NTC Update (NOV 19)

Attack Helicopter Company Observations & Best Practices

When managed correctly, Army Attack Aviation represents the most flexible and powerful combat multiplier a Division Commander can direct to any area of operations. Unlike a counterinsurgency fight, attack aviation in a decisive action training environment must be conserved to affect the fight in accordance with the friendly scheme of maneuver in a synchronized manner. Most often, this implies employing attack aviation, en masse, as a maneuver element to destroy significant enemy capabilities. Whether committed to weight the main effort, employed as a separate maneuver formation as an economy of force or in the deep area, Commanders must specifically focus how attack aviation elements are employed. Today, our attack aviation companies can provide additional capabilities, unheard of during the counterinsurgency days of the early 2000’s. Yet, our ability to employ those capabilities is dependent upon a unit’s ability to train them effectively at home station. 

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crew-chief scans the horizon during a 20 multi-ship air assault to the Pohakuloa Training Area on the Island of Hawaii, Nov. 11, 2019. During the fire support coordination exercise at PTA, the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade is tasked with providing troop-lift, air-assault, and close air support.

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Manned/Unmanned Teaming 

Observation

Attack Aviation Units Often Fail to Employ MUM-T Capabilities.

Best Practice

AH-64 companies, paired with RQ-7 shadows exercising manned un-manned teaming (MUM-T) tactics are arguably the most valuable maneuver resource to a Brigade Combat Team in a decisive action environment. The capability of the onboard sensors and point-target weapons systems provide a vital asset to the Brigade Commander. An attack aviation platoon consisting of four AH-64s and one to two RQ-7s can be paramount in developing friendly COAs, providing early warning, reaction time, and maneuver space, as well as massing firepower at the decisive point. However, this delicate asset must be planned and synchronized into the friendly scheme of maneuver or the mission is at risk of failing. 

Planning for Attack Aviation Employment 

Observations

Maneuver brigades often misunderstand the real-world considerations needed to employ the AH-64 platoon as a maneuver force. As stated in FM 6-0, a COA must be feasible, acceptable, suitable, and distinguishable. ADAM/BAE cells are an integral part of ensuring the attack aviation plan has these attributes. Brigade staffs must trust and value the input provided by the subject matter experts in the ADAM/BAE as well as the Aviation Task Force LNO in providing realistic options to the Commander during MDMP. Planners must analyze in detail how they will employ AH-64s, with strict consideration given to triggers driving readiness condition (REDCON) levels. Time-based triggers (that is, simply launching AH-64s as soon as they are available) rarely work out during an offensive or defensive phase because staffs did not analyze fuel consumption, time-distance data, flight time, or crew posture. 

Brigade staffs also face difficulty in determining the appropriate attack aviation mission for the appropriate tactical scenario. For example, AH-64 platoons are sometimes tasked with a zone reconnaissance to find and destroy enemy formations during the MDMP process. Two problems arise here; the task and purpose is not doctrinally sound, and the required commander’s reconnaissance guidance is often overlooked. The result is the AH-64 platoon focused on minute threats when NAIs with associated PIRs can be answered, providing decision points for the commander. This scenario is exacerbated when subordinate maneuver units lack mutual understanding of the attack aviation mission. A battalion commander or RTO can quickly diminish air-ground integration of a brigade-level operation by giving an on-the-spot task and purpose or “pushing” the AH-64s down to a company. 

Best Practices

The Aviation Task Force (AV TF) and AH-64 company must be integrated into the unit’s planning cycle early and maintain integration throughout the operation. Including the AV TF during the RSOI period is acceptable, but establishing the relationship at home station is optimal. If the brigade and AV TF are not co-located, dialogue must be established as soon as possible by way of VTC or some other means in order to understand the brigade’s rotational concept and unit airspace plan. This dialogue should aim to form the basis for ongoing bottom-up refinement during the rotation’s execution. AV TF planners must understand their role in conducting terrain analysis in order to submit airspace requests through the ADAM/BAE to provide options for the commander and retain flexibility of maneuver should an attack mission be dynamically re- tasked. 

The AH-64 company must also understand their responsibility to provide their own analysis and running estimates and to be able to give reasonable expectations to the commander. The company should be able to receive the mission, execute TLPs, and identify friction points to mitigate during TF-level rehearsals. Furthermore, they should rehearse contingencies (such as identifying the use of a holding area vs. launching from the AV TAA) at the company level to overcome unexpected mission changes and exercise mission command to achieve the overall commander’s intent during a decisive operation. 

In conclusion, Brigade Combat Teams can greatly increase their chances of success with attack aviation by integrating early, providing detailed commander’s intent and associated criteria, and developing realistic triggers for the AV TF AH-64s. First, integration will establish the baseline for operational timelines and ensure mutual understanding of airspace submission requirements. Secondly, commander’s intent understood at the lowest level will empower the AH-64 air mission commander (AMC) with making timely decisions on the battlefield; for example, a movement to contact mission developing into a hasty attack of the enemy exploitation force. Finally, thoroughly-analyzed triggers based on event and not by time will allow the precise response time to mass firepower at the place and time of the commander’s choosing during a deliberate offensive or defensive operation. 

POC: CPT Randall Nordlund, Eagle 11, Cav/Atk Team Lead, randall.g.nordland.mil@mail.mil 

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