Hannibal’s Failure

Ancient Battles with Modern Relevance, Pt I

With the thunder of elephants, Hannibal Barca descended out of the Italian Alps to wage his war on the Roman Republic early in the winter of 218 BC. Behind his elephants marched an army of African mercenaries, Spanish tribesmen, and Gaelic warriors. His assault caught the world off guard, as the Alps were seen as an impenetrable barrier, especially during the winter. The unexpected assault caught the Romans off-guard and would lead to a series of terrible Roman defeats. Yet Hannibal, who remain undefeated for the next 16 years, ultimately loses his war. The question at hand is “why?”

An 18th-century print of Hannibal’s forces in 210 BC. (Hulton)

This is the first in a series of essays devoted to taking a look at ancient warfare and its relevance to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of today. The historical events examined here are necessarily simplified in order to better serve the discussion and to make them more accessible. The historical background provided merely serves as context for the corresponding discussion at hand; it is not intended to be the focus of discussion. The reader is encouraged to use the questions at the end for personal reflection or to fuel discussion within their own formations.

The battle of Trebia was the first major confrontation between Rome’s Legions and Hannibal in late December 218 BC. The overconfident citizen infantry crossed the Trebia River and attacked Hannibal on ground of his choosing. Hannibal’s elephants and camels were too much for Roman cavalry and the Roman flanks collapsed. However, the Gaelic tribesmen tired quickly, and the Libyan footmen could not withstand the gladius. The Roman infantry punched through and were able to return to its own camp beaten, but intact.

Later that spring, a reinforced army sought retribution and pursued him closely to prevent his destruction of the countryside. Laying his army in ambush overnight, Hannibal’s army swept out of the hills at first light and trapped the advancing column against Lake Trasimene. Half of the legion was lost, and the Romans were forced to retreat. Nevertheless, elements of the heavy infantry were once again able to fight their way out. 

Just over a year later, a massive force of 50,000 Romans drew up to fight against Hannibal’s 30,000. This time, Hannibal placed his center further forward than his wings, arching toward the advancing Romans. This allowed them to receive the assault, absorbing it into his formation, and withdrawing in an orderly fashion. As the Carthaginian center seemed to give way, the disciplined Roman ranks began to collapse as every man moved toward the perceived break. The legion turned into a mob of confused men, while Hannibal’s army maneuvered and surrounded them on three sides. As the Carthaginian cavalry assaulted from behind, the butchering began. Hannibal ensured that every trapped Roman man, senator and soldier alike, was hacked to death on that field.

With those three actions, Hannibal had demonstrated that no Roman army could stop him, regardless of their size or strength. He had achieved a complete victory, and yet the staggering losses at Cannae did not decide the war. Hannibal did not besiege Rome itself, and the republic fought on for another 14 years before Hannibal’s home city of Carthage surrendered.

We must start with Carthage, and their origin as a Greek colony. Daughter of Tyre, and inheritor of her trade empire Carthage was one of the wealthiest cities in the world. Trade brought her resources and kept her closely connected with the culture and norms of the larger Greek world. This rise coincided with the time after Alexander the Great’s death known as the Hellenic Period, and was marked by Alexander’s style of warfare. Rather than large mobs of commoners, wielding basic weapons, Carthage fought with disciplined formations of soldiers, trained and equipped as one, and supported by heavy calvary. This was not a horde, it was a modern, disciplined army. 

The people were loyal to many things, but the concept of a nation was not yet widespread. Culture played a part, certainly, but more often it came down to money, and who had the wealth to support these mercenary armies. The training, and equipping of such forces was expensive, and it was dangerous to push them too far and too hard. After all, their loyalty was selfish, at best. A war with a nation of equal strength was a difficult undertaking and often ended when one side had a clear advantage. 

Carthage followed this same heritage. Their strength rested in their money and connections, not the physical empire and large peoples they controlled. Their army was bought, not raised, and their citizens were more concerned with trade than warfare. It was with this mindset that Hannibal invaded Italy. It was a war for position and influence over Sicily, Iberia (Spain), and ultimately, to see who would dominate the Mediterranean. He had no intention of destroying Rome as he lacked the resources and political will to do so. After achieving victory after dramatic victory over Rome, it only made sense to him that Rome would seek terms for peace.

Rome, in contrast, started as one of many city states on the Italian peninsula. Their early history involved savage fighting against nearby tribes that was only ended when one side was eliminated. Victory and defeat were absolutes, and their heavy infantry were citizens who fought to keep their families safe. War was to the end, not profit, and Rome didn’t give their enemies treaties. They forced their enemies into submission. They conquered rivals and replaced them with Roman citizens. “Allies” accepted heavy control as a client state and Rome absorbed them into the republic. When Hannibal invaded, Rome understood it to be a battle for existence between Carthage and Rome. Surrender was unthinkable and victory was worth any cost. When Rome defeated one Army, another was raised. And again. And again. 

Hannibal would continue to waste the Roman countryside for another 13 years, unsuccessfully trying to reduce Roman support and force them to accept defeat. It was a strategy that Alexander used well against the Persians and likely would have worked further east against the remnants of his empire still there. But, the Romans were able to continually find new recruits and support from nearby cities. Hannibal’s army was too small for occupation, and when he left a captured city, his support often ended quickly. 

It wasn’t just that Rome could fight a war of attrition, whereas Hannibal couldn’t. (He was able to do so in Italy for almost 15 years.) Hannibal clearly understood warfare, logistics, and strategy, using them all masterfully. He misunderstood what it would take to win. It was not a matter of killing soldiers or conquering towns, it was a matter of defeating the Roman people’s mindset. His misunderstanding led to years of stalemate, but not necessarily his own defeat. 

The application for today is apparent. We are currently in conflict with certain ideologies in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Our tactics and strategies are incredibly effective at killing enemies on the battlefield, dismantling logistical networks, capturing and killing enemy leaders, and gathering intelligence. We are excellent at virtually every measureable means of success in war, yet, so far we have not won in any of these conflicts. At best, we’ve achieved a costly stalemate. 

Here are some questions for discussion or personal reflection:

What do we not understand about our current enemy?

Can we beat an opponent that refuses to acknowledge they’ve lost? If so, how do we convince them?

What kind of enemy does our military assume we’re fighting now? Who do we think we’ll fight tomorrow?

Do our current military objectives make sense to our enemies? Should they?

What does it take to beat our military? 

When it comes to war, what is our mindset? What does victory or defeat look like? And for our current and potential adversaries?

What tasks are you struggling with right now? Can you identify the root problem?

Is there a time you failed to see what the true source of the threat/problem is? Did you correct it in time?

Benjamin Hockman serves as a Captain in the United States Army with a passion for ancient history and the stories they tell. He is currently an OC/T with 1-310 BEB under First Army and has previously served as a Battalion S6, Detachment Commander, Executive Officer, and Infantry Platoon Leader.

Recommended Reading

         

Subscribe to The Company Leader!

Complete archive of The Company Leader Posts

Back to Home