Cavalry troops frequently fail to provide early warning to the protected force while performing a screen. Units are placed on disadvantageous terrain, fail to array in depth, and neglect to incorporate available aerial reconnaissance to extend observation and maximize reaction time and maneuver space.
Best Practice
Screens must have sufficient depth to provide reaction time and maneuver space. They must be arrayed in a way that generates contact with the smallest element possible first. Cavalry squadron planners need to synchronize organic UAS with brigade and higher-level assets. Raven, Shadow, and other unmanned aerial surveillance (UAS) assets should observe named areas of interest (NAIs) forward of the ground troops.
Dismounted OPs offer the smallest ground troop signature and should be forward of vehicle positions with appropriate optics to observe assigned NAIs. Dismounts must be prepared to climb restrictive, elevated terrain in order to gain the best observation of the battlefield. Unit leadership must account for the time required to move dismounted in challenging terrain and during periods of darkness; a standard measure is no more than one kilometer per hour. Instead of choosing key terrain that is likely to have a planned artillery target against it, recommend picking the ‘next best’ piece of terrain to lower risk to dismounted OPs. Dismounted OPs employ optics (LLDR, LRAS, etc.) to increase their ability to acquire targets at distance, positively identify them, and rapidly generate an accurate fire mission.
Vehicles array themselves in mounted OPs behind dismounted OPs, or in hide sights nearby that will not compromise dismounted OP positions. Vehicles represent a significantly larger signature on the screen and represent a higher risk of discovery than dismounted units. Mitigate the risk of vehicle detection through employment of camouflage netting and the use of turret and hull down fighting positions when possible.
Finally, cavalry troops should coordinate with the task force scouts of the protected unit to add an additional layer of depth to ensure continuous reconnaissance and a deliberate reconnaissance hand-over leading up to engagement by the protected force. Task force scouts take up a position to maintain a security area, and allow for rapid execution of reverse passage of lines (RPOL). Annex B in ATP 3-20.97 provides multiple layouts for what the ideal width and depth of a screen should be based on unit composition and terrain as shown below.
Units that cannot position themselves far enough forward to provide sufficient time and maneuver space to the protected force can incorporate elements of engagement area (EA) development to disrupt approaching units. White phosphorous mortar rounds can obscure enemy observation of the area, slow maneuver, as well as deny use of high-speed avenues of approach. Artillery or mortar fire planned and executed along likely avenues of approach can break up movement formations and disrupt enemy progress. Units should deploy in sector with class IV items to establish hasty obstacles. Each vehicle should deploy with enough pickets and concertina wire to create one 25m triple strand concertina section. Units can utilize direct fires to slow and disrupt enemy forces. However, the unit should avoid becoming decisively engaged during this action.
Observation
Units fail to adequately rehearse and prepare for a rearward passage of lines (RPOL) as a part of the scheme of maneuver for a defense. This causes unexpected friction and delays when displacing at the conclusion of the security mission. Units attempting to conduct an RPOL must be able to complete the task without becoming decisively engaged while collapsing the security area.
Best Practice
BCT, squadron, and troop SOPs should standardize markings and communications for passage. Successful units rehearse the passage lane with the security element and the main body escort element. Successful rehearsals include the troop commander, a leader from the troop trains, and a representative from each platoon participating in the passage. In line with ATP 3-20.96; ensure that the escort elements from the stationary unit understand the scheme of maneuver and sequencing for the displacing elements of the RPOL. The escorts must understand the number of serials moving through the passage lane, as well as the composition and timing, and the timing of these serials arriving at the passage lane.
Perform time distance analysis or mounted rehearsal of the route to establish the exact timing under conditions expected (at night and in one or more forms of contact). Serials and their assigned escort vehicles must utilize far and near recognition symbols appropriately to avoid stopping the serial’s movement at the link up point. If the signaling methodology is properly understood and rehearsed, the methodology allows the serial to perform the near recognition symbol with their escort and continue movement immediately without stopping.
Units should identify triggers to maneuver slower trains vehicles through the RPOL lane prior to displacement of the platoons to prevent unnecessarily slow or congested RPOL execution. Units must have a recovery PACE plan to remove non-mission capable vehicles and equipment from the battlefield in a timely manner. Recommend
- Primary: Organic recovery asset
- Alternate: Like vehicle recovery
- Contingency: Escort unit recovery asset
- Emergency: Secure sensitive items and abandon vehicle.
Units should request that the escort vehicles position a recovery vehicle at the link up point to serve as the contingency recovery vehicle. Positioning the contingency recovery vehicle forward in the passage lane will mitigate the time required to notify and push the vehicle forward through the security area to the point of recovery.
Observation
Troop commanders and platoon leaders regularly fail to brief detailed commander’s security guidance and to confirm shared understanding by their subordinate leaders. Units typically have underdeveloped guidance for engagement, disengagement and displacement criteria. The failure to communicate the commander’s security guidance results in unresponsive, inflexible units during contact.
Best Practice
A best practice is when commanders brief security guidance by phase. Troops must clearly establish the engagement criteria for key weapon systems, and develop engagement priorities for their employment. Effective guidance outlines the conditions for employment of key weapon systems, each form of contact, and defines the enemy capabilities that exceed that echelon’s engagement criteria. Leaders plan and communicate these engagement priorities to the individual scout at the observation post (OP) level. For example, a commander’s engagement criteria
Example Commander’s Engagement Criteria:
- An OP that identifies a single tracked or wheeled vehicle will engage with their OP’s javelin.
- If that same OP identifies a section of BRDMs or BMPs, they will maintain visual contact and pass off that target to the supporting vehicle section to engage with 25mm.
- Engage a section of armor with TOW missiles at the platoon level.
- A platoon of armor will be the trigger for engagement by rotary winged aviation while maintaining visual contact.
- Stationary BRDMs and BMPs, up to platoon size, outside of direct fire range will be engaged with Troop 120mm mortars.
- Stationary armor outside of direct fire range will be engaged with 155mm artillery.
A successful TTP is immediately conducting a confirmation brief to ensure their subordinates retain and understand critical information, particularly on security guidance such as engagement, bypass, disengagement, and displacement criteria.
This brief should solve any remaining confusion regarding the mission. Units should codify the content of the confirmation brief in their TACSOP and the time limit for a confirmation brief should be no more than 15 min. During rehearsals, leaders must use injects to confirm understanding of their commander’s intent and security guidance. The commander or select personnel (recommend S2 for the squadron, executive officer for the troop, or senior scout for the platoon) select an appropriate moment during scheme of maneuver to discuss actions on contact. Leaders specifically ensure subordinates understand what reaching engagement and disengagement criteria means for their unit, and can execute those actions when necessary.
POC: Maj. Jim Plutt, Cobra 03, Task Force S3 Trainer, james.m.plutt2.mil@mail.mil
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