The Forward Support Companies (FSC) provide direct logistic support to each maneuver battalion in a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The FSC Commander is responsible for assisting the battalion S4 and, executing logistics support according to both the BSB and supported maneuver commander’s guidance, and serving as the link between organizations (FM 3-96, 9-7). To accomplish these tasks, the FSC echelons assets across the battlefield throughout the company trains, combat trains, and field trains. Synchronizing these elements requires unfettered communication between the key nodes at each echelon including the supported battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP), and Field Trains Command Post (FTCP). Manning and equipping the CTCP and FTCP is an implied task for the FSC but, it should be well defined. A symptom of BCTs tendency to perform collective training at the battalion level and of FSC culture which prides itself on not requiring support from the BSB is that Forward Support Companies struggle to provide adequate support during large scale combat operations (LSCO).
Observations
a. FTCPs and CTCPs struggle to communicate between each other and the supported battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which inhibits their ability to synchronize sustainment and track the battle. FTCPs are not often outfitted with the right communications networks to talk to their battalion, are not equipped with personnel that have a clear task and purpose, and are not tied in to their supported battalion’s synchronization meetings. As a result, the FTCP is unable to describe their battalion’s tactical situation, combat power status, and support requirements to the BSB causing desynchronization of sustainment that compounds over time. Similarly, the CTCP struggles to communicate with their TOC and does not remain in communication with the FTCP. This inhibits critical support function synchronization with the supported maneuver companies. This problem causes the FSC to execute LRPs to old company positions, and the BSB Distribution Company to execute LOGPACS to the CTCP when the FSC is not postured to receive supplies. These challenges in turn create the need for emergency resupply at the company trains.
b. It is common practice to co-locate the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) with the CTCP. The intent is to place the UMCP close to the fight to limit how far non-mission capable (NMC) equipment needs to be retrograded for repair. This linkage creates challenges because the CTCP needs to move frequently for force protection and to keep pace with their battalion. This inhibits the ability of the UMCP to establish and effect significant repairs. These repairs can take many hours and require extensive troubleshooting, during which the NMC vehicle and maintenance team are immobile. The result is that UMCPs end up dragging NMC equipment with them as they displace across the battlefield. This means that in large scale combat operations where a maneuver battalion’s operational readiness rate (ORR) can rapidly fall as low as 50%, the FSC recovery capability is quickly exceeded, and the UMCP inevitably leaves a trail of NMC equipment across the battlefield. This equipment has no security and, usually still has its crew with it because the FSC may not have the ability to transport the additional personnel when it displaces. This situation both inhibits the ability of the FSC to regenerate that equipment and, creates a significant force protection concern.
c. The FSC maintenance platoon is only equipped with basic capability to support ground support equipment (GSE), quartermaster equipment, electronic and missile systems, armament, metalworking, and fabrication. The FSC is either not authorized these personnel or, is only authorized one or two 20/10 level Soldiers. This shortfall limits the FSC’s ability to conduct complicated maintenance tasks in these areas and limits their capacity to conduct basic tasks at large volume, which can be detrimental to the battalion’s ability to shoot and communicate.
d. FSCs do not have adequate security and, rely too heavily on Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) to mitigate this shortfall. The FSC is not authorized up-armored combat platforms on its modified table of organizational equipment (MTOE) to protect itself. As a result, the CTCP is inadequately defended and FSC convoys frequently travel without security. This is dangerous in large scale combat operations where it is necessary for divisions and brigades to establish bypass criteria to maintain momentum; bypass criteria is inevitable and creates an environment where platoon size enemy elements will be present in the rear area. This coupled with the capability of peer adversaries to deploy special operations forces into the rear area creates an environment where security for logistics assets is essential. To mitigate this shortfall, FSCs and maneuver Battalion Commanders train to rely on APS to draw convoy protection platforms. This is a relic of COIN operations and is not appropriate for large scale ground combat which, will occur in a theater without sufficient APS to equip every unit in a Division or Corps size force.
e. FSCs frequently do not integrate well into BSA defense when they have forces echeloned to the FTCP or when present at the BSA for resupply. FSC personnel in the BSA often behave like transients, floating within the support area without reporting to a local headquarters. This causes the BSB to lose visibility of what personnel are inside the BSA which is detrimental to avoiding fratricide, maintaining accountability, and providing medical care to casualties during an attack. Failure to incorporate FSC Soldiers into the BSA defense plan creates dead space around the perimeter as it naturally expands to accommodate additional personnel.
