Major General Carl von Clausewitz’s On War sparks discussions in military classrooms across the world. However, German General Gunther Blumentritt cautioned against handing Clausewitz’s work to the military, as it is like “allowing a child to play with a razor blade.”^[i] It is certainly not an endeavor to be taken lightly, as Clausewitz’s difficult writing style, which is full of metaphors and philosophy, is challenging and prone to misinterpretation to those not ready to wrestle with his ideas. Overcoming this requires serious preparation, repetition, and reflection to develop a personal understanding of Clausewitz’s insights on war.[ii] As growing professionals, it is important to understand the business of our profession–war–and wrestling with his ideas is a great place to start learning about war’s nature, despite claims to the contrary.

Authors Joe Byerly and Nate Finney recently wrote a piece on reading Clausewitz for “trigger pullers” published on the Modern War Institute Blog. They provide an excellent annotated bibliography for company grade officers (and others) to begin this self-guided journey to study Clausewitz. This piece supplements their guide by providing additional context on how Prussia’s 1806 defeat and Napoleon’s broader operational success set the stage for Clausewitz’s own intellectual journey, reveals some previous misinterpretations of Clausewitz, and provides a short guide on Clausewitz’s philosophical method to help readers understand the path he takes to develop his insights.

The Genesis of Clausewitz’s On War

Unlike most modern strategic theorists, who are products of the academy, Clausewitz was a product of both the battlefield and the classroom.  He joined the Prussian army at age 12 as a Lance Corporal and would serve until his death while on campaign as a Major General. His first combat was at age 13, and he would come of age during the Napoleonic Wars (1806-1815). The most significant battle for Clausewitz was the Prussian defeat at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806, which convinced the Prussians that war was no longer the “sport of kings.” Napoleon’s harnessing of the energy of the French Revolution through the levee en masse was a revolution in military affairs and created a French military that was an existential threat to the Prussian state.

This motivated two things that, together, would lead Clausewitz to write On War. First, Prussia enacted a series of military reforms that would transform the Prussian army from a nobility-based officer corps to a merit-based officer corps. To support this, Prussia developed a professional military education system that examined war and warfare in a broad manner.  Clausewitz’s attendance and later posting as a professor and commandant furnished him an environment where his ideas could take shape through iterative reflection upon both his study of and experience in war. Second, based on Napoleon harnessing the energy of the entire French state, Clausewitz began to contemplate the relationship between war and the state, an endeavor that would lead to the most impactful insights in On War.

What is On War?

Clausewitz began work on what would become On War in 1818.^[iii] Unlike many authors of the day that were writing prescriptive works on how to prosecute war, Clausewitz sought to explore the very nature of war. What is war, and why it was a unique social phenomenon? His thoughts went through countless drafts and revisions and, in 1827, he had a breakthrough that would spur subsequent drafts and revisions exploring more deeply both unlimited and limited war and the moderating influence of policy upon the conduct of war.^[iv] By the time of his death in 1831, Clausewitz had incorporated these new ideas into Books 8 and 1.  Thus, his treatise was an unfinished draft, and it was left to his widow, Marie von Clausewitz, to pull together his unfinished work and publish it.

On War did not see immediate success, and it would not be acclaimed until decades later when the great Prussian Chief of General Staff, Hermuth von Moltke, praised Clausewitz’s work as an inspiration that led to the Prussian triumphs in the wars of German Unification (1866-1871). While Clausewitz’s writings would gain an audience among American civilian strategists in the late 1950s and early 1960s, he would not become required reading in U.S. war colleges until following the Vietnam War: 1976 at the Naval War College, 1978 at the Air War College, and 1981 at the Army War College.^[v]

How to (Mis)read On War?

“If an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of ideas.  Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be the target of much half-baked cristicism, for in matters of this kind everyone feels he is justified in writing . . .” Note by Clausewitz, 10 July 1827^[vi]

As an unfinished work, On War has seen its fair share of critics and those who have selectively (ab)used its insights. Prussian Chief of General Staff Helmut von Moltke praised Clausewitz, but also ignored his insights of the necessity of the continual influence of policy on war, stating that “at the moment of mobilization the political adviser should fall silent, and should take the lead again only when the Strategist has informed the King, after the complete defeat of the enemy, that his task has been fulfilled.”^[vii]

Separately, Captain B.H. Liddell Hart famously referred to Clausewitz as the “Mahdi of Mass,” focusing on Clausewitz’s emphasis on mass in battle and blaming Clausewitz for the spirit of the offensive that led to millions of death in the trenches of World War I. However, Hart did not understand Clausewitz’s philosophical approach and confused Clausewitz’s theoretical discussion of absolute war as an endorsement of absolute war.

