NTC Update (MAR 20)

Lift Aviation Assets in the Defense and Counterattack

Defensive operations for a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) are complex operations requiring the synchronization of numerous units across multiple lines of effort. Critical to the success of any defensive operation and to subsequent counterattacks is the BCT’s ability to rapidly move personnel and equipment across the battlefield to support sustainment as well as movement and maneuver operations. Aviation assets are particularly valuable in the defense because of their speed, mobility, and versatility.[1] Directly or indirectly, lift aviation is able to support each of the fundamentals of the defense (disruption, flexibility, maneuver, massing effects, operations in depth, preparation, and security).[2] These valuable assets, require in depth planning and analysis prior to executing the defense to ensure efficient execution.

Army AH-64 Apache aircrews conduct formation practice at Camp Williams, Utah, June 5, 2019, before the funeral flyover for Army Air Forces 2nd Lt. Lynn W. Hadfield, whose remains were recovered after being listed as missing in action for 74 years. (U.S. Army photo).

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During preparation for the defense, lift aviation can play a large number of roles to facilitate the ground force commander’s vision. A major aspect of the defense is to exploit the advantages of terrain[3], occupying key terrain that will force the enemy into committing their forces piecemeal or forcing them into canalizing terrain. A successful technique observed at the National Training Center (NTC) is the use of UH-60 aircraft to circulate the brigade commander throughout the battlefield with his subordinate commanders to recon the templated defensive positions. This recon provides subordinate commanders with an aerial view of the area to increase situational awareness, understanding of the overall plan, and how each position is mutually supporting.

Additionally, in order to take full advantage of lift aviation’s ability to rapidly move personnel and equipment across the battlefield, supporting units need to understand the unique requirements of each airframe as it pertains to landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) analysis, loading requirements, and best practices for packaging materials for transport. For example, when preparing CL IV barrier materials for resupply of a forward unit, the Soldiers at the PZ need to understand how to place the material on pallets, how tall the pallets can be stacked, how many pallets of what type each aircraft can take and what machinery is required to move it, etc. This portion of the preparation can be accomplished by having a subject matter expert from each airframe travel to the individual unit to act as a liaison prior to the actual execution of the defense to speak directly to the unit involved in the resupply.

Perhaps the most important part of the preparation of the defense is also the part that is overlooked the most: airspace. Brigades are responsible for airspace management of Army airspace users within their AO.[4] To properly construct airspace for the execution of the defense, the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) must be involved from the beginning of the planning process to deconflict air routes with planned firing positions to facilitate the rapid movement of aviation assets across the battlefield without desynchronizing fire support for forward units.

When analyzing air routing, units need to consider locations of logistical resupply points (LRPs), combat trains command posts (CTCPs), ambulance exchange points, as well as Role I and Role II medical facilities. The Brigade S4 and Support Operations (SPO) specifically need to involve themselves in resupply planning to ensure that the air routing supports their scheme of support. When selecting areas for ambulance exchange points, the MEDEVAC unit needs to provide feedback to the ground units as to where acceptable locations would be to minimize the time from 9-line request to aircraft launching.

While the brigade is defending, it is vital for the aviation task force to maintain an up to date Common Operational Picture (COP), and for the lift aviation assets to be kept informed of the battle’s progress. Doing so ensures that lift aviation assets can posture crews as required to surge capabilities during critical points in the battle as it pertains to each aircraft (e.g. additional MEDEVAC or mass casualty evacuation capabilities during templated large scale battles, additional crews available for resupply operations after a successful defense).

During the defense, the enemy may have the initiative, and as such, the commander may have to frequently shift shaping operations or supporting efforts to contain the enemy’s attack until the defending force can seize the initiative. This may require the commander to adjust subordinate unit AOs, repeatedly commit and reconstitute the reserve, and modify the original plan.[5] As stated earlier, one of the defining aspects of lift aviation support is the ability to move personnel and equipment across large distances quickly, which in turn makes it a critical asset in a rapidly shifting area of operations to allow the ground force commander to react to changing conditions and employ the reserve force at the optimal time and place to regain the initiative.

Once the initiative is regained, the brigade commander may opt to execute a counterattack. A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking.[6] Counterattacks lend themselves to execution using lift aviation assets due to the fact that the window of time for their execution is typically very small, and lift aviation is uniquely suited to the movement of large numbers of forces rapidly to facilitate the attack in an air assault operation.

To successfully execute a counterattack, the ground force commander must wait until the enemy is at their most vulnerable, which is when the enemy is attempting to overcome friendly defensive positions.[7] Critical to the successful counterattack is the planning process to facilitate surprise, control, and coordinated fires. To properly execute a counterattack air assault, planning needs to have begun during the preparation phase. The ground force needs to have templated a predicted area for the counterattack and coordinated airspace to facilitate the movement of troops and equipment via lift aviation to surprise the enemy and not to interfere with the employment of fires.

Lift aviation assets are a combat multiplier in the defense. Their ability to move across the battlefield for sustainment operations and troop movements is unmatched and provides the ground force commander with tremendous flexibility and support. As with all operations however, planning and having a shared understanding of that plan are absolutely vital to their efficient employment. Direct coordination with supported units and involvement in the brigade’s Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) from the outset are critical, and ultimately provide the ground force commander a massive range of options for employment to achieve the desired endstate.

POC: Capt. Benjamin Ingell, Eagle 19, Heavy Lift Trainer, at benjamin.w.ingell.mil@mail.mil.

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[1] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, para. 6-16

[2] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, para. 3-148

[3] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, para. 3-149

[4] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, March 2013, para. 6-39

[5] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, March 2013, para. 6-2

[6] FM 3-90-1, “Offense and Defense Volume 1”, March 2013, para. 6-22

[7] FM 3-52, “Airspace Control”, October 2018, para. 2-42