Operations in a Decisive Action environment against a near-peer threat stress maintenance systems at all levels. The units that go through the NTC carry in training level and competency. The following discussion is based on combined arms battalion maintenance observations over the last eight rotations.
At the platoon level…
…operators do a poor job of conducting preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS). This is often due to the pace of operations, soldier fatigue, or a lack of enforcement. Operators and their small-unit leaders do not understand how PMCS provides the parts they need. They are often not equipped or trained to conduct basic recovery, troubleshooting, and repair operations.
At the company level…
…challenges are multi-faceted. Compiling data and PMCS information are challenging if the chain of command does not emphasize and enforce PMCS requirments. A lack of maintainers attached to the company results in inaccurate reporting or ineffective quality control when reporting equipment faults. These problems are exacerbated in offensive operations or when the companies/troops get extended geographically. The transfer of maintenance requirements from the companies to the Maintenance Platoon and Battalion Command Posts (CPs) is difficult. This is exacerbated when a unit doesn’t have a clear plan for Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) communication,
At the battalion level…
…management of the flow of information and the flow of equipment is often not prioritized or is not incorporated into the Common Operating Picture, or is lost when a large amount of other information (intelligence, operations, plans, sustainment reports) are overlaid on top. Additionally, if key players (most significantly, battalion executive officers) are directed away from command and control nodes, the overall system is rudderless and fails to deliver results.
Maintenance at the higher pace of operations demanded by Decisive Action requires a clear, disciplined, realistic, well-understood, and well-practiced maintenance plan that is designed and executed at all levels. This discussion flows from battalion down to platoon-level, since the system needs to be defined by higher, with buy-in and execution conducted by subordinate elements.
Battalion Level Observations
Units often plan to conduct maintenance at the NTC along the following lines. Crews conduct PMCS at least once daily and record faults on a daily 5988-E. 5988-Es are turned in daily during logistics package (LOGPAC) operations and are hand-carried back to the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP). Clerks at the UMCP process and input them into the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). The clerks order part through GCSS-Army. The Forward Support Company (FSC) or Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) personnel pick them up at the Supply Support Activity (SSA) in the Brigade Support Area (BSA). Battalion Executive Officers (BN XOs) and Battalion Maintenance Technicians (BMTs) report daily to the BSA or Brigade Main Command Post (MCP). They conduct a daily, in-person Brigade Maintenance Meeting. This system is fully compliant with ATP 4-33 Maintenance Operations w/ Change 1, 19 November 2019.
However, observations over the past eight rotations indicate this system fails along three lines.
First, the printing, distribution, and collection of paper 5988-Es is too slow to keep pace with the operation.
Print capability is limited to the UMCP and the Battalion MCP, and the quantity of paper flowing back and forth is difficult for company leaders to effectively manage. Additionally, the request for critical parts becomes delayed because it is dependent on 5988-Es returning to the UMCP before being ordered. (Compounding the problem, the 5988-Es are often poor quality, discussed below in the following sections on the company and small-unit levels.)
Second, the standard unit requirement for battalion XOs to attend an in-person Brigade maintenance meeting commonly removes a critical leader.
It takes the BN XO from the command post and operations process for four to eight hours per day (1-2 hours for travel to the BSA or BCT MCP, 1-2 hours for the meeting, 1-2 hours of follow-on face-to-face meetings/discussions, 1-2 hours for travel back to the BN MCP). Battalions sometimes choose not to send the battalion XO, improving battalion performance but potentially disrupting the brigade’s ability to support the battalion’s maintenance.
Lastly, battalion maintenance communications PACE plan is insufficient for maintenance operations to keep up with the pace of Decisive Action.
With the exception of 5988-Es (which flow by hand through LOGPAC), maintenance PACE is usually subsumed under the operational PACE, and utilizes some form of Frequency Modulation Radio (FM Radio), Joint Capabilities Release (JCR)/Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) message traffic, tactical satellite (TACSAT), High Frequency Radio (HF Radio), or some combination thereof. Without specific frequencies, chats, or role names, maintenance information is de-prioritized or lost amid the din of intelligence and operational information.
Company Level Observations
At the company level, the maintenance system commonly involves the XO as he “plans and supervises the company’s maintenance effort before battle with the first sergeant and works with the first sergeant, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and maintenance team chief to maintain a current operating picture on maintenance.” (ATP 4-33, C1, 19 November 2019). In the prevailing TTP seen utilized at the NTC, the company XO receives a ream of 5988-Es from the LOGPAC (if the distribution element remembers to bring and distribute them) and then needs to distribute them to platoons. He then gives the completed 5988-Es back to the distribution element, hoping that his company’s 5988-Es don’t get lost or forgotten about during transit.