Next, Colonel Harry Summers, who reinvigorated the study of Clausewitz at the Army War College with the publication of his study On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War in 1981, used Clausewitz’s second trinity of the people, army, and government, and advanced an explanation that the Army failed to focus on conventional, large-scale operations and thus lost Vietnam. However, a more complete analysis that used the primary trinity of passion, chance, and reason for both the United States and North Vietnam and explored their interaction would have more properly utilized Clausewitz’s insights.

Thus, one must take caution when reading and re-reading Clausewitz, both to better understand what he had to say, but also to identify what still remains relevant today and which insights are no longer valid.

How to Read On War?

Clausewitz’s On War seeks to uncover the enduring nature of war–those things that are true throughout the ages–as opposed to the changing character of war.^[viii] This is often expressed as the difference between war and warfare or the difference between the objective and subjective nature of war.^[ix] To accomplish this, Clausewitz begins On War using parallel lines of inquiry.^[x] This methodology was introduced to Clausewitz by Kiesewetter, a disciple of Kant and a lecturer at the Institute for Young Officers that Clausewitz attended and at which Clausewitz later taught. The first line of inquiry examined the concept to determine if it was logical, i.e., it did not contain any inconsistency that would render it illogical. The second line of inquiry examined the concept to determine if it was material, i.e., did it exist in the real world? Finally, if the concept was both logical and material, then it was arranged within or among other known concepts.^[xi]

As an example, as Clausewitz is examining the concept of war, he develops the idea of absolute war, which requires the maximum use of force, the disarmament of one’s enemy, and the maximum exertion of strength. This represents what is logical–what is possible in theory.  However, in examining what is material, he discovers modifications in practice. Rather, war is never an isolated act, it does not consist of a single blow, and the result is never final. What explains this? Clausewitz determines that it is the political object that moderates war in practice; thus, war is not a phenomenon unto itself.^[xii]  Instead, he finds that it is “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”^[xiii]

Conclusion

On War is not an easy read. However, with an understanding of why Clausewitz was exploring war and his philosophical method of exploration, one can more easily interpret his insights, allowing the military professional to incorporate those insights they deem still relevant into their own theory and understanding of war.

Additional Resources

The articles by Leonard and Byerly and Finney provide a wealth of resources for further exploration.  However, I would add the following two for your intellectual rucksack.

“Five Things that Helped Carl von Clausewitz Become a Great Strategic Thinker.” This is a very short essay by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger that explores what contributed to Clausewitz’s professional development.  She offers five main factors:  the French Revolution, great mentorship, an [intellectual] partner, enormous experience, and plenty of time for ideas to mature.

Reading Clausewitz. Beatrice Heuser’s book provides insights into Clausewitz’s writings by examining his words and interpretations over time.  She starts by tracing the historiography of On Warand evolution of Clausewitz’s thoughts as he was writing the book.  She then moves into chapters dedicated to exploring the following:  politics, the trinity, and civil-military relations; beyond numbers – genius, morale, concentration of forces, will, and friction; the defensive-offensive debate, the annihilation battle, and total war; taking Clausewitz further – Corbett and maritime warfare, Mao and guerrilla warfare; Clausewitz in the nuclear age; and Clausewitz’s relevance in the 21st Century.

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References

• ^[i]As quoted in Handel, Michael I., Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, Routledge: Oxon, 2006, 25.
• [ii]This is a timeless comment, as demonstrated by this 1832 review of On War:  “The streams whose crystal floods pour over nuggets of pure gold do not flow in any flat and accessible river bed but in a narrow rocky valley surrounded by gigantic Ideas, and over its entrance the mighty Spirit stands guard like a cherub with his sword, turning back all who expect to be admitted at the usual price for a play of ideas.”
• ^[iii]Heuser, Beatrice, Reading Clausewitz, Pimlico: London, 2002, 4.
• ^[iv]Heuser, 33-34.  Clausewitz defines unlimited and limited war in terms of the policy objective that is sought, not in terms of the means used.  For example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq used limited means, but sought an unlimited objective from Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime:  regime change.
• ^[v]Heuser, 16-18.
• ^[vi]Clausewitz, 70.
• ^[vii]Clausewitz, 31.
• ^[viii]Mewett, Christopher, “Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside Its Changing Character,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/(accessed 7 March 2019).
• ^[ix]Clausewitz, 85.
• ^[x]Clausewitz’s method is often described as using the Hegelian dialectic.  While it did use the dialectic, it did not use Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, and synthesis format.  In fact, Clausewitz rarely developed a synthesis.  Instead, he used the contrast of opposites “to penetrate appearances and explore the substances of concepts more closely.”  See Echevarria, Antulio J. II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013, 38-39.
• ^[xi]Echevarria, 39-40.
• ^[xii]Echevarria, 40-41.
• ^[xiii]Clausewitz, 87.