A Long Day in the Desert

Last night we lost a soldier. A Stryker rolled over his torso. Another soldier, Spc. Mike Powers, had his feet crushed. A third soldier was inches from having his skull crushed.

B Co, 1-9 Infantry (SBCT) | National Training Center | 22 September 2020

Personal Journal of 1st Lt. Matt Connor

 

Rest in Peace Private Ryan Murphy

Infantrymen, M249 Gunner

2nd PLT, Battle Company, 1/9 IN

21 September 2018

 

The planets aligned last night to create tragedy. The unthinkable happened when a convoy returned to our Company area during a suspension of battlefield effects (SOBE). What should have been routine was the opposite. The Company Command Team, to include the Executive Officer (XO), was at the Brigade After Action Review (AAR). The Platoon Leader of 2nd Platoon, David Marchand, was given the 5Ws from the XO tasking his Platoon to conduct a LOGPAC– logistics package resupply–and was told to send his B2/2 vehicle to the Unit Maintenance Command Post (UMCP).

The XO already coordinated to have the Stryker worked on. The vehicle dumped all its hydraulic fluid and the Height Management System had seized. The Stryker could barely move on its own, needing a tow from another Stryker. The Combat Trains Command Post was collocated with the UMCP, so the headquarters section tagged along to conduct the LOGPAC. David and his Platoon Sergeant (PSG), Sgt. 1st Class Williams made the trip to ensure that the LOGPAC ran smoothly.

It was 2000 hrs with 30 minutes left in SOBE. The sun had set down behind Teifort Mountain. My platoon was conducting last minute Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs). I walked down the ramp of my Stryker and observed my Platoon moving like a machine–with calculated purposed. In just five minutes, they would be ready to move.

Over the J-Box (Radio Intercom inside a Stryker), I heard Sgt. 1st Class Williams call on the Company Net and give the warning order to be ready. When they returned, the Company was going to move into a Tactical Assembly Area style formation. We wanted to be REDCON-1 (Readiness Condition 1 – meaning being ready to fight and move tactically in mounted formation upon order) for when the Company Command Team returned. SOBE was supposed to end shortly anyway. It wouldn’t be long. We had done this every SOBE. We would be REDCON-1 15 minutes prior to resuming the fight. Two minutes later, I heard the vehicles arriving, with David in his Stryker, B2/1, leading the convoy.

Earlier in the day, the soldiers in 2nd Platoon laid down behind their Strykers to nap. My guys did too. Our unit had just fought through Razish in a Battalion plus Combined Arms Breach and had been awake for nearly 30 hours. We were in JSLIST gear and the temperatures had reached 100 degrees by 1100. We were exhausted and needed to catch up on much needed sleep.

Two of 2nd Platoon’s Strykers left on the LOGPAC/recovery mission leaving the soldiers out in the open. The sun was blinding, so they got in close with the scrub brush. The Company’s vehicles were in a motor pool style formation. 1st and 3rd were facing 2nd and Headquarters in two rows.

David and Sgt. 1st Class Williams assumed their Platoon was close to being REDCON-1. My Platoon was almost REDCON-1 and I could see that 3rd Platoon was too. 2nd Platoon left two Staff Sergeants to manage their guys. I imagined they were ready.  We did this every day.

B2/1 previously dropped ramp right next to B2/2. David, along with his Vehicle Commander (VC) and driver thought that B2/1 was going to pull into that same space in 2nd Platoon’s row. PVT Murphy and the rest of the soldiers in his Fire Team would have been relatively safe had they still been behind their Stryker. However, B2/2 was at the UMCP receiving much needed troubleshooting by Manchu mechanics.

B2/1’s lights were on, but the crew couldn’t see anyone in front of them. Murphy and his Fire Team were still asleep under the scrub brush. David and his VC didn’t kick out a ground guide – we were supposed to be REDCON 1 within minutes, everyone should be ready. They assumed they were not going to drive through an area soldiers were sleeping in. My Platoon was ready! 3rd Platoon was too. None of our soldiers were asleep.

