The Armor Company/Team constitutes one of the most powerful direct fire capabilities any Brigade in the world can commit to seize an enemy position thru overwhelming firepower, speed, and shock effect. In a decisive action environment, the ability of these formations to react quickly and decisively hinges on their intricate understanding of unit SOPS, a consistent understanding of their position relative to enemy forces, and the flawless execution of Company and below battle drills. Armor, like other units, achieve this standard by repeatedly ensuring they master truly essential tasks such as the ability to conduct tactical movement, actions on contact, attack by/support by fire, and defense of a position. They must exercise tactical patience by taking the time to clear restricted terrain, but, once committed, ruthlessly attack.
Train to Sustain at the Company and Platoon Level
Observation
Leaders from Company to vehicle commander level must be familiar with their role in supporting the unit level sustainment plan. Company and below level leaders are frequently are not familiar with how small unit and individual actions impact the overall sustainment plan, which has the effect of limiting options for the Task Force Commander.
Best Practices
Specific successful unit TTPs for training sustainment at the Company level and below include the following:
• Conduct a Sustainment LPD at home station that explains how all aspects of sustainment are doctrinally executed from the FLOT to the BSA. Walk leaders through their role in the process so they understand the importance of LOGSTATs, 5988E flow, LRP operations, recovery planning, and the composition of unit level maintenance assets.
• Define “Operational Reach” based on sustainment at the company and platoon level. Company and platoon level leaders should understand how long they can operate and how far they can advance during offensive operations based upon their consumption of supplies with a particular emphasis on CL IIIB. Leaders can illustrate this point by defining a phase line or other graphic control measure which constitutes the point where the unit will culminate due to sustainment. This “culmination line” will generally be the farthest from the unit immediately after LOGPAC and will move closer to the unit as they consume supplies; the “culmination line” is further extended when the unit receives resupply.
• Train vehicle recovery in suboptimal conditions. Successful units have trained combat vehicle recovery under fire using a variety of methods (tow bars, cables, straps) while in contact and in elevated MOPP conditions. Soldiers must understand the technical limitations of their vehicles and what they can do based on their experience level and the Commander’s risk tolerance.
• Crew Level Sustainment (CL I, III, V, VIII). Establish the load plan for all classes of supply by combat vehicle and explain the importance of updating the LOGSTAT as crews consume supplies during operations. Successful units establish standards that are understood and enforced by junior officers and NCOs.
• Casualty Evacuation. Establish a clearly understood plan for marking vehicles in support of evacuating casualties. VS-17 panels or equivalent marking system on various parts of the vehicle can be effective if understood by the team. Implement a clearly defined standard for what constitutes a non-standard CASEVAC asset and rehearse using said capability. Identify what special equipment must be present beyond the Medic’s aid bag and what should be transferred from the organic M113, FLA or Stryker when the vehicle becomes NMC.
Maintenance During Sustained Operations
Observation
Units struggle to create a maintenance focused battle rhythm during rotation and arrive at NTC unprepared to sustain maintenance operations during continuous operations. Units arrive at NTC without appropriately forecasting CLIII(P) or IX for the rotation, without sufficient bench stock on hand, resulting in vehicles remaining non-mission capable longer than they should and resulting in lost training opportunities for Soldiers. Units can look at historical data to analyze common maintenance issues and forecast appropriately. For Tank companies, maintenance often becomes the focus of the rotation, which takes time away from TLPs, planning cycles and other MET tasks. Tank Companies arrive with systems optimized for garrison operations without a defined maintenance battle rhythm. DA5988Es and LOGSTATs are not submitted routinely and few units establish a format prior to arrival at NTC. Maintenance meetings do not occur until operational readiness rates drop below unacceptable levels.
Best Practice
Determine average CL III(P) and maintenance stats during planning. Companies must forecast bench stock for their rotation and stock their SSL accordingly. The demand signal from home station training will not compare to the OPTEMPO at NTC so command directed fills must be maximized. Companies must develop a load plan for CLIII(P) on each tank and with the field trains.
Train to Use Special Equipment
Observations
Leaders and small units are frequently unfamiliar with the basics of how to use the ancillary equipment typically assigned to an MTOE Armor Company. This includes, but is not limited to, mine plows, rollers, and CBRN and communication equipment.
Best Practices
Soldiers at the Company level and below should understand how to employ every assigned piece of equipment in their formation. Specific equipment Commanders should pay special attention to include:
• Plows and Rollers. Units can train on plows and rollers by mounting them during all crew and collective training at home station. Successful crews are familiar with the components of both systems and have done basic familiarization by mounting, dismounting, inspecting, and driving with the plow and/or roller. A successful TTP for home station training may include reserving a training area that allows for digging and having tank crews repeatedly execute a driving course, mount/dismount drills, use of the manual lifting straps (for plows), and the transfer of either plows or rollers to the HHC mine roller section for transport. Units frequently arrive at NTC without ever previously mounting the plows and rollers, are unfamiliar with the components, and have never rehearsed the transportation of either asset.
• Communications Equipment including JBC-P (or JCR), RT-1523s, and SKLs must be associated with their parent system in GCSS_A if applicable and understood at the operator level. Units that have conducted deliberate training on the individual communications systems and can execute -10 level tasks may save time by not requiring a 25U to execute crew level tasks on every combat platform.
• Radio Net Management. Armor companies are limited by having only six RT-1523 series radios in each tank platoon. Platoon and company level leaders must rehearse company internal PACE plan and understand who monitors platoon internal, company command, fires, battalion command, and battalion A&L and what constitutes an appropriate use of each net. An example of an inappropriate use of an FM net would be using the Company Command net to call a 9 line medevac request while the company commander is using the same net to maneuver the company in contact with the enemy.
