It Can Be Done

Lessons from an HHC TOC Defense Live Fire

As the company commander of a Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC), I was given a tremendous opportunity to conduct a company live fire (LFX) for the first time in the unit’s memorable history. The company had minimal experience in the tactical arena. We struggled with the little things like qualifying on our machine guns and carrying our weapons at the low ready. Leading up to the LFX, we focused on building soldier familiarity with basic skills and the ability to operate tactically in a deployed environment. We knew the experience of conducting a live fire exercise would be beneficial, but we didn’t realize how much we would learn from the process.

The Butcher, the Baker, and the Candlestick Maker – an HHC LFX is rarely “sexy”. It is hard to plan and even more difficult to pack into an already full training schedule focused on preparing lethal squads and platoons. But…it can be done!

This is a Guest Post by Captain Michael Hoffman. Mike is an Active Duty Military Intelligence Officer, currently in command of Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 92nd Engineer Battalion, 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Prior to this he was an Infantry Officer, serving as a Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Assistant Operations Officer. In 2012, he deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Mike is a 2010 graduate of Appalachian State University where he majored in International Relations. He is currently working on his Masters Degree in Intelligence Operations from American Military University.

Identify Capability Gaps

I am not sure of the genesis for conducting a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Defense LFX, but I remember initially being hesitant. However, my First Sergeant (1SG) showed me previous After Action Reviews (AARs) from rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center, making the need for this event apparent. We lacked the ability to secure a self-sustaining TOC in the decisive action environment. With a deployment to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) on the horizon, we recognized the importance of fixing this capability gap. Additionally, being an Engineer unit, our HHC has a survey and design section that could potentially deploy around the battlefield in small teams operating with minimal security. With the shortfall identified, we set to work fixing it.

Develop the Concept

Our goal for this LFX was to create a simple scenario that tested the company in four different facets. First, we tested the staff’s ability to react to contact and assume battle positions in a defensive posture. Second, we tested the surveyors by deploying them outside the perimeter and requiring them to react to contact. Third, we tested our Quick Reaction Force (QRF), comprised of soldiers that did not work in the TOC or with the surveyors. Finally, we incorporated a casualty evacuation drill at the surveyor’s react to contact site. This tested and evaluated our ability to react to a casualty, and the company’s competency in casualty evacuation from point of injury (POI) to the Battalion Aid Station.

Execution

We established a realistic timeline to mirror combat operations with a day and night shift. In reality, our night fire was limited to dawn (EENT) and dusk (BMNT) due to risk factors in training and equipment. We conducted the LFX over the span of four days. Prior to the LFX, we planned several rounds of classroom training and dry runs in garrison – adhering to the 8 Step Training Model. However, a snowstorm swept through Southern Georgia and closed the installation for the entire week, when we planned to conduct our classroom training. This setback added an additional layer of risk. Crucial to mitigating this risk was having dedicated safeties with each of the three moving elements. The key lesson here – increased risk requires increased safety measures. 1SG and I stationed one safety with the TOC defense, one safety with the surveyors, and two safeties were with the QRF.

“We don’t rise to the level of our expectations; we fall to the level of our training.” –Archilochos

On Day Zero, we made movement to the site, built the TOC, Company Command Post (CP), and Aid Station, confirmed the plan with range control and conducted a rehearsal with the entire company. On Day One, we conducted two dry iterations with subsequent AARs. And, on Day Two we executed blank and live fire iterations. Finally, on Day Three, the company “jumped” the TOC to a new location.

The training was decisive and focused on our simple objectives. For example, each iteration lasted approximately 30 minutes, allowing for retraining and increased throughput. The time allotted to meet our training objectives was almost perfect for our experience level. We witnessed the iterative gains that come from repetition. The initial “dry” iterations were rough, demonstrating a lack of muzzle awareness, communication, and situational awareness. Our lack of practice was apparent. However, as the iterations continued, we used AARs and repetitions to train muscle memory.

Lessons Learned

Short Range Training Ammunition (SRTA)

SRTA provides maximum target feedback with minimal risk. It allows for force-on-force iterations with a thinking enemy and enforces good marksmanship techniques. The weapons require a different bolt that you draw from TSC/TADDS. Without these special bolts, the weapons will likely malfunction and degrade the training value. This ammunition doesn’t have the same range as live rounds, but it minimizes training restrictions that otherwise detract from combat realism.

Mitigating Risk

The enemy gets a vote. In training, time and external factors (such as the snowstorm) are the enemy. Training plans need to be flexible, with added safety measures and plans to gain efficiency where it is otherwise lost. Our team mitigated the additional risk with more lane safeties and addressed the limited time with a quick and iterative concept that allowed for more repetitions.

Communication

Communication and properly task-organizing equipment is critical. Our ability to communicate, or lack thereof, became a problem because we did not have an internal task organization with radios when we shifted from TOC operations to TOC defense. This limited leaders to voice only, and lessened our agility on the battlefield. Leaders were more passive because they lacked shared understanding. This improved with repetitions, but it showed us a glaring shortfall in our contingency and TOC defense plans.

Overestimating Experience

We assumed a higher level of residential knowledge than existed. Because of this, we naturally assumed that our NCOs and Officers have the experience to react to various environments. The lack of experience, especially when it comes to infantry-basic tasks, was prevalent within the first few iterations. Ultimately, the Company learned that we need to focus on basic warrior skills and tasks, evaluate soldiers and leaders to assess shortcomings, and train the basic skills prior to the event. We learned a lot on a steep learning curve and we focused very heavily on basic skills that we could have trained prior to this collective event.

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