During the crucible of training for Large Scale Combat Operations at the National Training Center (NTC), leaders face conditions that are impossible to replicate at home station. Time, distance, the pace of operations, the desert environment, and a ruthless, thinking opposing force combine to challenge the Brigade Combat Teams in unforeseen ways.
To be successful, units must respond by growing to new levels of effectiveness. With good leadership, commanders can serve as catalysts for that unit growth. Conversely, poor leadership methods will slow a unit’s growth by creating friction, frustrating subordinates, stifling initiative, and producing an overall painful experience for the team.
Rotation after rotation at NTC has shown that there tend to be common, predictable moments where the commander can make an outsized difference on the unit’s performance. Fail in those moments and the rotation will be difficult for every echelon. Succeed in those moments, however, and the unit is primed to not only grow, but win.
Below are but a few of those moments at NTC that commanders should deliberately consider, rehearse in their minds, develop SOPs for, and strive to employ the best version of their leadership.
The Commander’s Huddle
Perhaps no other discrete session can generate drastic change and mountains of friction like the Commander’s Huddle.
Situation
At NTC, this often looks like a Brigade Commander bringing in Battalion Commanders to discuss (rather, alter) the upcoming operation over a map in the BDE Plans Tent. The BCT S3 or XO are sometimes included but are often out of earshot as the Brigade Commander pulls the Battalion Commanders in close to the map. This huddle sometimes occurs after the Mission Analysis Brief or the Brigade Operations Order Brief, but too often occurs after the Combined Arms Rehearsal, when units have already begun setting conditions for the operation. The leaders discuss maneuver timing, the information collection and fires plan, mission objectives and boundaries, communications plans, sustainment, and so on. Sessions can surpass 90 minutes.
Result
The leaders engage in what amounts to a Wargame session for the operation already in motion. Unfortunately, the changes to the plan will rarely go out in an order, the staff will likely not synchronize them, and there will be little time to properly rehearse. If a notetaker was present, the staff will scramble to get the summary of changes and incorporate them before crossing the Line of Departure. Meanwhile, Battalion Commanders disseminate their own version of what was discussed and decided upon. Multiple avenues of change propagate through the formation, creating confusion among staffs and subordinate leaders as they struggle with version control on fighting products. The resulting friction only reinforces the temptation for commanders at every echelon to dismiss staff efforts at synchronization and control the fight themselves.
Recommendation
Commanders must be intentional about when to invite feedback and collaborate. Unless a crisis is approaching, impromptu wargame sessions often cause more harm than good. Decide upon acceptable windows in the Operations Process for making changes to the plan. If you are keen on bringing in commanders to collaborate, do it early in MDMP, like after the Mission Analysis or the COA Development Brief. Frame the session with a time limit, a framework for input, and an idea of desired output (e.g. executive summary, FRAGO, etc.). Incorporate as many staff members as possible so they can not only follow the developments, but also so they can understand how commanders think and what is important to them. The commander’s timely leadership during this crucial dialogue can align commanders and staff as they Plan, Prepare, and Execute operations.
The Combined Arms Rehearsal
“The rehearsal is a coordination event, not an analysis.” (CALL Handbook 19-18, 1) Commanders can derail the CAR by micromanaging the process or by turning it into a Wargame.
Situation
The Brigade CAR for major operations at NTC usually occurs in vicinity of the Brigade Main Command Post 12-18 hours before crossing LD. Brigade and battalion leadership, key staff, attached enabler leaders drive or fly in from across the area of operations and spend hours away from their units. Some brigades require company commanders, which can push the audience to well over 100 people crowding around the routinely undersized terrain model. Good units have distributed a CAR script to guide the exercise and leaders know what the commander expects them to brief. As staff and commanders brief, however, the BCT Commander senses something he doesn’t like and stands up to clarify what’s being said. His question draws a few battalion commanders into the conversation as the Brigade S3 steps forward to clarify what was in the order. Getting frustrated and wanting to take charge of the situation, the BCT Commander walks onto the board and starts giving refining guidance.
Result
In a matter of minutes, the CAR is reduced to a Wargame and then digresses to a COA Development session as the BCT Commander walks over the crowded terrain model issuing changes to the plan. Then, as battalion commanders point out friction points in this undeveloped plan, they draw closer and closer on the terrain model until the CAR is reduced to 100 people standing around watching several commanders have a private conversation. At one NTC rotation, one BCT Commander followed this path and, ironically, huddled the commanders around his personal plexiglass mapboard instead of the full-sized terrain model they were standing on.
Recommendation
Develop an SOP for the CAR. Refine and rehearse it. Stick to it. (That goes for commanders, too – do not take over the CAR.) A CAR SOP should be a guide that helps keep the event moving, avoids tangents, and provides the commanders with enough visualization to identify friction and risk. As a general rule, avoid using a word for word script or following a line-by-line execution checklist. These products tent to turn the CAR into a rote recitation instead of a synchronization exercise. As stated in the Commander and Staff Guide to Rehearsals, the CAR is an opportunity for leaders to confirm the synchronization of the COA the commander has already selected, making ”only those changes essential to mission success and risk mitigation” (1). Commanders must be patient and avoid trying to remedy every friction point the CAR reveals. It’s more effective to capture a note in the moment, staff a solution following the CAR, and issue a FRAGO.