• CBRN Equipment. Armor units should incorporate JCAD, A/N VDR-2, A/N UDR-13/14, M256 kits, and equivalent capabilities into training. This will allow the company and platoon level units to update load plans, adjust their tactics according to the threat environment, and update LOGSTAT to reorder consumable items (batteries, M256 kits, etc.).
• CVTESS-MILES and associated TADDS. Incorporate a deliberate block of instruction on the installation, employment, and maintenance of MILES systems for combat and individual platforms. Include TTPs on the practical employment of MILES based on the NTC EXOP with a specific emphasis on boresight procedures and a secondary emphasis on vehicle camouflaging requirements with respect to MILES sensors.
Prep to Fire Checks
Observation
Due to perceived time constraints, Armor forces operating in a decisive action environment often fail to conduct proper pre-fire checks during force-on-force. Correct pre-fire checks are often not performed until immediately prior to live fire, and are typically not performed again. Perhaps the simplest and most basic function of an armor company is to kill the enemy. However, accurately engaging the enemy seems to be one of the hardest tasks for tank crews during live fire. Poor accuracy during live fire seems to come from poor habits during force on force prior to live fire. The TESS does not require full bore sighting procedures, muzzle reference sensor (MRS) checks/updates, armament accuracy checks (AAC) or meteorological data updates, or other pre-fire checks. Essentially, crews can “get away with” abbreviated versions of these essential tasks during force on force. This makes their transition to live fire problematic. Often battle rhythms, SOPs and priorities of work, which were at least adequate during force on force, are no longer effective. Implementing new SOPs and priorities of work either become an oversight that is never corrected, or implemented in hasty fashion. Pre-fire checks (including bore sighting or MRS checks/updates) are rarely conducted after the initial LD for live fire. Meteorological data updates are often only disseminated by a battalion command and control node after a company requests it, which is usually long after initial contact with the enemy and/or long after an update should have been disseminated. Even after the initial request for updated meteorological data, higher headquarters do not disseminate the information with any sort of regularity and it is often up to the subordinate unit to request an update when it occurs to them.
Best Practice
Train as you will fight. Your Soldiers will execute in battle what they must perform repeatedly to a high standard during training. Direct that daily battle rhythms, SOPs, and priorities of work be developed and executed as if crews were firing live rounds every time. TESS specific SOPs and priorities of work should be added on during force on force, and then can be either reduced or eliminated during live fire. Unit SOPs need to address when to boresight, conduct MRS checks/updates, AACs, and pre-fire checks. This better prepares units to train as they fight. During training prior to and at the NTC, units should incorporate the dissemination of meteorological data as part of a battle rhythm or have an SOP that triggers the dissemination.
Company Movement Techniques and Dispersion
Observation
Companies training at the National Training Center often struggle to identify the probable line of contact (PLC) during operations and deploy into proper movement formations and techniques prior to contact. Often, planning at the company level does not include sufficient red ink on their
graphics, which leads to companies failing to transition from movement to maneuver prior to making contact with the enemy. Enemy direct fire or indirect fire ranges are rarely depicted on graphics as the commander prepares his/her plan. There are multiple reasons for the lack of sufficient planning at the company level. Battalion staffs fail to disseminate information in a timely manner, company commanders do not conduct parallel planning with battalion, and the enemy SITTEMP is not fully developed. We often witness companies remain in column or wedge formations in open terrain without proper dispersion along an avenue of approach toward an objective. When units fail to identify the PLC and deploy into maneuver formations, they become easy targets for the enemy and rarely reach their objective.
Best Practice
Battalion staff should publish WARNORD 1 with the enemy SITTEMP as early as possible, ensuring they stay within the 1/3, 2/3 rule. The S2 can identify the PLC and provide a threat ring analysis for the commanders to plan a probable line of deployment (PLD) against. Commanders can conduct IPB and provide a bottom up analysis as they are, more often than not, more familiar with the terrain. Commanders establish a standard for enemy SITEMP on graphics and conduct PCIs to ensure compliance.
Train to Task Organize and Combine Arms
Observation
Platoons and Companies must be prepared to support dynamic changes to task organization that support battalion and brigade level mission requirements. Companies frequently have difficulty employing task organized assets, and platoons struggle to integrate into non-like type units (Armor to Infantry, etc.).
Best Practices
Specific successful unit TTPs to train task organized formations include the following:
• Establish Attachment/Detachment Checklist. Units develop attachment and detachment checklist to support task organization requirements. This includes a reference card to provide in the event the supported unit is not familiar with unit capabilities, limitations and requirements.
• Publish specific times for task organization planning and execution. This allows all assets in the company team to participate in Task Force level rehearsals and execute TLPs at the company and platoon level. Train Company and platoon level leaders to ask for this and/or provide recommendations if not provided by the higher echelon.
• Combine Arms at home station by establishing habitual relationships during collective training. The best units observed at NTC have executed collective training together on multiple occasions prior to arriving at Fort Irwin. Task organized armor, engineer and infantry platoons arrive understanding how to operate together and are quickly able to combine arms even when operating in a time constrained planning environment.
• Develop unit level SOPs or playbooks that are published and used during home station collective training and include the habitual relationships mentioned above. Units frequently arrive with SOPs that govern operations at the platoon and company level that have not been trained or rehearsed at home station. Company and platoon common TACSOPs are a possible solution.
• Develop, issue and inspect unit level systems to publish analog and digital graphics at the platoon level. Successful platoons and companies have designated individuals to copy or develop graphics, inspect graphics during PCIs and update as the situation develops. Publication of graphics to all organic and attached elements allows company commanders to synchronize assets, de-conflict with adjacent units and combine arms in accordance with Army doctrine.
POC: CPT Will Rand, Panther 14, Armor Company Trainer, william.j.rand6.mil@mail.mil
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