After two decades of conflict, the sniper continues to be an underutilized asset on the battlefield. The problem that plagues the sniper community is: what is the definitive role of a sniper? The Operational Force has failed to define what they want out of a fully qualified sniper. In turn, it has put a tremendous strain on the Generating Force, which has to play catch up in order to sustain sniper training in the 21st century.
Other nations, such as Israel or Russia, train their snipers to support both irregular and conventional war. They are currently deployed along the front lines of Ukraine and Gaza with great success. The sniper, for them, is a critical node on the modern battlefield. Yet on our home front, there is talk of sacking sniper institutional training from high level figures at the Infantry School. It is critically important that we maintain an institutional school for snipers at Fort Benning. Commanders must understand the vital role of communicating with the Generating Force on what they need from their snipers.
CURRENT MISSION STATEMENT
In decisive action, the infantry battalion’s sniper squad’s primary mission is to deliver precise long-range fire on selected targets. (ATP 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion) Sniper fires has a marked effect on enemy troops. It creates casualties, slows movement, instills fear, influences their decisions, actions, lowers morale, and adds confusion to their operations. The sniper squad’s observational and navigational skills and specialized equipment help them see the terrain in detail and observe changes.
John C. Simpson, former Instructor at the Special Warfare Center’s Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) back in the early 80’s summed it up best in his book, The Sniper’s Notebook.
“Sniping is an interdiction technique. It is economical in the use of personnel and has a demoralizing effect. A few well-trained snipers can cause casualties among enemy personnel, deny or hinder their use of certain routes, and require the enemy to employ a disproportionate number of troops to rid the area of snipers. Snipers can also act as part of a raiding or ambush force, or operate by themselves.”
SNIPERS IN MODERN WAR (1969 TO PRESENT)
Vietnam
In the spring of 1969, the 9th Infantry Division’s most successful ambush tactic was the employment of snipers. The sniper program was initiated back in the US as result of a visit to Fort Benning in January 1968. The Army Marksmanship Unit, led by Major Willis L. Powell, cooperated to the fullest extent. They made funds available to increase the accuracy of rifles and to provide sniper-scopes. The goal: get the Marksmanship Unit to train 9th Infantry Division soldiers in Vietnam in sniper tactics.
The first hand-picked group of volunteers from each battalion graduated in early November 1968. The first sniper kill was registered on Nov. 19, 1968 north of Binh Phuoc in Long An Province. The second group of snipers graduated in early December, giving 9th Infantry Division a full complement of 72 snipers, six per battalion and four per brigade.
Brig. Gen. James S. Timothy was given the task of getting the sniper program off the ground. He set about analyzing equipment, personnel, methods, and tactics for snipers. One flaw was that snipers were parceled out by the battalions on the basis of two per line company. The company commanders were responsible for their snipers; many were less than invested. They would use snipers just as any other rifleman. This was the reason they were not getting results. Consequently, Division directed that snipers were assigned to the battalion headquarters. They held battalion commanders responsible for the proper utilization and emphasis on the program.
Once the snipers began to get personal attention and could handpick their assignments and fit their talents to the mission, the results were extraordinary. Sniper teams normally consisted of two snipers and two additional infantrymen armed with an M-79 and an M-16 and carrying a radio. At the start of the war in Vietnam, the United States had no snipers; by the end of the war, Marine and Army snipers had killed more than 10,000 NVA and VC soldiers–the equivalent of an entire division–at the cost of under 20,000 bullets, proving that long-range shooters still had a place in the battlefield.
Iraq
In Iraq, small kill teams (SKT) were routinely used to destroy improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement teams, conduct counter-mortar and counter-rocket missions, and establish observation posts (OPs). Their success was attributed to the snipers’ ability to provide rapid, precise and discriminate fires onto a target area and to act left of bang in preventing an enemy on carrying out an attack. Similar to the team dynamics of Vietnam, the SKT was made up of four to six personnel, with snipers, FO’s, security and communication elements all working in unison.
SKTs were employed by a platoon, generally the Scout Platoon located in HHC. These SKT’s were tasked with gathering intelligence, harassing the enemy, and destroying enemy personnel and equipment. The SKT typically conducted an attack by fire, with the Quick Reaction Force element closing in and destroying the enemy. The SKT contained both an assault and security element to maximize firepower and maintain enough firepower if decisively engaged.