Creating and Maintaining Tempo
“Commanders build the appropriate tempo to provide the necessary momentum for successful attacks that achieve the objective… A rapid tempo allows the BCT to deliver multiple blows in-depth from numerous directions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Blows from multiple directions cause a multidimensional dilemma for the enemy” (FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, 6-6).
Situation
Momentum is not a natural occurrence in military operations. The individual fatigue that each soldier feels is multiplied across the formation, resulting in a unit that is content to sit and wait for the next operation. This tendency is especially true at the NTC after a major operation like the seizure of the urban objective of Razish. “The platoons did good but they’re whooped – we need time to recover” is a familiar narrative. Similarly, units tend to view upcoming major operations as discrete fights that will occur at the “no later than” time. They fail to understand that major objectives will require conditions-setting with smaller fights for key terrain – the unit must build momentum before the big fight.
Result
Few BCTs who come through NTC are able to put real pressure on the enemy. Their application of combat power tends to surge and wane, creating tempo that feels more like a sine wave than a steady stream of effects that shape the enemy and set conditions. BCTs rarely surprise the enemy with unexpected attacks or rapid tempo. Consequently, the unhindered enemy has significant freedom to prepare defenses and attack the BCT in multiple domains.
Recommendation
All momentum starts with leadership. For a unit to overcome the drift towards stagnation, leaders must constantly drive the team to seize the initiative. Momentum comes from creating demands that push organizations beyond what they think they’re capable of and at a pace they’re not ready for. One successful BCT Commander at NTC defended the Brown-Debnum Pass Complex in the afternoon and ordered a dismounted attack on the urban center of Ujen only hours afterwards. The attack occurred a full 24 hours prior to when the Division had directed and caught the enemy off-guard. Commanders who maintain tempo at NTC visualize the fight as a constant march to seize key terrain and apply sustained pressure on the enemy. They don’t let off the gas. They use mounted and dismounted maneuver in tandem while aggressively collecting information and combining arms to support both the deep and close fights. These commanders also recognize (and lead subordinate commanders to understand) that a major operation is a success on which to capitalize, not an excuse to consolidate and recover.
Leading on the Move
It is hard to overstate the importance of commanders performing face to face leadership and visiting the lesser known areas of the organization.
Situation
As the rotation progresses at NTC, it’s not uncommon to see commanders narrow their presence on the battlefield. The pace of operations quickens and they become less intentional with their time. They dart from one briefing to the next, from one rehearsal to the next, with little engagement elsewhere. Then the enemy “votes” at the most inopportune times to further derail the planned battle rhythm.
Result
The commander gets stuck in an engagement loop rotating from TAC to Main to Higher HQ, losing touch with important areas of the operation. During one rotation, the BCT commander had intended to confirm each of battalions’ engagement areas during the preparation for the defense. However, an enemy spoiling attack tied him up for six hours and he never got the “feel” of the defense that he sought. At other times, without a disciplined staff to push the process, MDMP can grind to a halt as the commander is pulled elsewhere. And inevitably, problems like failing maintenance and insurgent threats will arise in the Consolidation Area and can undermine the BCT’s combat power. Commanders who become locked in the close fight tend to underappreciate these challenges and because they rarely visit the Support and Engineer Battalions, never seeing the effects firsthand.
Recommendation
The commander is responsible for and must lead all parts of the organization. Identify key areas by phase where the commander could benefit from a firsthand glimpse of the situation and build them into the battle rhythm. Visit the anticipated decisive point of the upcoming operation, then perhaps a maintenance meeting, a battalion Main CP, the Field Artillery gun line, or an Information Operations effort like the Civil Military Operations Center. Additionally, assign clear roles and responsibilities for key leaders like the BCT XO and S3, so they can keep the fight going while the commander engages other areas of the team. Build a PACE plan for battle rhythm events so the commander can engage when not in the Main CP and prevent delays in key efforts like MDMP planning. Finally, recognize how meaningful it can be for subordinate leaders to see the commander in person, have an opportunity to give their perspective of the fight, and hear him personally reinforce guidance. The commander can make an impact for the team, too, by recognizing and motivating lower echelon effort, then giving them “the big picture” perspective.
Conclusion
People are the most important asset in the US Army. And because “leadership is the activity of influencing people,” leadership is the most decisive element in Army operations (ADP 6-22, 1-15). Successes and failures. Action and inaction. Victory and defeat. It all rests on good (or bad) leadership. As commanders navigate the crucible of NTC (and eventually in LSCO), the demands of the complex fight occupy their attention and degrade their effectiveness in expected ways. The commander’s huddle, the CAR, while fighting for tempo, and while circulating the battlefield are but a few of those moments. Commanders must lead through with intention and disciplined execution if they are to enable their formations.
This is part of a series of posts focused on Leader Development in Contact. Click HERE for the rest of the series. Footnotes are annotated in the PDF version found on the Series homepage.
Complete archive of The Company Leader Posts