5988-E Chokepoint
A critical company 5988-E chokepoint is a quality check. Company XOs can supervise 5988-E flow, but they often lack the necessary subject matter expertise without a forward mechanic to advise them. We observe that units rotating through the NTC which do not detach Field Maintenance Teams (FMTs) to their companies have drastically degraded maintenance outcomes. This is less common in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), which are resourced by their Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) to include FMTs for each company. But it is very common amongst Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), which do not have MTOE FMTs and doctrinally rely on smaller contact teams.
Maintain Forward
The decision not to have an FMT/maintainers forward can be due to a lack of manning in the Forward Support Company’s (FSC’s) Maintenance Platoon, because of an equipment shortage, or because the battalion wants to maximize maintenance capabilities and throughput at the UMCP. However, without even just one motivated maintainer to assist the PMCS process, assist in basic diagnosis and repair, conduct troubleshooting, and conduct quality control of maintenance needs, company XOs often provide incomplete and/or inaccurate data to the battalion and unit maintenance personnel. Bad information begets incorrect parts, which causes inefficiency and unnecessary delays in fixing equipment.
Platoon and below Observations
Platoons and subordinate crews lack the experience or desire to conduct basic operator-level maintenance, placing undue burdens on the FSC’s maintenance platoon. Crews and operators fail to conduct basic-level troubleshooting and diagnosis of faults or operator-level repairs. OC/T observations indicate that platoon leadership and crews see daily 5988-E processing as an onerous administrative requirement and fail to prioritize it. The requirement for a crew to fill out daily 5988-Es while conducting operations becomes a cursory paper drill as competing requirements take precedence. Delay or friction in receiving parts reinforces junior leader and operator perceptions that 5988-Es are a waste of time. In this environment, leaders who attempt to enforce daily 5988-E execution often gain higher frequency at the cost of reduced actual quality.
Additionally, platoons and subordinate crews often come to the NTC without the equipment or training they need to conduct recovery. Not every recovery requires a wrecker or purpose-built recovery vehicle. When units default to these critical assets, it increases the load on maintainers and reduces their availability where they are truly needed.
Best Practices
Effective battalions which keep operational readiness (OR) rates up throughout high-tempo Decisive Action operations address the issues stated above at all levels. They establish a maintenance system that makes sense and reduces the burden at every level, while ensuring the quick, effective distribution of information, parts, and capabilities. Most importantly, the units establish this system early and train to maintain at all levels.
Platoon Best Practices
Platoon leadership, crews, and operators must be educated on the maintenance system, trained, and practiced in diagnostics and operator-level repair, and understand the importance of conducting PMCS to quickly identify dead-lining faults and issues. Soldiers must see their work produces parts, and understand the delay when it does not. When combined with a less-frequent 5988-E cycle (described below, in the battalion-level recommendations), junior leaders can successfully re-frame the PMCS process from “fill out the form so that we can get battalion off our back” and more about “let’s do the PMCS we need to so we can keep this equipment running to stay in the fight.”
Units must keep minimum essential recovery and repair equipment and high-failure rate parts on hand and established in load plan SOPs. A best practice is to have two appropriate tow bars (and associated other equipment) per platoon, with the other vehicles in the platoon carrying chains or tow straps. Stryker platoons may load a spare tire per vehicle with the other equipment associated with changing tires, as load plans and SOPs allow. Platoons should also carry used Class III(P) like oil, coolant, and transmission fluid so operators can conduct quick fixes that keep vehicles running until a lull in the operation presents itself.
Company Best Practices
Attached Maintainers
A best practice is to have a habitually attached maintainers with the company trains. OC/T observations of a Stryker Infantry Battalion that chose to push maintainers forward indicate a significantly higher OR rate across the force than those that did not (~60-70% OR rate vs. 90-95% OR rate averages). Units can leverage maintainers in training to train operators to conduct basic recovery and repair operations. Additionally, when operators conduct PMCS and identify faults, forward maintainers can assist in diagnostics and troubleshooting. They can then translate that knowledge into actionable information for the UMCP and battalion.
Maintainers can conduct quality control of 5988-Es as they get turned into the company. They can assist the company XO in ensuring that the most accurate information gets transmitted. Finally, a properly equipped FMT will be able to conduct most repairs required if they get the required parts. This will increase efficiency and reducing the time required to evacuate a vehicle to the UMCP, repair, and return.
Direct Reports
Another best practice is for companies to send reports directly to the BN MCP, CTCP, FTCP, and UMCP. They can do this via JCR/JBC-P with the minimum required information to order parts on GCSS-Army as soon as the faults and parts required are identified and verified by the FMTs. This TTP ensures that multiple command and control (C2) nodes are receiving the information at the same time. This also helps to speed up ordering parts in GCSS-Army without having shop office clerks work through a ream of paper. We cannot overstate the amount of time that units can save by distributing this information widely. The BN MCP and CTCP receives near-real time data on maintenance faults and needs. This ensures units can compile the maintenance COP and combat power data quickly for the commander.
