At the National Training Center, we spend time assisting units to build their understanding of doctrine, the operations process, the science of control, and the fundamentals our units must execute on the modern battlefield. While critical to our success on future battlefields, some rotational units overlook the most critical element of combat power: leadership.
In October 2019, the National Training Center distributed “Recommendations for Commanders to Consider During Home Station Training” to correct a few common shortcomings seen among rotational units. Mastering the fundamentals at echelon and the associated ability to truly focus units on training identified critical collective tasks to a high standard topped the list of recommendations for Commanders to consider.
Reconnaissance formations constitute an invaluable asset on a modern battlefield. The notion that sophisticated enemies, equipped with air defense, electronic attack, as well as cyber capabilities will just allow us to remotely sense their actions prior to commitment of our forces is quickly fleeting. Responsible for answering Commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements during either reconnaissance or security operations, Cavalry Troops and Scout Platoons often have less time than other maneuver units before being required to act. For the average Scout Platoon or Cavalry Troop, simple tactical mistakes can have catastrophic effects on a larger formation’s ability to understand the situation or maneuver effectively against a determined enemy. The ability to operate continuously utilizing sound SOPS, basic maneuver techniques and tactics at the crew, section, and platoon level, as well as the ability to share information collected are just of the few tasks these units must do exceedingly well to accomplish their mission.
The Armor Company/Team constitutes one of the most powerful direct fire capabilities any Brigade in the world can commit to seize an enemy position thru overwhelming firepower, speed, and shock effect. In a decisive action environment, the ability of these formations to react quickly and decisively hinges on their intricate understanding of unit SOPS, a consistent understanding of their position relative to enemy forces, and the flawless execution of Company and below battle drills. Armor, like other units, achieve this standard by repeatedly ensuring they master truly essential tasks such as the ability to conduct tactical movement, actions on contact, attack by/support by fire, and defense of a position. They must exercise tactical patience by taking the time to clear restricted terrain, but, once committed, ruthlessly attack.
The BCT’s military intelligence company provides a diverse set of capabilities to a Brigade Combat Team. Whether facilitating the execution of HUMINT operations in a local urban area, SIGINT operations by attaching small teams forward with reconnaissance elements, or information collection activities with UAV assets, every MICO should allow the Commander to better understand the tactical situation. Yet, to employ this formation effectively, it should be intimately comfortable operating in small teams, dispersed throughout the organization, trained to provide capability when and where it is needed to facilitate intelligence operations. Too often, Commanders relegate the training of these small teams to a series of command post exercises without critically thinking through how to best employ these crucial Soldiers on a modern battlefield.
The criticality of command and control as a warfighting function cannot be overstated. Without the ability to communicate, units cannot conduct synchronized operations. Without proper systems that enable control, synchronization of activities across the formation becomes nearly impossible. Yet, formations habitually dedicate less time to training how to effectively communicate at echelon than many other tasks. The lack of training and associated routine operator level maintenance results in improperly maintained or non-mission capable equipment, automatically degrading the combat power of the larger combined arms team. Remember, if you can’t talk, you can’t fight.
The role of the BSB distribution company is to plan, direct, and supervise supply distribution to the brigade. It conducts daily receipt, storage, and issue of supply classes I, II, III, IV, V and IX and transports cargo for the brigade. This unit is employed in the brigade support area and operates throughout the supported brigade area.
According to ATP 4-11 (Motor Transportation Operations), one Transportation Composite Truck Company (Heavy) is designated per Division with an Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The CTC is assigned to the Sustainment Brigade in support of Division operations usually attached to a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) (Sustainment Handbook, 2019). The CTC Mission is to perform Transportation and convoy security support to Sustainment Brigade operations for a Heavy Division. They provide transportation assets for the movement and distribution of dry and refrigerated containerized cargo, general non-containerized cargo, ammunition, bottled water, bulk water (when equipped with tank racks / hippos), heavy equipment, tanks and oversized loads as well as perform unit moves, transport personnel, and provides escort services for contracted trucks.
The Brigade Role 2 MTF has the capability to provide packed red blood cells (liquid), limited x-ray, clinical laboratory, operational dental support, combat and operational stress control, preventive medicine, and when augmented, physical therapy and optometry services. The Role 2 MTF provides a greater capability to resuscitate trauma patients than is available at Role 1. Those patients who can return to duty within 72 hours are held for treatment as long as the Role 2 remains in place and/or has the lift capacity to move patients during a displacement. The Role 2 is also responsible for evacuation of patients from each battalion’s Role 1 (ATP 4-02.55).
The Forward Support Companies (FSC) provide direct logistic support to each maneuver battalion in a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The FSC Commander is responsible for assisting the battalion S4 and, executing logistics support according to both the BSB and supported maneuver commander’s guidance, and serving as the link between organizations (FM 3-96, 9-7). To accomplish these tasks, the FSC echelons assets across the battlefield throughout the company trains, combat trains, and field trains. Synchronizing these elements requires unfettered communication between the key nodes at each echelon including the supported battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP), and Field Trains Command Post (FTCP). Manning and equipping the CTCP and FTCP is an implied task for the FSC but, it should be well defined. A symptom of BCTs tendency to perform collective training at the battalion level and of FSC culture which prides itself on not requiring support from the BSB is that Forward Support Companies struggle to provide adequate support during large scale combat operations (LSCO).