2nd Platoon’s PSG had made link up over the net with the Company. I heard his net call. The whole Company should have been awake and ready to go.  David and his PSG must have called their Platoon and instructed them to be REDCON-1 or at least told them before they departed to be REDCON-2 (readiness condition 2 – 5 minutes needed to begin movement) before they got back. Wouldn’t they?  Besides, everyone in the Company knew SOBE ended at 2030. Sgt. 1st Class Williams called it out to everyone earlier in the day and SOBE had always ended around then.

What happened next was terrible. I don’t want to cast blame. The leaders in the B2/1 Vic will never forget this. All the leaders in Battle Company will never forget this.

B2/1 drove up to what the leaders in that Stryker thought was the spot their Stryker parked in earlier. Doing so, they drove over Private Murphy and through where his Fire Team was still asleep on the desert floor.

The immediate actions taken by the medics, NCOs and by David were commendable. A medevac bird landed within minutes and they were back in the air no more than 15 minutes after the incident.

I ran over to B2/1. Chaos. I yelled something to David about a Medevac. I turned around and looked back over to my Platoon. They were walking over. I shouted to them to stay away. I called for my Medic. My PSG, one of my squad leaders, and my medic ran over to Spc. Mike Powers to treat him. I jumped into my Stryker.  My VC, SGT Burner and I tried to call up the 9-line on Manchu main – no answer. Should we use the JCR? No, that’s too slow.  SGT Burner then flipped to the NTC real-world medevac net – he had written it down. Through the J-Box we heard David’s voice.

“Line Four: Delta.  Line Five: 2 Litter”

I wanted to help. I walked by the casualties; my guys had Powers in a space blanket for shock.  The Company Medic was putting someone else in a space blanket, who was that?  He was unrecognizable. Someone set up markings for the LZ. The Medevac bird flew over. Apparently, they couldn’t see where to land from the vehicle lights. We scrambled to shut them off. The bird landed.

SGT Bergeron, SGT Hernandez, SPC Martin, and I stood next to my Stryker and watched as the casualties were loaded. It felt like eternity. Time stopped. The bird finally took off. We stood still, motionless, and silence fell over us.

Murphy died on the flight to the hospital. The doctors tried for 45 minutes to revive him. His wounds were too great. Our PA told my Company Commander if Murphy received his injuries in a hospital, on a hospital bed, with a team of surgeons around him, it wouldn’t have mattered. At 1230 today the Commander told the Company that he died. Casualty Officers notified his family. If he were a soldier in my Platoon, I don’t know what I would do. A painful blow to Battle Company.

Murphy had been in the Army for 6 months. He was 19. We can’t let this happen again. We are not even in combat.

Author’s Note

The above journal entry is fictional. It is however, based on a real life event. I changed names and units in order to maintain the privacy of the soldiers, NCOs, and Officers involved. The emotions and confusions are true. Mistakes were rife.  The narrative parallels a real journal entry written the day after a real-life incident like this occurred.

I wrote this to show fellow leaders that these incidents are real.  Soldiers die in training. Avoiding them requires tireless vigilance. Training deaths are preventable. These incidents don’t occur when you’re fresh, motivated, and ready to train. They occur when everyone is tired, hungry, and complacent.

Small units across the Army have Standard Operating Procedures and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in place to prevent these incidents. Army Regulations exist for these specific scenarios. However, following them, down to the individual soldier, is a lot harder when you are tired, hungry, and dirty. Leaders can’t get complacent in enforcing standards and discipline with their soldiers and subordinate Leaders. Soldiers’ lives depend on it.

Pat Reynolds is an Infantry Captain in the U.S. Army serving as a Brigade Assistant Operations Officer in the 101st Airborne Division. He has served as a Platoon Leader and a Company Executive Officer out of Joint Base Lewis McChord and is a graduate of the University of Connecticut.

Subscribe to The Company Leader!

Complete archive of The Company Leader Posts

Back to Home