NTC Update (NOV 19)

Transportation Company Observations & Best Practices

According to ATP 4-11 (Motor Transportation Operations), one Transportation Composite Truck Company (Heavy) is designated per Division with an Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The CTC is assigned to the Sustainment Brigade in support of Division operations usually attached to a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) (Sustainment Handbook, 2019). The CTC Mission is to perform Transportation and convoy security support to Sustainment Brigade operations for a Heavy Division. They provide transportation assets for the movement and distribution of dry and refrigerated containerized cargo, general non-containerized cargo, ammunition, bottled water, bulk water (when equipped with tank racks / hippos), heavy equipment, tanks and oversized loads as well as perform unit moves, transport personnel, and provides escort services for contracted trucks. 

(U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Brooke Davis, Operations Group, National Training Center)

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Observations

a. During large-scale combat operations (LSCO), most CTCs struggled with both internal and external communications, particularly long-range communications during convoy operations, which inhibits their ability to execute battle drills and perform movement control. 

b. CTCs and other CSSB subordinate units rarely deploy with company SOPs. The complex nature of LSCO requires specific guidance detailed in company SOPs. Given that CSSB subordinate units do not deploy with their organic battalion headquarters, they deploy untrained on their attached battalion Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TSOP). 

c. CTCs that do not have or maintain analog and digital tracking tools have difficulty planning for and tracking equipment, personnel, and missions which desynchronizes them from the supported unit. 

d. CTCs that have PCC/PCI checklists and enforce PCCs/PCIs greatly increase their responsiveness and survivability during LSCO. 

e. CTCs do not always properly disperse commodities in convoy configuration or in the Division Support Area (DSA) resulting in complete loss of one or more classes of supply in the event of an attack. This greatly affects the ability of the CTC and the CSSB to conduct distribution during combat operations. 

Best Practices

a. Communication systems and processes: It is vital for CTCs to have the ability to communicate with their higher headquarters, other companies, and most importantly with their convoys out on mission. During LSCO, long-range communication is usually only possible through Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). Terrain features and extreme weather conditions often greatly reduce the FM transmission range. Without FM re-trans sites, CSSBs and CTCs rely solely on JCR, limiting the unit’s PACE plan. Currently, JCR has several variants that require different installation kits, wiring cables, and mounts which causes friction when units draw equipment from Army Prepositioned Stock (APS). Successful units conduct detailed analysis to ensure all systems are compatible and have the correct installation kits for different JCR and vehicle variants. These systems require the same or most current software updates in order to connect with other systems. Units should meet these conditions by conducting a Communication Exercise (COMEX) at echelon prior to deployment. 

b. Updated SOPs: Successful CTCs have and maintain a comprehensive company SOP that defines specific transportation tasks and supplements the battalion TACSOP. In accordance with ATP 4-11 “The combat sustainment support battalion is a flexible and responsive unit that executes logistics throughout an area of operations, providing transportation” and other services to the supported maneuver brigade; “the CSSB is tailored to meet specific mission requirements”. The tailored nature of the CSSB that provides that flexibility means that it is not able to provide subordinate units with a TACSOP during training. A Company SOP helps provide a common understanding of CTC operations outlining convoy and mission procedures, battle drills, timelines (N-hour sequence), and anything else pertinent to accomplishing the mission. 

c. Digital and analog tracking products: Approximately 50% of CTCs deploy with analog or digital trackers for missions, personnel, equipment, maintenance, communications, and Sensitive Items (SI). Deploying with current digital and analog tracking products facilitates unit reporting, mission planning, personnel status, maintenance management, and assists leadership with planning and managing operations. During the operation, the unit has the opportunity to refine products while conducting their mission but this is much more difficult if they do not have a base product already. 

d. Understanding and enforcement of proper pre combat checks/ pre combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs): The CTC and many of the units assigned to the CSSB frequently ignore how import PCCs and PCIs are for successful mission accomplishment. These inspections ensure that soldiers and units are adequately prepared to execute operations to standard, which prevents Soldiers from becoming complacent. Unit’s should document these standards in PCC/PCI checklists in their SOP and disseminated in writing to all Soldiers for implementation. PCC/PCI checklists should include all equipment and supplies that might be required for changes of mission to mitigate risk. In LSCO, a mission can extend from a few hours to up to over 36 hours long. Leaders tasked with convoy missions are required to support Soldiers with water, fuel, and food for these extended periods. Maps assigned to each vehicle will help the convoy as a navigation aid even if the convoy has operational JCRs or BFTs. Convoys frequently get lost when equipment malfunctions, convoy integrity is lost, or the convoy leaves the main road. All of these situations endanger the mission, equipment, and possibly Soldiers’ lives. In addition, posting a nine-line MEDEVAC and other reports such as UXO, SALUTE, call for fire/air support, and COMMO cards in vehicles enables agility during an emergency. 

e. Conduct transportation for movement and distribution of supplies: There are several best practices for conducting successful movements. Warrior task and battle drill (WTBD) proficiency is the baseline for success. Weapons training, driver’s training, and tactical communications all increase Soldier survivability in combat and provide the framework for collective tasks. Proper dispersion of commodities in convoy configurations as well as in the Division Support Area (DSA) prevents complete loss of one or more classes of supply in the event of an attack. Lastly, established and well-rehearsed collective battle drills greatly increase the survivability of the unit during area defense and convoy security. Rehearsed collective battle drills are integral to reducing operational, tactical, and environmental risk. 

POC: CPT John Acevedo, Wagoneer 37, Composite Truck Company Trainer, john.acevedo9.mil@mail.mil 

You can access the entire November 2019 NTC Update in a PDF HERE – or click the link below for an archive of all Lessons from Atropia.

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