Proactive Parts Staging
Likewise, the UMCP can lean forward and prepare parts that are available in the bench or shop stock SSL/ASL for movement . The FTCP can keep track of parts needed and coordinate with the Brigade Support Battalion to acquire parts as quickly as possible. At the very least be ready to pick those parts up from the SSA when they become available. (The requirement to do 5988-Es to officially account for the parts still exists. Per ATP 4-33, para. 3-18, “units may utilize communications to rapidly pass information up the chain of command but must utilize a DA Form 5988-E to maintain a permanent record.”)
Battalion Best Practices
Reduce 5988-E Requirements
A best practice is simply to reduce the requirement for hard-copy 5988-Es to a manageable frequency. If units submit 5988-Es less often they can prevent overloading maintenance clerks, printing constraints, excess paperwork. At the NTC, a period of 48 to 72-hours between 5988-E turn-ins required seems to strike the right balance. This more effectively utilizes the limited time available and balances competing requirements. OC/T observations indicate that turn-in rates for 5988-Es on a 48 to 72-hour cycle approach 100% compliance. This contrasts turn-in rates for 5988-Es on a daily schedule that are often are as low as 25-50%. (Even when turn-in rates are higher, OC/T observe that units turn-in the majority of daily 5988-Es with incorrect or incomplete information.)
The 48 to 72-hour Cycle
A 5988-E turn-in cycle of 48 to 72-hours may seem like a decline in standards and a way to excuse operators from conducting PMCS. However, no regulatory or policy guidance exists that require 24-hour 5988-E cycles; in practice, OC/Ts see an increase in actual PMCS, even without a fresh 5988-E to log it on. (Best practices for daily PMCS with semi-daily 5988-E cycle includes maintaining maintenance notes on a running, laminated 5988-E or 2404.) Units should combine less frequent but more accurate 5988-Es with maintaining the FMT/maintainers at the company level. This will help with quality control and a solid communications plan. When units implement this guides, OC/Ts observe battalion maintenance speeds up to keep pace with Decisive Action operations.
None of this precludes the ability of any subordinate to immediately report a deadline fault to their higher in order to expedite the troubleshooting and parts ordering process. One TTP practiced by successful units is to reduce the frequency of 5988-E. They mitigate this by maintaining a method for immediately reporting deadlines via JBC-P to expedite deadline maintenance. This TTP does reduce the daily burden on operators and clerks by placing an emphasis on quality over quantity.
A Flexible Plan for the BN XO
The battalion XO’s input to the Brigade maintenance meeting is vital. It helps keep the brigade’s sustainers informed on battalion operations, intent, and friction. When the BN XO needs to be there, BNs can mitigate his or her absence through deliberate planning. Examples include synchronizing battalion planning around the brigade battle rhythm, coordinating for the S3 to stand in, etc. When not required, or when the battalion needs to have its XO present, the BN XO should participate via Ventrillo, SVOIP, or another distributed C2 system. Units must establish this coordination prior to starting operations. It is much more difficult to establish on-the-fly.
The overall message of these best practices is that the maintenance system must be clear, disciplined, realistic, well-understood, and well-practiced. It is too late to implement a system when a unit arrives to the NTC or in combat. The prevailing maintenance system executed by BCTs at the NTC is often a departure from home station training exercises/garrison operations. And OC/Ts see units struggling to execute a system with which they are not familiar. Regardless of the system the BCT implements at NTC or in combat, they must train it while at home station. They must train it with clear expectations, roles, and focus at all levels. Units must practice it at every opportunity. They can do so in the motor pool, during steady-state training, or in major training events like collective Field Training Exercises or Live Fire Exercises.
Maintaining at Night
One of the key strengths of our Army is our ability to operate at night. Just as we can maneuver and engage the enemy at night, we must be able to maintain at night. Often, maintenance at the Unit Maintenance Collection Point stops shortly after the sun goes down. This is often due to a lack of comfort to repair in limited visibility, or more commonly having limited experience. If units only conduct major maintenance operations during daylight hours, this drastically reduces the pace of regenerating combat power.
Often during AARs, topics of a units SSL, parts received but not installed, and even the number of toolboxes available will come up. However, we rarely discuss hours of operation for a UMCP. It should be a 24-hour operation and often is not. Everything can align perfectly. Units with limited maintainers or wrench turning, will yield less than desired results.
The Role of the CAB Forward Support Company
Picture yourself in 2032. You are the Forward Support Company (FSC) Commander and deployed in support of a Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) in an Armored Brigade. You receive an urgent message from the Battalion S4 over your Joint Battle Command–Platform (JBC-P), “Need you at the CTCP. We need to talk combat power for the attack. Bring a copy of the Equipment Status Report (ESR) with CL IX parts statuses you’re tracking at the BSA and any parts on hand there.”
