Although the defense is an opportunity to inflict tremendous casualties and damage to enemy forces, many Army units and leaders view the defense with suspicion. Leaders often choose to spend the vast majority of training time on offensive tasks rather than defensive fundamentals. With appropriate planning and preparation for defensive operations, units can halt the enemy’s momentum, regenerate their own combat power, and then regain the initiative for offensive operations. According to ADP 3-90, this is the primary purpose of the defense[1]. When properly utilized, Engineers shape the battlefield, enhancing maneuver units ability to stop the enemy’s advance and destroy them in an engagement area (EA). If units overcome the following common friction points observed during National Training Center (NTC) rotations they can aggressively train and prepare to repel a fierce enemy attack – at NTC or wherever America needs them.
Success in the defense is no accident. Doctrine explicitly states, “it is difficult to transition to the defense without prior planning”[2]. Transitions must be forecasted and planned by the Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) staff to allow maneuver commanders the greatest flexibility when preparing the defense. Engineer battalion staffs struggle with three facets of the defensive plan:
- Understanding the actual Engineer effort available
- Task organization
- Logistical support to the defense.
First, the BEB planning effort during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) must focus on gaining and maintaining an accurate understanding of what engineer capabilities are available for preparation of the defense. BEBs must maintain accurate running estimates of combat power and Class IV (CLIV) supplies on hand, enabling them to forecast their total defensive effort available. This forecast is ideally created using historic obstacle emplacement rates as well as data from TM 3-34.8 and ATP 3-90.8 when actual emplacement rates are not available. Army doctrine contains dig rates, CLIV estimates for different types of obstacles, and equations used to compute the total effort available and required for a given defensive frontage. Once the BEB staff has forecasted the total effort available, they can present options to the Brigade Engineer (the BEB Commander) and brigade planners for weighting defensive effort across the brigade’s EAs. This will lead to the task organization required to complete the defensive plan.
Second, BEB staffs must publish the defensive task organization in a timely manner. Delaying this linkup of engineer assets with their supported task force decreases the amount of Engineer effort available by decreasing preparation time in the EA. The BEB must work with the brigade staff to publish the defensive task organization as early as possible, ideally prior to EN units departing to execute the offense. This will allow Engineer units to plan for the transition to the defense at the company and platoon level and ensure that minimal time is lost due to delayed linkups after the offense’s culmination.
Last, the BEB staff must coordinate logistic support to the defense in accordance with the task organization. The most frequent failures in logistical planning are related to CLIII and CLIV. CLIII must be coordinated with the supported task force, as the BEB does not have enough fuelers to support dig assets in multiple EAs across the BEB’s area of operations (AO). Along with maintaining accurate running estimates of CLIV on-hand, the BEB staff must plan for transportation of the CLIV to each EA. Successful BEBs plan for the CLIV to be transported by assets internal to the brigade, either with the supported task force or with Alpha Company of the BSB. It is difficult to forecast the defensive location accurately enough 72 hours in advance to request transportation by the combat support sustainment battalion (CSSB).
Engineer leaders must prepare for the defense. One way to accomplish this is through rehearsals. When the time and resources are available leaders should ensure their soldiers are constructing practice obstacles of triple standard concertina (TSC), anti-vehicle ditch (AVD), as well as survivability positions, and the supporting tasks that are critical to the success of these defensive tasks. These include but are not limited to loading and downloading a bulldozer (especially at night), performing a functions check on a volcano, demolitions prep, and driving and operating all equipment and vehicles with night vision devices.
Once it is clear that friendly forces have transitioned to the defense, it is time to construct obstacles and develop the EA. In order to quickly emplace their assigned obstacles, leaders should ensure that the start and end points of the obstacle are templated and disseminated down to the lowest level. If the obstacle will not meet the desired intent as determined by leaders on the ground then these points must be adjusted. It is important to identify whether leaders at the company or platoon levels are authorized to change to the start and end points of an obstacle as well as the communication plan following a change. As stated in ATP 3-90.8, obstacles should ideally reinforce the restrictiveness of terrain to reduce the amount of obstacle effort required to have the same or similar effect on the enemy[3].
Once the start and end points are identified, subordinate leaders can determine how to get their equipment to these locations, where to stage support equipment, and where to establish C2 nodes to include the company command post (CP). Often, Engineer elements view the defense as a construction jobsite rather than a tactical objective. Reversing this mindset is important due to how far forward these Engineer units operate during the defense. Establishing an objective rally point (ORP) ensures that subordinates know where to fall back to in the event they take contact. In the event of contact with enemy armor or aviation, soldiers at all levels need to know what actions to take and where to re-consolidate, especially since most echelon above battalion (EAB) Engineer units are not equipped with weapons required to suppress or destroy either of those threats.
The enemy does not want friendly forces to emplace obstacles and develop a lethal EA. The enemy may conduct a spoiling attack, either applying just enough combat power to force friendly forces to withdraw from the obstacle, or destroy Engineer assets outright to ensure they cannot emplace further obstacles. Disengagement criteria is important to define prior to occupying the obstacle or objective. Leaders must define whether friendly units will fall back in the event of a certain sized enemy element, enemy capability, or fight in place. Along with disengagement criteria, a retrograde plan ahead of time will reduce confusion and increase the likelihood friendly forces will be able to reconsolidate with minimal losses to friendly personnel and equipment. Ideally the withdrawal plan should be rehearsed if time and resources are available.
