In the post-World War II era, the United States has enjoyed a near faultless tactical dominance and overmatch against its enemies. And yet, in that time we have, at perhaps equal rate, failed to “win the peace” in the post-war/kinetic environment. In the Post 9/11 era this has become status quo, a constant in U.S. combat operations. The shift from Afghanistan in 2003, “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq, and a whole host of other U.S. incursions overseas have left many scratching their heads. How can a global superpower win so spectacularly at the tactical-level and yet come-up short so often in the strategic ends? That is exactly what Lt. Col. Brendan Gallagher set out to discover in his recent book, The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace.
This website is not shy about its clear focus on the tactical level of war. The argument regarding tactical v. strategic development of leaders through professional military education (PME) rages. But this is a false dichotomy. The best leaders are masterful communicators, able to translate strategy into tactical implications to the soldiers on the fighting end of policy. Alternately, they are able to describe tactical realities to the leaders developing our national strategies and policies.
Lt. Col. Brendan Gallagher does just that in his book The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace. An important read for leaders at all levels, Brendan examines four case studies, ranging from Kosovo to Afghanistan, to illustrate the policy and strategy shortfalls of focusing on Phase III (Dominate) operations without a deliberate and resourced plan for Phase IV (Stabilize).
I had the pleasure of talking with Lt. Col. Gallagher and discussing his book, its origins, and its implications for tactical leaders. Here was our Q&A:
Q. You said in a recent interview on The Dead Prussian Podcast, that the idea for this book started when you were a younger leader, sitting in deployed environments, wondering “how we got here.” That question clearly took you to the strategic level of war, why is that?
A. I think the strategic level is where most of our biggest, most consequential mistakes took place. In places like Iraq we repeatedly have not had a clear understanding of why we were going to war, and what realistic end-state we were seeking to attain. So, we were fundamentally confused, and didn’t capitalize on the tactical successes we achieved early in our operations.
Q. Why does America keeps making similar mistakes over and over in our recent wars – or as you put it, why do we keep “stepping on the rake”?
A. When we don’t deliberately think through why we are going to war and what we can realistically achieve, it’s a problem. We have often fallen victim to dangerous cognitive pitfalls. We may succumb to magical thinking, believing everything will neatly fall into place and selectively ignoring historical experiences that highlight how difficult things could be. These sorts of cognitive traps help begin to explain why we step on the rake again and again.
Q. What are the one or two most important lessons we should learn from America’s recent wars?
A. One key lesson is to acknowledge that the postwar phase will likely be extremely hard – usually harder than the military campaign itself. So, we should spend at least as much time and effort preparing for postwar challenges as we do for the initial battlefield encounters. Another key lesson is we should be more selective in deciding when to go to war in the first place. Our recent wars have primarily been wars of choice, and we dug ourselves into some pretty difficult situations of our own choosing.
Q. In what ways did your research focused on strategic shortfalls in Phase IV operations lead you to better understand your role as a tactical leader?
A. Tactical leaders shouldn’t dismiss the postwar phase as someone else’s problem. If everyone adopts that mindset, and we collectively point the finger at somebody else, then that “somebody” may not have sufficient capacity, expertise, or desire to pull it off. There needs to be a sense of shared ownership by leaders at all levels, and a recognition that the initial battlefield encounters may just be the easy part.
Q. Given America’s poor track record, can we ever expect to get the postwar right and what can we as tactical leaders be doing during kinetic operations to better posture ourselves and our leaders for it?
A. The odds are usually stacked against success, and there is rarely any guarantee of a good outcome. But we might be able to improve the odds of a tolerable outcome. At the tactical level, leaders shouldn’t assume that someone else will parachute in and magically solve the various postwar challenges. If you don’t see anyone else on the ground, then chances are, you might be stuck with it. To the extent possible, all echelons should try to support a clear, achievable, overall goal that can be sustained over time.
Q. Whenever the next war occurs, how can we do it better? What does winning look like during the day after?
A. Ideally, we would make smarter decisions up front about when to go to war in the first place, with a much greater appreciation of the lasting costs and consequences. Don’t expect a glorious triumph with a ticker-tape parade at the end. We need to be clear about our realistic goal. This means being clear about the obstacles and the resources we’ll need to get there. We may need to lower our aims for the types of complex, ethnically-divided places where we often find ourselves fighting. This might mean being satisfied with partial successes.
Q. How has your research and the lessons you learned influenced how you lead as a battalion commander?
Q. What else should we, as the tactical-arm of U.S. foreign policy, be reading and thinking about?
A. We should remain humble in our predictive abilities. Remember, no one holds the secret to exactly where or how the next war will unfold. Some scenarios might be more likely than others, but there is no crystal ball revealing exactly what will happen. So I would recommend reading deeply on different types of conflicts. This includes a focus on how the initial expectations did or did not align with how things actually unfolded. I also suggest reading and thinking about how tactical events tie into broader political outcomes. The crucial link between them is repeatedly overlooked.
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Developing the ability to connect ends, ways, and means is an important skill for any leader. Leaders clearly communicate that connection to multiple, different audiences. We need to develop a critically-thinking mind and some strategic acumen in leaders at the tactical level. This will help aid in creating the foundational building-blocks for greater depth later down the line.
Pick up your print, kindle, or Audible copy of The Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace HERE.
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