Analysts of the Russian Airborne Forces’ (VDV) failures in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine run the risk of making piece-meal assessments that airborne forces are irrelevant and incapable of achieving success in large scale combat operations (LSCO). The world observed the necessity of conducting effective suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) in support of a joint forcible entry (JFE) operations and the planning for secondary echelons to arrive and support the force that gained the lodgment.
Achieving surprise is a fundamental principle of JFEOs. By not conducting the JFEO at night, the VDV failed to adhere to the principle of surprise and increased their operational risk. An additional factor contributing to surprise is the principle of marshaling the force while protecting operational security. This was difficult to achieve due to the prolonged overt buildup of combat power along the borders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia which indicated early on that a JFEO was imminent.
Another fundamental of JFEOs that the VDV violated was controlling airspace. At a minimum, they needed to neutralize the Ukrainians’ air defense and aircraft to gain local air superiority over the lodgment. This later contributed to the VDV losing access to their only fire support asset, fixed wing close air support (CAS) and rotary wing close combat attack (CCA). Furthermore, the VDV should have integrated artillery and mortars vis-à-vis an air assault into the lodgment with naval surface fire support from the Black Sea.
The VDV also failed to conduct electromagnetic spectrum management. Their electromagnetic order of battle and adjacent unit electromagnetic order of battle interfered with each other. As a result, at the tactical level, they forewent encrypted communications and were susceptible to targeting and information collection.
They failed to neutralize enemy ground forces that could react to their air assault of airports in Ukraine. Thusly, the VDV were unable to continually land additional troops and materiel to create maneuver space for follow on operations. The VDV failed to expand the lodgment and rapidly generate combat power. Therefore, they couldn’t augment their ability to secure the lodgment and to react to a Ukrainian counterattack. They also failed to enable the continuous landing of troops and materiel rapidly transition to follow on operations. A JFEO requires air movement and delivery of logistic support into an objective area to support combat forces’ mission.
The VDV failed to maintain superiority in the Information Environment. After securing the lodgment, they failed in the media space. The VDV didn’t deny their adversary’s media from collecting, processing, and disseminating an uninterrupted flow of information. Because of this failure, the international press was able to report on the VDVs hasty defense against the Ukrainian counterattack from just feet away. They did so in near real time. The conflict also demonstrated the impact of social media. The proliferation of cell phones changes the security of the operational environment.
The VDV also violated principles of mission command during their JFEO. Reports indicate that VDV prisoners believed they were on a training exercise vice a training exercise. If true, this indicates a lack of mutual trust up and down the chain of command. Without this principal mission command failed and subordinates were less willing to exercise disciplined initiative. Building trust is critical to rapid decision making and the lack of mutual trust compounded challenges present in the VDV’s officer-centric leadership system.
The VDV lacked this level of trust, indicated by the reported belief that they were conducting a training exercise. Subordinates need to understand the operation’s expanded purpose and the higher commander’s intent . This understanding directly impacts their ability to conceptualize requirements, restrictions, and why they are executing the mission.
JEFOs are more relevant now as we transition to large scale combat operations, not less. These Russian Armed Forces VDV operations demonstrate the importance of adhering to the principles of a JFEO and Mission Command. We should learn from their mistakes and train our similar capabilities. Only then can we decisively and swiftly execute JFEOs in support of Large-Scale Combat Operations in our near future.
Capt. Gabriel A. Abreu is a US Army Paratrooper who served with the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team from 2018 to 2021 as an Artillery Officer and is serving in the 82nd Airborne Division as a Military Intelligence Officer.
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