Afghanistan
Current operational snipers in Afghanistan are being utilized in small teams embedded at the company level or with special operations forces (SOF) elements. Both day and night operations see the sniper teams moving quickly through the Operating Environment (OE). Snipers are moving with assault elements and positioning in overwatch positions to cover movements.
A report from 2019 from a current operational sniper stated, “I was operating mostly in northern Afghanistan in the mountains (7,000-11,000 ft.) where maneuverability was the most important factor when it came to being able to make successful engagements. If I was static at a blocking position or an observation post as a sniper I wouldn’t have even made half of the engagements that I did. Having ISR or fires platform spot personnel close to our force, I’d let the Ground Force Commander know I intended to move to a position to engage them. I’d bring a small security element and maneuver to where I could engage them from, talking back and forth with the ISR or fires platform the whole time, getting updates on the personnel or if they had any recommendations on where I could move to have a decent line of sight.
Once I was in position I’d have ISR drop a sparkle if they were capable, and if they weren’t I’d just have them talk me onto target. Having the freedom to maneuver in situations like that was by far the most important thing that produced those opportunities for my team. While there is a time for it, I strongly disagree with the idea of the sniper being locked into a position on the battlefield.”
SNIPER CAPABILITIES BASED ASSESSMENT
During the height of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Army identified that it needed more from its snipers to combat the current threat faced in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. It requisitioned a Capabilities Based Assessment to determine shortcomings and possible solutions.
- 2006 – Tasking from LTG Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff tasks TRADOC to advise the HQDA G3 on a way ahead to organize, train, and equip Army snipers. Creation of the Sniper Defeat Integrated Capabilities Development Team (SD-ICDT).
- 2007 – SD-ICDT identifies that the current force has an inadequate number of snipers trained personnel IOT conduct effective ISR, sniper employment, targeting, and counter sniper operations.
- 2009 – DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policies) gap analysis conducted on Fort Benning identified, prioritized, and validated the capability gaps.
Capability Gaps; Lacking the Ability to…
- Effectively engage personnel with precision out 1500 meters
- Conduct surveillance
- Conduct patrols
- Control supporting arms
- Conduct counter sniper operations
- Effectively engage hardened or material targets with precision
- Employ an adequate number of qualified snipers in the force
Figure 1. 2009 assessment of Sniper trained personnel.
TRADOC began to address these issues with near term fixes. They added Sniper Mobile Training teams (MTT’s) and ordered a revision of the sniper manual. They began the development of a Sniper Center of Excellence Concept. Lastly, they directed the Requirements division to begin the development of a new Bolt action Sniper Weapon System (M2010) and soon after a Compact Semi-Automatic Sniper System (CSASS).
DEVELOPMENTS 2017 – PRESENT
Army Sniper Doctrine
The US Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) released an updated Training Circular 3-22.10, Sniper, in December 2017. The MCoE revised and released the sniper training circular to include topics such as sniper planning, employment, field craft, marksmanship, ballistic programs, and complex engagements. The training circular’s intent was to create uniformity within the sniper community, and to align sniper training and employment with current U.S. Army doctrine.
Army Sniper Course
With updated doctrine, The United States Army Sniper Course began to align itself to support it. A recent article from Small Wars Journal states, “In late 2018, the United States Army Sniper Course cadre took a hard look in the mirror and asked the all-important question, “What is the role of the sniper when it comes to large scale, ground combat warfare? How do we train the next generation of snipers to be effective force multipliers on the battlefield?”
Collectively, the cadre concluded that Snipers need to focus on acting as sensors, communicators and human weapons systems, supporting enhanced multi-domain command and control from the ground in anti-access area denial environments. The shift from a linear type of training to a more progressive, complex training mindset directly stemmed from reports that cadre received from downrange. Gone were the archaic ways of snipers employment. To remain relevant, the schoolhouse needed to adapt and shift focus to complex engagements in irregular and conventional wars.
Sniper Individual and Collective Tasks
The cadre also examined why snipers lacked effective training at their home station. Individual and Collective tasks, the foundation for training development, were incomplete and outdated. Sniper individual tasks only included weapon maintenance and zeroing procedures. Collective tasks were nonexistent. With approval from the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, the cadre sat down and produced a comprehensive list of relevant tasks that would align with modern warfare principles and complement the infantry battalion’s mission.
