The prevalence and pervasiveness of disinformation, and its effect on the force is a polarizing topic. Call it what you would like: fake news, propaganda, information warfare etc. The fact remains that disinformation has seeped into not only civil society, but within our formations. Right now, in your unit area, there are soldiers and leaders with their necks craned-downward – either sitting down or leaning against a wall – staring at his/her smartphone and scrolling through social media pages. Embedded amongst the benign posts by friends, fitness pages and news outlets, is malign disinformation. Some disinformation is specifically designed to target service members, or public perceptions of the military. Disinformation is often skillfully designed to look legitimate and is difficult to counter. Disinformation poses a threat to unit cohesion may create mindset that runs counter to the Army Ethic. Legitimate beliefs become morphed into polarizing, divisive actions.
First, let’s make sure we are using a common language. There is a difference between disinformation and misinformation. The term misinformation refers to false information that is spread regardless of intent to deceive. For example, this is when your aunt or uncle spouts-off on Facebook with their interesting thoughts and *facts* on an issue that are incorrect. Disinformation, conversely, is the purposeful misrepresentation of information as a means of manipulating or deceiving. Put simply, disinformation is when you know what you are saying is incorrect, but you spread it anyway.
Going forward, we will assume the intent to deceive and refer to this as disinformation. Information warfare is very much part of our adversaries’ strategy to compete with us. But the effects can be much the same regardless of the intent- misinformation of disinformation.
Although it is difficult to counter disinformation, Doctrine offers us insight on how we conduct ourselves as Army Professionals. A simple battle drill of sorts can help you handle disinformation’s impact on yourself, and your unit. The purpose of this discussion is not to place blame, engage in partisan debate, or even stop disinformation. Rather it seeks to equip leaders with ideas when it comes to the issue at hand. Leave no doubt, that shortly after navigating away from his article you will encounter some form of disinformation.
Leader Actions on Contact
Treat disinformation for what it is, contact with the enemy. Of course, this isn’t the same as reacting to contact. There is no physical danger and there is no established battle drill. However, it stands as a fact that our adversaries use disinformation to impose their will. Multi-Domain Operations acknowledges that information operations are a part of modern conflict. Disinformation serves the same purpose as artillery and small arms fire. Effective disinformation campaigns cause discord, which leads to physical harm. The innocuous meme you are considering sharing might be a small part of a larger shaping operation.
Consider how your “actions on contact” with disinformation reflects your character. ADP 6-22 states an Army Professional is someone that is certified in among all things, character. Does your social media persona conflict with your professional identity? You may have strong views on a partisan topic; however, as Army Professionals, we must harmonize our personal and professional identities. As defenders of the Nation, we should also be willing to put partisan views aside for the greater good. If you remotely suspected a post was disinformation, would you still share it? Why or why not? Discussion and discourse are part of a healthy democracy. But, disinformation – designed by a foreign intelligence agency – is not.
Realize your soldiers are in “contact” with the enemy too. A leader must be aware of the information environment, to which their soldiers are exposed daily. Leaders must also remain aware of a generational technology gap between senior leaders and new soldiers or officers Our doctrine calls for us to be geo-cultural political experts. While we may understand Iraq’s tribal intricacies, do we understand our own soldiers’ relationship with social media? Do we understand how they perceive the digital world?
Leaders’ should pursue fluency and engage in discussions about what social media platforms soldiers are using. Leaders’ should find time to highlight instances of negative social media conduct, or new information on adversary use of disinformation. We are expected to know our soldiers – this extends to their online interests and activities. I am not suggesting leaders search soldier’s phones. However, leaders should engage soldier’s about their reactions to what they view online. They should assist subordinates in understanding the role disinformation plays in provoking emotional reactions.
Preparing Your Soldiers
Tailor Your Approach
Disinformation amplifies false perceptions on already divisive topics. Examples include an array of subjects including, race, politics a U.S. foreign policy. Leaders might understandably feel uncomfortable directly engaging in these topics. It is possible however for leaders to engage subordinates without directly challenging their personal beliefs. Consider the methods of influence described in ADP 6-22. Our doctrine describes collaboration as one method of influence to “achieve mutual understanding… while giving subordinates the opportunity to share their ideas and perspective.” Leaders can approach the situation with the mindset of “how do we solve this issue?” Rather than highlight a partisan issue, collaborate on disinformation’s negative impact and how “we” can curb it. This method is more apt to avoid creating resistance or making a subordinate feel ostracized.
One example of a collaborative approach is the discussion on how disinformation influences elections. Disinformation created by foreign governments might seek to raise or lower voter turnout. It seeks to undermine voter faith in the system. There is also ample research that veterans are heavily targeted by disinformation. Discussing this aspect of the problem can make soldiers aware of the broader scope of the problem. Contemporary research shows that disinformation targets all demographics, not just one group. It also impinges that the goal of disinformation is not to advance any domestic interest, but rather sew discord for the benefit of our adversaries.
Conduct Rehearsals
We do this for any other operation, and it should also apply here. Of course, a rehearsal for combatting disinformation won’t look the same as a react to contact rehearsal. However, leaders should consider discussing the social media environment with their soldiers. There is ample information about foreign governments deliberately targeting soldiers with disinformation. We should be open about why this might be happening, and what we can do about it. Encourage subordinates to seek self-awareness on the issue. Relay to them how disinformation might impact their character.
Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
Have you talked to your S-2 lately about this? There exists ample discussion on combating disinformation, but are units taking the time to package and discuss this in a way that resonates with soldiers? Units should leverage their intelligence staff to provide greater awareness on the issue. Senior leaders should empower their intelligence staff to engage with subordinate units. This would help sensitize soldiers to disinformation and how the enemy uses it as an extension of warfare. Soldiers will walk away better equipped to identify potentially malign posts on social media.
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Combating disinformation is no simple task. Our adversaries have skillfully inserted it into our day-to-day lives. The hydra-like nature of the problem means it will continue to present itself. This is why we must take efforts to combat the issue at our level. By engaging in self-reflection and discussion with our soldiers we can get ahead of the issue. Leaders should look to be more aware of the language of their tech savvy subordinates. We should seek to avoid naivety towards our personal conduct online. Social media users, military included, may not feel responsible for the aggregate problems caused by disinformation, but remember Douglas Adams once said “no drop of water feels responsible for the flood.”
Captain Adam Wendoloski is an active-duty officer currently working at the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic at the United States Military Academy. In his previous assignment he served as a battalion S-2. CPT Wendoloski holds an MA in International Affairs from the University of North Georgia.