If you’re an Army professional, you’ve probably experienced this scenario: You’ve subscribed to a litany of military social media outlets and other mediums that perpetuate a nearly constant stream of leadership focused articles. Each time one pops up, you open it…wondering what you can learn to become a better leader. While many are helpful and provide niche comments on ways to improve, they often miss the primary point of Army leadership: To inspire others to risk their lives to accomplish missions of importance to the Nation.
Tag Archives: Lessons from Atropia
Battlefield Leadership Starts Before the Battle
"Failing in order to Succeed"
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In today’s operating environment, we are challenging leaders with more complex scenarios that exercise the implementation of additional enablers across all warfighting functions. Bringing these enablers and internal assets to bear at a decisive point on the battlefield is the training objective, and failure is not an option. In most cases, this the first time these challenges are presented and expectations are high. Great units and leaders achieve success, and that is expected. Success breeds success, but what if, just what if, we changed our thought process and implementation of lessons learned throughout our careers? What if in fact failure breeds success and this thought process changes our perception of what makes a great unit or great leader. What if failure IS an option?
Creating a Better Training Culture
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In 2016, the Army transitioned to standardized mission essential tasks (METs) and training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for battery level units and above. It’s hard to believe that, prior to this, commanders chose their own mission essential tasks. But the transformation is not complete. Battery and platoon level leaders still struggle with understanding their METS, T&EOs, and performance steps. This requires a cultural shift that is lagging behind the doctrinal change.
Who Should Serve as TF Engineers in an IBCT?
A Critical Position for Success in the Decisive Action Training Environment
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The Infantry Brigade Combat team is, by definition, a light organization. Never is that more apparent to its soldiers than on the lead edge of the battlefield, defending against an Arianin armored thrust. This is the point, in time and space, where soldiers rue the fact that “light” fighters, are also “light” on engineers and their heavy equipment. Whether the defense at the battalion-level fails or holds usually boils down to one person, the Task Force Engineer (TF ENG).
The Skolkan OPFOR Empire
Three Years of Lessons Learned as US Army Europe's Opposition Force
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They are the demons who run around in black, tan, or green uniforms. Unnamed fighters who cover their MILES gear in sunscreen, wreaking havoc to friendly forces on the mock battlefield. They are the source of sweat drenched days and sleepless lights, a seemingly unbeatable force from the depths of hell. Just who are these mythical combat creatures?
National Training Center Update (MAR 2020)
Defensive Operations Against a Near-Peer Threat
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While nearly every leader prefers to maintain an offensive mindset, defensive operations serve a purpose and are listed as a Mission Essential Task for nearly every formation in our Army. While applications vary, defensive operations often allow our Army to retain decisive or key terrain, attrite or fix an enemy force, or counter an enemy action. Each rotation at the National Training Center, at some point, stresses a unit’s ability to conduct a defense.
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Cavalry Defensive Operations Against a Near-Peer Threat
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Cavalry troops frequently fail to provide early warning to the protected force while performing a screen. Units are placed on disadvantageous terrain, fail to array in depth, and neglect to incorporate available aerial reconnaissance to extend observation and maximize reaction time and maneuver space.
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Armor and Infantry in the Defense Against a Near-Peer Threat
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The main reason we conduct a defense is to set the conditions to transition to the offense. At the company level and below we must recognize the significance of properly preparing for defensive operations. Units planning against a near peer threat at the National Training Center (NTC) will focus on preparing for an attack or conducting the seven steps of EADEV in preparation for a defense, but rarely do units prepare simultaneously for both. Commanders must think through transitioning into defensive operations prior executing offensive operations.
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Planning and Integrating Obstacles and Indirect Fires in the Defense
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Successful defensive operations against a near peer threat require units to thoroughly conduct engagement area development. Most units are able to effectively execute defensive operations, but struggle with the detailed planning required for obstacle emplacement and the time distance analysis required to choose effective locations for obstacles, indirect fires, and direct fires.
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Defensive Operations for the Field Artillery Battalion
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a context for Field Artillery (FA) units executing defensive operations in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). The specific unit of focus for this paper is the Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT), Direct Support (DS) Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. The primary audiences for this paper are Fires Battalion Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, Battery and Forward Support Company Commanders, and First Sergeants. This paper is a collaboration of Key Developmental billet complete Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts) with an aggregate of ~100 rotations of experience at the National Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, CA.