. Their strategies clearly demonstrate how to achieve victory and success through oblique means. By denying your enemy their base of support, and by steadily increasing your own, you can tip the scales to your favor. It is important to recognize the risk and cost of investment with these bold changes in the face of annihilation. These ideas were not quick to see results, and both men experienced resistance from fellow Romans who failed to realize the wisdom behind their actions.
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These concepts are directly applicable to the modern warrior, both in garrison and on the battlefield. We have waged recent conflicts with an overmatch of military power, yet we do not always find success. We cannot win in Afghanistan and Iraq through sheer force of arms. Likewise, we cannot beat back the obstacles inherent in planning and resourcing training. Finally, the internal politics of working on a staff can often feel like a warzone, and contains challenges that cannot be overcome through argument and force of will. In environments such as these, progress is made only through patience and understanding.
Here are some questions for discussion or personal reflection:
- Has the U.S. Military applied this idea in recent history? Have our enemies tried this against us?
- What are ways we are using this approach to the current insurgent threat? What about a war against a near-peer?
- Have you ever been given a task that, no matter what resources you leveraged, you couldn’t seem to overcome? What was the ultimate result?
- Can you think of any examples, in wartime or otherwise, where brute force were the only means of success?
- What tasks do you and your team have that you are able to make headway on? Is it possible to exploit that to gain momentum elsewhere?
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