In order to identify enemy forces approaching the friendly objective, Engineers must either place reconnaissance elements from within the organic force or ensure that communications are tied into the operational environment owner. While tying into friendly communications sounds easy, it can be difficult to execute at the company and platoon level. The vehicle or CP monitoring friendly communication must have at least two radios as well as a trained radio telephone operator (RTO) who is aware of what information is critical and how to disseminate that information. Friendly scouts are often operating forward of the objective and can provide intelligence on the enemy composition and disposition. This information is only useful if it is shared with Engineers on the ground and these Engineers can respond appropriately. Once on or near the templated obstacles, leaders must ensure that obstacle emplacement begins as quickly as possible as we cannot control when the enemy will attack. The obstacle is likely forward of the majority of friendly forces and in range of enemy direct and indirect fires.
Leaders are responsible for obstacle emplacement. soldiers need a clear task and purpose; leaders have the responsibility to ensure this is communicated down to the lowest level, allowing the obstacle to be constructed. Once obstacle emplacement begins, leaders need to be thinking about the next task. Whether this is another obstacle, fighting position, or offensive preparations, leaders need to begin preparation for follow-on tasks. Unfortunately, there are often significant delays between emplacing one obstacle and another. These delays are often preventable, or at least can be reduced. Leaders have a responsibility to minimize these delays. If the next task is clearly identified and communicated down to the lowest level it will minimize idle blade time and keep leaders and subordinates alike in a mindset that maximizes efficiency. When subordinates believe they are done and can sleep or rest at the end of a certain task and are then informed that they are not and additional tasks await, it can lead to decreased morale and lower work rates. However, when NCOs know what tasks await, they can prepare their soldiers and their equipment for follow-on missions as well as provide bottom up refinement on future tasks.
Leaders must conduct quality assurance spot checks, ensuring that the obstacle emplaced in the correct location and will meet desired intent. However, leaders do not need to remain on site for the duration of obstacle emplacement. There is a flurry of activity leading up to obstacle emplacement and once emplacement begins there can often be a lull. Once this lull hits, leaders often think they can take a tactical pause, which is not the case. Once emplacement is started, leaders need to lean forward towards the next defensive task in order to maximize time and defensive effort.
Obstacle progress needs to be reported accurately on a regular basis. Doctrine states that each echelon must track obstacle effort two levels down[4]. Therefore, reporting requirements are often set at the battalion or brigade level. Wire obstacles should be tracked in phases (pickets, two lower loops, and complete) while dig effort should be reported by calculated distance and with MGRS grid coordinates. Completion status either in distance complete and distance remaining or, a percentage is often required but quality or obstacle effect is frequently overlooked. For example, if a unit is tasked with completing an AVD of 1,000m the distance complete is easy to send up. However, the depth of the ditch as well as the height of the berm of said obstacle can be challenging to communicate via radio or digital methods.
Along with clear reporting of the qualities of the obstacle, it is important to report whether the leader on the ground believes this obstacle and/or EA will have the desired effect on the enemy. What often happens at the National Training Center is that Engineers simply emplace the specified obstacle yet do not ask themselves if this obstacle will truly block, turn, fix, or disrupt the enemy. Reporting becomes especially important if and when the friendly force is required to abandon obstacle emplacement or EA development either due to a spoiling attack or due to approaching a prescribed no later than defend time. As the emplacing unit pulls off, it is critical to communicate whether the obstacle intent will be met. This may trigger a reserve force to be committed to those area(s) where the intent was not able to be met.
Once complete, transfer of the obstacle can begin. Having a deliberate plan for transferring the obstacle and then executing this plan is critical to ensure obstacle effectiveness is not degraded[5]. The responsibility for the transfer falls on the Engineers emplacing the obstacle. Doctrine states that the details for transfer should be established when the obstacle is sited[6]. However, if the owning unit is not present at obstacle siting, handover should be done as the obstacle is being finished and should ideally take place with a face to face handover with the commander from the owning unit and the OIC or NCOIC of the obstacle construction. If the obstacle will not meet the intent of the owning unit, the emplacing unit can either adjust the obstacle on the spot or request guidance from higher if other Engineer tasks are specified after obstacle completion.
Another reason it is critical to communicate planned vs. executed obstacles is that it could reduce the amount of time and resources needed for reverse breaching of friendly obstacles. Reducing the amount of time and resources needed for reverse breaching reduces the amount of time the enemy can prepare their defenses for the friendly counterattack. While reverse breaching of friendly obstacles and transition back from defense to offense is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to consider this when emplacing and reporting friendly obstacles.
In conclusion, transition to the defense starts long before the actual defense. Thorough planning is critical to successful defensive operations. Leaders at all levels own the responsibility to develop and then execute a realistic defensive plan. Once successfully executed, forces can then transfer back to the offense and regain the initiative.
POCs: Capt. Peter Linscheid (Sidewinder 19 – Engineer Construction Company Trainer) with contributions from Capt. Steve LaFave (steven.p.lafave2.mil@mail.mil, Sidewinder 3A – Brigade Engineer Battalion Battle Staff Trainer) and Capt. Kristopher Edson (kristopher.c.edson2.mil@mail.mil, Sidewinder 16 – B Co BEB Trainer).
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[1] Department of the Army. ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense 2019 paragraph 4-2, p. 4-1
[2] Department of the Army. ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense 2019 paragraph 3-121, p. 3-19
[3] Department of the Army. ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 Combined Arms Countermobility Operations 2014 paragraph 1-9, p. 1-2
[4] Ibid paragraph 2-32, P. 2-7
[5] Ibid paragraph 4-23, P. 4-4
[6] Ibid