Military folks love to argue myriad topics, but one that seems to stoke the vitriolic flame is Strykers. Whether it is their inception, their fielding, their maintenance issues, or the never-ending up-gun debate, the Army community is never short on opinions about Strykers. There are valid arguments on all sides, but I–for one–love Strykers.
I am certainly not a tactical genius, no Rommel incarnate, but I am a passionate party with an opinion. I started as a light infantryman, and when I arrived to an SBCT as a young captain I was far from all-in on the platform. My lack of knowledge and experience, combined with a fleet as old as time prone to mechanical issues that were only exacerbated by a lack user care, combined to erode my confidence in the platform. But four and a half years later, I left that unit with a new found respect and as an apostle of the Stryker-formation. This is my ode to my love, the Stryker. You can be the judge of worthiness of my opinion.
This is not a comprehensive review of the history, tactics, and employment of the Stryker. For some of those, you should look here, here, or here. Each of these articles has its merits. It’s also not a discussion of the Stryker as a Cavalry platform, or the other variants within the Stryker family. This is a primer and a personal philosophy from training and fighting Strykers with some fantastic NCOs, Officers, and Soldiers who taught me to love my ICV. Furthermore, I hope this serves as a primer for a continued discussion of the future of the SBCT within the DOTMLPF-P construct.
Firepower
C Co, 1-23 IN, conducted a Combined Allied LFX during Exercise Foal Eagle on Mar. 30, 2017. (U.S. Army Photo by SFC Luis J. Coriano).
The up-gun debate rages on, and I am not charging headfirst into that trap. But, regardless of the weapon system mounted on the Stryker, it will never be a tank. Stryker won’t achieve overmatch against an armored force or IFVs. I am all for more firepower, but not at the expense of seats. The Stryker needs to keep the “carrier” in Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). The minute we sacrifice the ability to carry a 9-soldier squad for firepower, we are losing our way. I also want to maintain the M2 .50 cal machine gun and Mk 19 within the formation.
Some argue that a bigger gun will mean it becomes a bigger target. This argument has validity in the HPTL/HVTL and engagement criteria realms. A larger caliber weapon-system will move that platform up on the enemy’s red checkbook and engagement criteria. But it won’t change the threat to the Stryker or where it ranks on the food chain. It may make a difference relative to lighter armed Strykers and MATVs or technical vehicles. But, no matter the firepower, Strykers will remain firmly located below tanks and brands, and above MATVs and HMMWVs, on the vehicular food chain.
Protection
This is the third of three priorities (subordinate to firepower and mobility). The Stryker needs protection against IEDs and direct fire weapon systems. How much protection? As much as we can get without sacrificing mobility (this includes range), firepower, and the ability to carry a 9-soldier squad. This means that the protection cannot increase the weight of the vehicle so much as to degrade its ability to maneuver distances, over lighter-weight capacity bridges and infrastructure found in some operational environments.
Mobility
The Stryker is the greatest infantry carrier vehicle in the arsenal. It is not made for winning tank wars in the central corridor. Strykers are for moving lots of infantry and infantry stuff over operational distances on 52 gallons of fuel, and maneuvering to the decisive point in networked vehicles. The Strykers’ employment, flexibility, modularity, and protection are all linked to and maximized by their mobility.
A Few Principles
With the above as a backdrop, let’s explore some tactical precepts for the fighting and employment of Strykers.
Deliberate Movement
Strykers don’t have the same overmatch opportunities of other platforms to allow a Leeroy Jenkins movement to contact charge forward that sometimes subsidizes poor tactics and planning. Strykers rarely fight with overmatch. They need to be employed with a flexible combination of dismounted and mounted maneuver. Up-gun it all you want, I won’t complain about more firepower (within the confines of the criteria I listed above). But, it won’t replace doing relative combat power analysis and deliberate movement and maneuver planning.
Probable Line of Contact (PLOC)
Stryker-leaders need to understand the PLOC relative to the enemy’s most dangerous and most likely courses of action. The PLOC is the geographic point at which the enemy’s weapon systems can engage friendly forces. When the enemy has weapon systems capable of destroying a Stryker, this needs to drive the probable line of deployment (PLOD). A PLOD is a “phase line that a commander designates as the location to completely deploy the unit into assault formation before beginning the assault.” (FM 3-90) I have heard leaders use the FLOT (forward line of troops) framework to discuss dismount operations and deployment of dismounted infantry. But the better paradigm is using the PLOC.
X, Y, and Off-set
The x, y, off-set dismount model is one used frequently in air assault operations. Dismounting “on the x” means on the objective. Driving up to the proverbial door, dropping hatch, dismounting, and kicking it down. The y is dismounting and deploying short of the objective. And off-set is deploying at a distance, usually one or two terrain features away, and walking. Deliberately plan your movement and maneuver, understand the PLOC, and let it drive your PLOD within the x, y, off-set framework.
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ICVs are not an “Armor” (big A) vehicle. They are not a replacement for a tank or an IFV. When treated like another gunnery platform by inside-the-box tankers or like “just a ride to the objective” by the lazier-of-us infantrymen, they aren’t maximized. These are just two of many ways the proverbial triangle-shaped Stryker is being smashed into a square-shaped hole. If you try to use a hammer like a screwdriver you will walk away thinking the hammer is useless. There are plenty of arguments worth debating to improve the Stryker and the SBCT, but many of the arguments (tactically, mechanically, employment, etc.) are the result of misunderstanding, mistaken identity, or operator error.
Stryker-leaders template the PLOC, determine the dismount point, and fight their Stryker in concert with their dismounted formation and AT-systems. Don’t fight Strykers like an IBCT or an ABCT. Fight like an SBCT, taking advantage of the unique strengths and empowering what others view as weaknesses. Flip the script; once I learned to, I started loving my Stryker.
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