Best Practices
a. The FTCP is responsible for coordinating logistics requirements with the BSB and assisting the BSB distribution company with configuring LOGPACs to the supported battalion. To do this the FTCP and CTCP need to be equipped to execute the entire battalion PACE plan. This should include both upper and lower TI capabilities to mitigate the contested electromagnetic spectrum that exists during large scale combat operations and intervening terrain down the lines of communication. Both nodes also need to have common operating picture products that mirror what their battalion TOC is using to maintain situational understanding. In addition, the battalion must conduct an internal LOGSYNC that includes the S4, CTCP, FTCP, FSC Commander, and a representative from the battalion S3. This meeting will build the battalion’s sustainment COP and create synchronization by arming key personnel with the right information and creating a venue to hold them accountable. Although the FTCP needs experienced personnel, their selection should be based on personality and experience in the unit rather than position. If the FTCP is unfamiliar with how the battalion fights, then they will be ineffective. The value of the FSC Commander is their position as the senior logistician in the supported battalion, which allows them to act as a forward observer for the sustainment enterprise to synchronize their company’s efforts. To effectively command, the FSC Commander needs the ability to move up and down and lines of communication between nodes to observe support actions, make corrections, and the interface with both the BSB and supported Battalion Commanders. To support their mobility, the FSC Commander should not be directly tied to either the FTCP or CTCP.
b. The UMCP needs to be relatively stable to be effective. One technique is to allow the UMCP to remain in place when the CTCP displaces. This enables the UMCP to attempt to get as many NMC vehicles as possible mobile to facilitate the movement. The FSC and CTCP does not usually have enough security assets to protect two sites which means that separating the UMCP and CTCP involves significant risk. An alternative is to place the UMCP in the BSA with the FTCP, while leaving partial field maintenance teams (FMT-) forward to execute quick repairs with on hand shop stock that do not require extensive troubleshooting. Although this increases the time for NMC equipment to get to the UMCP, it unburdens the CTCP from the most significant factor that detracts from its mobility and, one of its most vulnerable activities. While in the BSA, the UMCP has easy access to the SSA’s Common Authorized Stockage List (CASL) which shortens their wait time for parts and reduces the requirement to push CL IX forward on LOGPACs. Placing the UMCP at the BSA enables the Battalion Maintenance Technician to easily attend the Brigade Maintenance Meeting in person so that he can collaborate with the Brigade Maintenance Technician, SSA Accountable Officer, and the commodity shop warrant officers in the BSB’s Maintenance Company. Co-locating the maintenance platoon with the FTCP also arms the latter with an officer, warrant officer, and senior NCO capable of fulfilling the FTCP’s responsibilities on behalf of their supported battalion.
c. FSCs should leverage the commodity shops in the BSB maintenance company to call forward additional, more experienced personnel to supplement their own capability. This should be requested through the CTCP, and coordinated by the FTCP. Calling these personnel forward enables the battalion to leave the affected equipment in place which includes weapons, generators, radios, environmental control units, and night vision devices. This equipment is usually quick to repair and, significantly degrades the battalion’s lethality if pulled back to the UMCP by either degrading its infrastructure or, reducing their Soldier’s ability engage the enemy.
d. The supported battalion can to attach an infantry platoon to the FSC to ensure that it has adequate security both at the CTCP and, on convoys. In the absence of this task organization, FSCs need to prepare to fight with the equipment that they have on their MTOE. This means installing ring mounts on every vehicle that will travel on a convoy. To be effective in this capacity, FSCs must certify crews through gunnery table six. In conjunction with arming logistics platforms, CTCP personnel must train to establish dismounted fighting positions for security because in the absence of an attached security element, the preponderance of the FSC vehicles capable of carrying a weapon will be assigned to convoys.
e. FSC personnel assigned to the FTCP and, temporarily situated at the BSA must report to the BSB headquarters and be incorporated into the BSA defense plan. The FTCP is responsible for serving as the supported battalion’s mission command node within the BSA and must maintain accountability of, and exercise command and control over all personnel from their battalion present in the BSA. These personnel should be assigned fighting positions on the perimeter to contribute to the defense, as the BSA expands to accommodate them. This will also ensure that the BSB maintains accountability of FSC and supported battalion personnel in their perimeter and, will in turn reduce the likelihood of fratricide.
POC: CPT John Tompkins, Goldminer 5A, Deputy Support Operations Trainer, john.g.tompkins.mil@mail.mil
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