Almost every Intelligence Warfighting Function leader at some point has asked some version of the following question: “What are the keys to success for an S2 (or other IWfF leader) during a Combat Training Center rotation?” Collectively as an Army, we have the experience of hundreds of rotations over the 40-year history of the National Training Center (and the other CTCs), countless lessons shared from experienced leaders through LPDs, articles, and even social media engagements. The question generates many responses: a well-established Intel architecture, thoroughly rehearsed processes and SOPs, integrated teams, effective transitions, etc. These topics are among many that any Intel leader desiring to be successful should give due diligence. But this particular paper won’t delve into staff processes, effective architecture, or SOPs. Its purpose is to tackle a topic that is on its surface much simpler, but in practice requires a much greater up-front investment than any of those to get right– effective battlefield leadership.
If it’s true (and it generally is) that we consider an S2 or other Intel leader good because they were effective/successful during an NTC rotation, we are acknowledging a couple of important points. First, that a CTC rotation is as close as we can get to the crucible of combat. The complexity of the Operational Environment (OE), competitive peer or near-peer enemy, and demanding conditions create challenges unequaled by any other training event. Hopefully, the 14 days in the box at NTC will be the most challenging an S2 will ever face. Consequently, the second point is that we validate good IWfF leaders based on their ability to excel in contact under these conditions. In other words, if you can succeed here, you can probably do it anywhere.
Large-Scale Combat Operations on Today and Tomorrow’s Battlefields
Easier said than done. Large-scale ground combat operations are characterized by complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. BCTs, and specifically the Intelligence Warfighting function, face challenges greater than ever in terms of friction and stress. The threat forces on the battlefield today and tomorrow can effectively use integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, counter reconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic warfare operations, camouflage and concealment, and deception. The concept of “fighting for intelligence” has never been tougher, yet it is more critical than ever to enable a commander’s decision making.
The OE in a rotation at the National Training Center will present all of those challenges and more. From day one, the BCT will be in contact with the threat. Cyber and EW, enemy proxy forces intermixed with the civilian populace, micro UAS, Division Tactical Group reconnaissance elements, etc. As the rotation progresses, S2s quickly realize the enemy has mastered an ability to use the effects of the terrain to their advantage. They effectively use every available form of contact (direct, indirect, non-hostile, obstacles, CBRN, air, visual, and EW) and in so doing are able to mass combat power, usually at the decisive point of the fight. Detailed threat models, a well-executed Mission Analysis (including all four steps of IPB), a solid collection plan – even then it’s difficult to apply adequate predictive analysis to stay ahead of this enemy.
You Own the Problem but the Solution Requires a Team
As an IWfF leader in a BCT, you understand the challenges and complexity of trying to oversee the entirety of the Intelligence Process – plan and direct, collect and process, produce, and disseminate – and a constant turn of analyzing and assessing. It would be challenging enough if every soldier and platform that has a role in this process was located in the same CP, working for a single person who had no other responsibility than to run it. But that isn’t the reality you face. Structure, and the very nature of collection and analytical requirements necessitate a federated approach to the Intelligence Process. Collection platforms, reconnaissance elements, battalion intelligence sections; they all work for someone else and often have different (even competing) requirements.
And that’s only touching on what is organic to a BCT. Large-scale combat operations are always multi-domain and a BCT is part of a much larger enterprise in fighting them. This is particularly true when it comes to the vast intelligence enterprise. Many of the capabilities required to compete in a multi-domain fight (even at the BCT level) aren’t Army capabilities. An inherently Joint, inter-agency “national to tactical” approach to intelligence is an absolute requirement for success on the battlefield today and tomorrow.
So where does that leave you S2? You have disparate formations and organizations, both within and outside the BCT, all with some role in your BCT’s intelligence process. They don’t work for you (and in some cases they don’t even work for your commander). Yet ultimately, it is your job to lead this intelligence effort. Yes, commanders own the intelligence effort – they are responsible for everything within an organization. But commanders have a whole lot on their plates. Intel leaders and every echelon must step up and take ownership of every aspect of the intelligence process. You must pull it all together to provide relevant, timely, predictive intelligence to your commander to enable effective decision making and mission success.
Case Study: Where is the Shadow?
It’s not easy – even with organic assets that are completely dedicated to the BCT’s information collection efforts. Imagine you are several days into the rotation and preparing for a significant operation (attack to seize Razish for example). You have some critical intelligence gaps, so success during this operation will hinge on the BCT’s reconnaissance and collection efforts over the next 12-24 hours. You walk in to speak with CUOPs to get an update on the NAI where you expect the Shadow to be actively scanning, only to discover that CUOPS has no idea where the Shadow is located. After 30 minutes of asking around, you discover that the Shadow Platoon broke down the launch and recovery site about an hour ago and are preparing to jump to a new location. It will be at least 18 hours before they are ready to begin operations again.
