One can confidently assume that all organizational leaders at as some point, especially during a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, have experienced and observed the frustrations of deliberate or undeliberate selective compliance on noncompliance of actions and orders by individuals or groups. Numerous times at National Training Center (NTC), I have witnessed organizational leaders, specifically the BCT Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) in frustration state, “I told them to do that; we discussed or talked about that; I don’t understand why it didn’t happen; why didn’t they report that; I don’t understand why that happened, AGAIN!”
Tag Archives: Fires
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Planning and Integrating Obstacles and Indirect Fires in the Defense
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Successful defensive operations against a near peer threat require units to thoroughly conduct engagement area development. Most units are able to effectively execute defensive operations, but struggle with the detailed planning required for obstacle emplacement and the time distance analysis required to choose effective locations for obstacles, indirect fires, and direct fires.
NTC Update (MAR 20)
Defensive Operations for the Field Artillery Battalion
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a context for Field Artillery (FA) units executing defensive operations in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). The specific unit of focus for this paper is the Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT), Direct Support (DS) Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. The primary audiences for this paper are Fires Battalion Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, Battery and Forward Support Company Commanders, and First Sergeants. This paper is a collaboration of Key Developmental billet complete Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts) with an aggregate of ~100 rotations of experience at the National Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, CA.
Offensive Operations for the Field Artillery Battalion and Below
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a context for Field Artillery (FA) units executing offensive operations in a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). The specific unit of focus for this paper is the Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT), Direct Support (DS) Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. The primary audiences for this paper are Fires Battalion Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, Battery and Forward Support Company Commanders, and First Sergeants. This paper is a collaboration of Key Developmental billet complete Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts) with an aggregate of ~100 rotations of experience at the National Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, CA.
Fires on OBJ Sheridan (IBCT CO Fire Support Plan)
The Company Leader TDG 20-01
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Your light infantry company is preparing to complete an air assault and secure a key intersection necessary for your division’s counterattack. The enemy’s airborne forces defeated the Atropian Army units, forcing them to withdraw and consolidate. You haven’t encountered the enemy, but expect your base ammunition load to be at 90% after maneuvering to your objective. You are responsible for completing a fire support plan for the company attack and follow-on operations to secure the intersection. Your company will need to secure the intersection for at least 48 hours until the counterattack forces reach your position.
NTC Update (NOV 19)
Field Artillery Battery Observations & Best Practices
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Field Artillery units constitute the single most powerful combat multiplier on the battlefield under the direct control of the BCT Commander. By adeptly utilizing artillery fires, Commanders can effectively shape the deep fight prior to enemy forces making contact with the lead units of the BCT. They can also provide additional firepower to disrupt, neutralize, or even destroy enemy elements in the close fight. The decision to employ artillery and the decision to transition the weight of your artillery fires from one task to another cannot be haphazardly controlled. The deliberate execution of a scheme of fires, conducted in concern with the movement of direct fire ground forces onto enemy positions (the very definition of maneuver) constitutes one of the single most important tasks a Commander must perform to be successful in a decisive action training environment against a near peer threat.
Call for Fire
The Company Leader TDG 19-04
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After a long night supporting your reconnaissance troop’s zone recon mission, you do a final radio check with your Fire Support NCO in his OP on hill 509. The scout platoons are settled in to their positions on the screen line, watching the valley known as the 15 tango for enemy movement. So far, the troop has encountered Skolkan alliance Special Purpose Forces in trucks, as well as wheeled recon vehicles from the enemy’s Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) recon company. The troop’s 120mm Mortars are sitting at 60% of their base ammunition load after suppressing those enemy Ops the night before, with 30 rounds of HE between the two tubes. The troop commander is huddled in the CP on his headset, receiving an intel update from the Squadron on the enemy’s anticipated attack. The call concludes, and he looks at you. “You’re going to be busy today”, he says, only half-jokingly.