Army Sniper Weapons and Equipment
The material solution to extend the sniper’s ability to engage targets beyond the M2010’s effective range of 1200 meters came in the form of the MK22 Multi-caliber Sniper Rifle System (MSRS). The MK22 is a modified version of the market ready Barrett Multi-Role Adaptive Design (MRAD), capable of caliber changes at the user level allowing for a dual purpose (anti-personnel and anti-materiel) capability up to 1500 meters. Proposed calibers for this sniper weapon system are 7.62mm NATO, .300 Norma Magnum, and .338 Norma Magnum. The MK22 will come outfitted with a Leupold MK5hd riflescope, utilizing the Army’s Mil-grid reticle. The MK22 will replace the M2010 and M107 and their respective families of ammunition.
This year, the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (M-CDID) launched a handful of Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) M110 upgrade proposals. Although there is no near-term replacement for the aging M110 Semi-Automatic Sniper System (SASS) fleet, it is still a viable weapon, and with a few modernizations, could meet the need for years to come. The M110 SASS will remain as the secondary (Spotter’s) weapon. Initially, the Army approved the Leupold MK5hd 3.6-18 scope (NSN: 1240-01-690-1728) to replace the 12-year-old Leupold MK4.
The SEP proposals’ evaluations began this spring to look at a new buttstock and scope mount. The current buttstock limits adjustment for shooter ergonomics; crucial when making long range precision engagements. To better enhance the capability of the new optics, the force is considering a modular scope mount. This mount will allow the mounting of ancillary equipment, i.e. Laser Range Finder, Red Dot, Angle Cosign Indicator and a scope Level.
SNIPERS IN LARGE SCALE, GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS (2021 AND BEYOND)
As the U.S. Army transitions to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), sniper and reconnaissance elements can continue to be an essential intelligence node on the battlefield.
A recent article from Infantry Magazine, Spring 2020, “Closing the Gap,” states:
“The sniper team is inherently low-tech and if provided with the right equipment and clear mission objectives prior to crossing the line of departure will be able to conduct reliable reconnaissance and reporting while being agile enough to avoid detection. Snipers can conduct infiltration prior to the assault of dense urban terrain by Army brigades. Snipers can move in 48-72 hours prior to the brigade’s movement and begin disrupting enemy formations within the cities and identifying obstacles and bypasses. Working with the infantry and cavalry reconnaissance platoons, they can reduce the enemy’s picture of the battlefield by eliminating listening posts/observation posts, dog teams, roving patrols, communications or retrans sites and teams, mortar firing points, and machine-gun teams; pinpointing enemy armor; and controlling close air support and artillery. Historically, a small number of snipers in dense urban terrain have shown the ability to fix and attrit both mounted and dismounted formations, most recently during the Ukraine-Russia conflict in Crimea.”
The sniper community needs answers from the Army. It needs direction, a clear mission statement, and guidance from senior leadership. Too many times, Army leadership has hidden behind words such as lethal, adaptable, and versatile. Leaders often use these buzzwords as a way to avoid making hard choices about capability tradeoffs; by optimizing for everything, we optimize for nothing. The simple answer: senior leaders must train their snipers using current doctrine and individual and collective tasks.
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The sniper’s greatest skill is the ability to discriminate and provide precise fires and maintain overmatch to their formation. In summary, commanders must understand the devastating effect an invisible threat can have on the enemy. Secondly, they have to appreciate the inherently low risk of collateral damage to civilians and infrastructure that snipers provide. We are moving into an era of conflict with robust electronic warfare and constrained resources. Sniper teams meet this challenge as a low-tech, highly skilled, and flexible tool that can help ensure mission success.
ONE SHOT ONE KILL!
Sgt. 1st Class (Ret.) Christopher Roberts is a Precision Weapons Expert with 18 years’ experience in the United States Army. As a Sniper, he provided his knowledge and experience while conducting domestic and global contingency operations. He completed his military career as a Senior Instructor and Team Sergeant at the revered U.S. Army Sniper Course. Transitioning from Active Duty, he became the Army’s lead Precision Weapons Subject matter Expert; where he advises sniper training, force modernization, and weapon development.
Sgt. 1st Class Christopher M. Rance has 17 years of professional experience in the realm of precision shooting; having served in a variety of sniper positions within the U.S. Army. During his tenure as an Army Sniper Instructor and Team Sergeant, he trained hundreds of Soldiers, to include elements of Air Force Combat Controllers, Air Force Special Reconnaissance Airmen, 75th Ranger Regiment, Law Enforcement and Foreign Allies. He is the author of Training Circular 3-22.10, Sniper, which is the governing doctrine of all U.S. Army Snipers and served as a Military Field Consultant for Kestrel Ballistics.