Some variation of this scenario happens far more frequently than you might imagine. What do we blame? A failure to plan properly? A lack of communication? Competing priorities and natural friction? Yes to all, most likely. Somewhere between plans, the Collection Management Element, the MICO Commander, the Shadow Platoon Leader, CUOPS, the BEB S3, or any number of others who have responsibility for the planning and execution of the Shadow collection effort things fell apart. It’s very possible the Shadow Platoon had a very good reason to jump at that time. Upcoming weather, an increased threat to the current location, extended lines of communication, etc. But ultimately, through something completely avoidable, we failed as a team to provide essential information collection at a critical time in the fight.
This is one example of many that occur across the BCT during a typical rotation. The CAV squadron doesn’t get an updated Annex L and begins movement to collect on NAIs that aren’t synchronized with the BCT’s IC plan, the HUMINT or signals collection teams end up in the wrong locations or attached to the wrong battalions, the Shadow is scanning NAIs from a 2-day old collection plan and is consequently behind the FLOT.
Leadership Competencies – Builds Trust, Extends Influence, Communicates
There is generally no single issue we can point to when these types of break-downs occur. There are a lot of hard-working soldiers and leaders trying to do the right things – it’s rarely a lack of effort. But the common thread is almost always that all that effort ended up pulling in different directions. At its core, it’s fundamentally an issue of leadership.
Effective IWfF leaders in the fight understand the importance of all leadership attributes and competencies as explained in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession. They master the “Be, Know, Do” model, and apply who they are (attributes) in what they do (competencies). Each is as important as any of the others, but the remainder of this paper will highlight three competencies of particular relevancy to leading the Intel Warfighting function in the fight – building trust, extending influence, and communicating.
Building trust starts long before the time arrives to load the train and head to the National Training Center. For an S2, this means working on building trust within the section, across the staff, and clearly with your commander. It also means building a similar trust with the MICO Commander and his or her team, the battalion S2s, and many others. Genuine trust between all IWfF stake holders often seems elusive – but successful units get it done. A unit with a climate where trust exists up, down and laterally will almost inevitably be successful. While intangible, it’s very easy to observe from day one of a rotation. An S2 who has a lack of trust in his or her subordinate leaders or other members of the team will often try to do it all and will almost always be less effective. Sometimes when asked about it, S2s will admit they don’t have a lot of confidence and trust in subordinates and it’s easier to do it themselves. Junior officers, NCOs and soldiers in organizations like this often feel marginalized and fear taking initiative. In most cases it isn’t a lack of competence, it’s simply a lack of effort in empowering subordinates, building trust over time. As Ernest Hemmingway said, “The best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them.” This isn’t something you can do overnight, so start early!
Even an IWfF leader who has established trust with superiors, subordinates, and peers must also master the competency of extending influence beyond the chain of command. As highlighted earlier, almost every member of the IWfF enterprise in and outside the BCT work for different bosses. Achieving success requires unified action which means creating a shared purpose. Ultimately meeting the BCT commander’s intent guides and directs this purpose, but there is a lot of leg work required to help the entire IWfF team work towards this purpose. Yes taskings, orders, task organization changes, etc., are all ways to formalize requirements and are necessary. But an S2 and IWfF team who rely solely on that to get the team moving in the same direction will fail almost every time. Far more effective is the S2 who learns to lead a team of teams – maybe in one instance a coalition of the CAV squadron, FA and AVN BN S2s, elements of the MICO, an attached CA team and a SOF LNO. Without formal authority over any of these, the S2 could potentially lead an effort capable of providing a truly common Intelligence picture that would provide the BCT Commander the best available information and intelligence to enable decision making.
Finally, the leadership competency of communication is paramount. As evidenced in the shadow platoon jump example, a breakdown in communication can sometimes lead to mission failure. We often blame our technical ability to communicate (not everyone is up on upper TI, don’t have access to JBCP/JCR, etc.). Certainly, these challenges make effective communication difficult. But more often than not, we find a way to get messages to and from those who need it. Unfortunately, the message we thought we sent and the message received are not always the same. As ADP 6-22 reminds us, “communication as a competency ensures more than the simple transmission of information. Communication generates shared understanding and situational awareness.” In other words, like trust, communication is a two-way street and requires clear messaging and active listening.
Conclusion
Back to a variation of the question that so many have asked over the years, “What does success for an S2 and IWfF team look like at NTC?” While there are many ways to answer that question, common to them all is a cohesive team that provided effective, timely predictive intelligence support to enable the commander’s decision-making. If you dig a little deeper into an IWfF team that does that well, you will inevitably find leaders who reflect Army’s expectations of attributes and competencies – particularly an ability to build trust, extend influence, and communicate.
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This is part of a series of posts focused on Leader Development in Contact. Click HERE for the rest of the series. Footnotes are annotated in the PDF version found on the Series homepage.
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