You think to yourself, “We already rehearsed and discussed the plan at length at the battalion combined arms rehearsal. Why do they need CL IX earlier than our scheduled logistics package (LOGPAC)?” You reply back to the Battalion S4, “I’ll be there in two hours.”
On the way to the CTCP you finally get to catch up on messages from the battalion administration/logistics chatroom. Then you realize why the Battalion S4 wants to talk. Scrolling up you read:
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A/XO: 1x M1 no mobility, 1x M1 turret destroyed, 1x M1 no power
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B/XO: 1x M1 no brakes, 1x M1 trans inop.
You arrive at the CTCP. The distribution platoon soldiers immediately begin downloading the CL IX repair parts. The BN S4 and the BN maintenance warrant greet you at your JLTV door. “Did you see the messages from the company XOs?” they say. The maintenance warrant adds, “We have 18-24 hours to get three more M1s back in the fight for the commander. Let’s go talk.”
There are three major keys to success that the fictional organization described above can do to regenerate combat power for future operations:
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Task organization of field maintenance teams (FMTs).
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Specified Maintenance Control roles and responsibilities.
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Shared understanding of the battalion’s maintenance picture.
Mobile but well-equipped FMTs are critical to fixing forward. The FMT looks different than garrison operations because they have to keep up with the fight forward. The most successful method is to attach each company’s assigned M88 recovery vehicle, a contact truck, and an LMTV to haul a small section of the unit’s shop stock listing (SSL). This will enable field maintenance teams to fix as far forward as possible. The Forward Repair Systems (FRSs), each FMT chief, and the bulk of each SSL should be located inside the UMCP. An unequivocally crucial component to maintenance operations inside the UMCP is lift assets. Each FRS and the M88s organic to the FSC give that capability.
The Expando Van
Another key to success is operations inside of the expando van. Each member of shop office has specific roles and responsibilities. The ability to successfully synchronize these efforts can effectively drive maintenance for the battalion. There are three key leaders inside the maintenance control section. They are: the maintenance warrant, the maintenance control officer, and the maintenance control sergeant.
The Maintenance Warrant
The maintenance warrant is the primary driver of maintenance for the battalion. The maintenance warrant should be the most technically proficient member of the UMCP in regards to maintenance and supply/GCSSA operations. They focus on parts flow from the SSA, work order statuses, and attend the daily maintenance meeting at the BSA. Additionally, the maintenance warrant keeps the Battalion Executive Officer informed of available and projected combat power.
The Maintenance Control Officer
The maintenance control officer (MCO) battle tracks what is happening forward with the companies. The MCO does this through JBCP and FM communication with the company executive officers. The MCO synchronizes daily operations between the shop office and FMTs. This is especially true when the maintenance warrant has to be away at the BSA. Lastly, the maintenance control sergeant (MCS) directly manages operations and work orders on the ground inside the UMCP. The MCS receives priorities of maintenance from the maintenance warrant and assigns work orders to each FMT. The MCS should be interfacing multiple times a day with FMT chiefs to inspect progress of work orders and ensure safe operating procedures.
The Maintenance COP
The last thing for successful maintenance operations is a maintenance common operating picture (COP) inside of the shop office. GCSSA is the system of record for maintenance in the Army. However, analog tracking inside of shop office creates redundancy. This will help when the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is non-mission capable (NMC). Analog tracking synchronizes efforts and gives leadership a complete picture of the battalion’s maintenance posture. A maintenance COP inside the shop office should include:
- Overall slant for combat power in the battalion
- Status of work orders for combat power inside the UMCP
- Parts statuses
- Estimated time of completion for repairs
- Ongoing recovery missions
This vignette began with a situation from the perspective of the FSC commander. The FSC commanders is in command of all maintenance assets for their supported battalion. He or she is also the senior logistician for their supported battalion. In that role, the FSC commander must insert him or herself into maintenance management. Too often their response to this is, “I have too many other things to worry about. That’s why there is a maintenance warrant.” The FSC commander should be using their command authority to employ the processes outlined above to enable successful maintenance operations for their supported battalion.
POC: Maj. Woo Shin, Tarantula 02, XO Trainer, at woo.c.shin.mil@mail.mil; Capt. Martin A. Johnson, Scorpion 17, FSC Trainer, at martin.a.johnson37.mil@mail.mil; Capt. Amanda L. Walton, Panther 17, CSS Trainer, at amanda.l.walton4.mil@mail.mil
Doctrinal References:
- ATP 4-90 – Brigade Support Battalion
- ATP 3-90.5 – Combined Arms Battalion
- ATP 4-33 – Maintenance Operations
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