They are the demons who run around in black, tan, or green uniforms. Unnamed fighters who cover their MILES gear in sunscreen, wreaking havoc to friendly forces on the mock battlefield. They are the source of sweat drenched days and sleepless lights, a seemingly unbeatable force from the depths of hell. Just who are these mythical combat creatures?
Who are the OPFOR?
Opposing Forces (OPFOR) are realistic and flexible military and/or paramilitary forces. They represent a compilation of varying capabilities from existing forces around the global. OPFOR are used in lieu of a specific, named enemy force and employed in training and developing U.S. forces. (AR 350-2, 2015).
Combat Training Centers: Home of the World Class OPFOR
The threat environment is facing a time of constantly evolving threats across the globe. The National Defense Strategy seeks to address this threat. With this strategy in mind, Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have never been more vital. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) is responsible for developing our joint war-fighting capability across the European Theatre. It provides realistic training to our own formations, helping to intertwine friendly and multinational elements within those formations. Units that rotate through JMRC get the unique ability to work along-side many NATO and Non-NATO allied and partner nations. Our collective ability to be successful in that dynamic could be the difference in our next large scale engagement.
In my three years as a JMRC OPFOR team and squad leader, I participated in twenty-nine Decisive Action Training Exercises. I trained British and American officer cadets, prepared units to support America’s KFOR roles in Kosovo, and engaged in numerous other OPFOR training exercises. I participated in countless AARs and concluded that many senior leaders focus on how battalion and higher can improve. They don’t address what the OPFOR threat means to the normal company commander in a conventional US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) unit. The often overlooked company-level threat is dynamic; understanding it is critical to success in the CTC environment.
Lesson 1: Mission Command
This phrase has echoed in the minds of every commander, first sergeant, and newest private in the United States Army. We all know what it means and the principles of it. Most of us believe we know how to use it properly. Throughout my three years, I participated in numerous “engagements” with small dismounted sniper teams, medium-sized formations of mounted armored personnel carriers, and large-scale formations of two tank battalions while mounted. Observing various kinds of engagements gave me a unique insight into how commanders across the Army operationalize mission command.
I often witnessed commanders and platoon leaders actively stop their momentum to call for higher approval. Now in some cases, this was necessary (i.e synchronizing subordinate and adjacent units) but on numerous occasions my soldiers and I destroyed a company-sized element just waiting in the open to move or break contact. The OPFOR forced the BLUEFOR leader on the ground to wait, paralyzed with fear for making the wrong call.
We go to CTCs to learn, to refine TTPs and SOPs, and to become better leaders and followers. We do not go for impact awards or NCOER/OER bullets. Entrust your subordinate leaders, let them fail, and give them a clear and concise intent. Additionally another mission command issue I observed resulted from the commander’s intent often being vague with too much room for interpretation (i.e “Eliminate all enemy forces from here to the 73 easting”). What happens when the leader arrives at the 73 easting? Does he wait and establish a foothold or does he keep moving and ensure the TOC is battle tracking his movements to deconflict with other units? With vague intent, the junior leader stops and is consequently ambushed by some tired, dirty guys in black uniforms.
Lesson 2: The Peer/Near-Pear Way of Life
Throughout my time at JMRC, I was impressed on numerous occasions by the overall might, tactical efficiency, and overall lethality of some of the armored brigades I encountered. On the other hand, most of the elements defeated by the OPFOR typically brought it upon themselves. We have all read the reports and papers and listened to the podcasts on eliminating the “creature comforts” we have been accustomed to over the past twenty years. My team encountered units that were all in line eating hot chow as darkness was setting in. My team frequently used generators to pinpoint positions in the winter. I have ambushed sleeping crew members in vehicles thanks to the thermal signatures they failed to conceal.
A critical piece of information that can be pushed to the tactical level leader is this: get uncomfortable and learn to be proficient in these environments. We all cut corners when the conditions are nasty–everyone does. The CTCs are there for us to hone and practice those skills. Our next enemy will not “safety kill” us; we all know what actually will happen. Simulated training distracts Leaders and soldiers. We think: “oh it’s just laser tag” or “this isn’t even real, who cares?”
However, we must remember that we alone can initiate and sustain change. I am aware of the challenges–I go through them like all of us. How do we push the envelope of training without tearing up our soldiers? How do we show them that this training may save their lives? I do not think any one person has the answer to these questions, but if we keep these thoughts in the forefront of our minds perhaps we can find some answers.
Lesson 3: Technology – Capabilities and Limitations
We live in a world that is almost completely digital, and our Army has followed that trend too. We have some of the most tremendous technology that makes the lives of our warfighters quite easy. These technological advances help us focus on other things. They make it easier to manage and multitask in the modern battle space. We, as leaders, also realize an important fact: where a piece of technology exists, there also exists a way to counter it. When I arrived at JMRC, the use of technology to provide realistic training to the rotational units amazed me.
We developed Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) SOPs, used quadcopters to counter enemy recon elements, jammed radio frequencies, and spoofed GPSs. Our intelligence shop tracked enemy movements, sent fire missions from social media posts, and provided us with updated reports every day. Our use of technology greatly enhanced our situational awareness and battlefield capability against the friendly forces.
Adapting to Limitations in Technology
On the other hand, some of our smaller OPFOR units had more limited technological capabilities compared to the friendly forces such as encrypted JCRs or BFTs. This meant that friendly forces were listening to us, forcing us to adapt our communications. With that in mind, we developed TTPs, and relied on solid PACE plans in case of separation of elements. Originally I felt out of my comfort zone during those first few rotations. I was running operations using my finger, a protractor, and a map sitting in a gunner’s hatch in the rain.
These, however, are the conditions at which our soldiers need to proficiently operate within, and doing so starts at the company level. I am a firm believer that one of the ways that we were so efficient at the small unit level was our lack of dependence on technology and constant battle tracking. We found success in our ability to adapt, improvise, and trust our PACE plans.
Example of Adaptation
One such example of PACE improvisation we used at the small unit level would be when we received our mission order and contingency plan if our element’s combat power was reduced to a level at which we were no longer combat effective. Simply put, by any means necessary, we would displace to a certain village (mission dependent) and try to inflict as much damage as possible on the way there. As a leader, I was always aware that if something hit the fan and we were separated, I knew exactly where my soldiers were headed, and I could possibly determine the route they took.
I present this example because I believe it made us substantially more effective in the battle space when it occurred. We had elements spread in all directions, causing chaos, and confusing the “enemy”. It gave the surviving members a moment to huddle, create a contingency plan, brief that plan, and execute it. Also on an administrative note, it gave some of my junior troops the ability to lead an element in terrain and conditions they were possibly not familiar with, which was satisfying to me as a squad leader.
Conclusion
While I hope these observations can provide important lessons learned based on the numerous rotations I witnessed over three years at JMRC, I understand that they by no means provide all the answers to effectively succeeding at our CTCs. From my experience as both OPFOR and BLUFOR, I rarely received AAR feedback directed at my level on how I could better succeed in unfamiliar environments, and this is unfortunate.
Providing feedback to these lower levels is critical, as the infantry rifle company is the backbone of our war-fighting mission. A company unprepared to adapt and be more effective is a company that will suffer losses in the future. For an environment that is focused on the improvement of the Brigade and Battalion level, I trust the lessons I have personally learned and outlined will better prepare the company level leader to make the most out of a CTC rotation.
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