Category Archives: Guest Post

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Sustaining Multi-Domain Operations

The Logistical Challenges of Future War

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The Army can’t guarantee overmatch in future war – a luxury we have had since the end of the Cold War. Our senior leaders are acknowledging it. This is a sobering thought, especially for sustaining the force. As part of the so called “tail,” this changes how we support the future fight. We have spent our entire military careers operating in theaters where our forces have superiority across all domains. Our forces executed resupply operations from the division rear area in relative security. We were able to appropriately prepare to provide logistics across the line of departure, but no longer.

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Understanding the Tempo of Reconnaissance

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Tempo is the rate of speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-90). It is related to the capabilities and supporting efforts within an organization. This definition is different than reconnaissance tempo, but equally important to military operations. Tempo controls or alters the rate of the operation to maintain the initiative for offensive operations. Visualization is key to understanding tempo. FM 3-98 illustrates an “X” chart with two sets of tempo: rapid and forceful & stealthy and deliberate. But, there are more tempos available to reconnaissance commanders. Proper understanding and application of tempo are means to mitigate risk and accomplish the reconnaissance objective.

Army National Guard Infantrymen from the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team seize a town from the enemy, June 7, 2019, at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. Seizing the key terrain enabled the 116th CBCT to maneuver pass the previously contested area. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Mason Cutrer)
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Operationalizing the Battle Staff in Garrison

Part III: Get Your Planning Reps, by the Desert Tortoise

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The Military Decision Making Process: four words that send shivers up your shell. But MDMP is simply a methodology to understand and solve tactical problems collaboratively. An underlying theme of Part I and Part II of this series is enabling and enforcing collaboration to achieve shared situational understanding. This piece focuses on leveraging shared understanding to solve home station problem sets with the same methodology you will use in combat. MDMP is hard because we rarely use it to frame and solve dilemmas at home station. The friction and fog of war will challenge your ability to execute MDMP. We can make it easier by training ourselves and our teams to solve home station problems collaboratively via this tried and true process. In this article, we will explore three common opportunities to get your battle staff good reps at planning: annual/semi-annual training guidance, collective training events, and the weekly FRAGORD.

M1 Abrams Tank overlooks the city of Razish while the crew undoubtedly hears the voice of Sir Alec Guinness saying “You will never find a more wretched hive of scum and villainy.”
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Ethics in the Crucible

The Saga of Lieutenant Jake Portier

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It seems that the entire world has heard of the saga of Chief Eddie Gallagher, the Navy SEAL on trial for charges of premeditated murder, attempted murder, and obstructions of justice. Members of his own platoon alleged that he engaged in heinous acts of violence against civilians and detained combatants. The purpose of this article is not to weigh in on the accusations against Gallagher. Many have and will continue to do so, including the President himself. Nor is it to further probe the bizarre alleged “spying” of the defense by the prosecution. For us junior officers, the more relevant leadership lessons come from a lesser-known member of Gallagher’s unit– Platoon Commander Lt. Jacob “Jake” Portier.

Navy SEALs conduct dive operations training in the Atlantic Ocean, May 29, 2019. SEALs are the maritime component of U.S. special operations forces and are trained to conduct missions from sea, air and land.
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The Danger of “Should”

Guest Post by Capt. Benjamin Hockman

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In 218 B.C.E., Hannibal crossed the Alps and invaded the Italian peninsula. It should not have been possible to bring a large army, including cavalry and elephants, along that route during winter. When the two armies met at Cannae, Hannibal’s elephants were long dead, and he was outnumbered 5 to 3. The Roman leadership assumed their standard tactics would be sufficient. What should have been a straightforward victory became one of the most famous massacres in military history; Hannibal slaughtered virtually all of the 50,000 Romans.

A 173rd Airborne Brigade Paratrooper gives directions to his troops while participating in Exercise Immediate Response at Pocek Training Area, Slovenia, May 15, 2019. Exercise Immediate Response is a multinational exercise co-led by Croatian Armed Forces, Slovenian Armed Forces, and U.S. Army Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Henry Villarama)
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Not Just for Nerds

Real-Time Military Strategy Games as TDEs

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Real-time strategy computer games are an underused tool for teaching tactics and strategy. Hold your skepticism and hard eye-roll for just a moment. I’m not talking about first person shooters where you look through the eyes of a soldier (although some of these games might have a place when it comes to tactical teamwork and on the spot decision-making). I am referring to tactical strategy games where the gamer control various units against another thinking, human being. They are simulations and they are not perfect, but I believe if you can teach a tactical leader the controls of some of these games you can hit home the complexity of tactical combat.

Wargame, and other such real-time strategy video games, offer another tool to add to our TDG kit. We push LVC-G options at the unit level, why not look to open source, market solutions as well. Image retrieved from YouTube still photo.

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Operationalizing the Battle Staff in Garrison

Part II: Processes and Procedures

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Now that you replicated your tactical command post in your unit headquarters (Read Part I HERE), you need to put it to use. If the Command Post exists to enable Commander decision-making and to synchronize and support the efforts of subordinates, then we must implement the processes and procedures necessary to facilitate those efforts. Establish a battle rhythm focused on Commander touchpoints, build the running estimates that efficiently inform his or her decisions, and enforce tactical reporting as the mechanism to update those running estimates.

Engineer Advisors from A Co, 5th BN, 1st SFAB work with FORSCOM units to enable their advisory missions in the Indo-Pacific region. Photo Retrieved from Facebook.
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Beware the Casual Clausewitzian

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Major General Carl von Clausewitz’s On War sparks discussions in military classrooms across the world. However, German General Gunther Blumentritt cautioned against handing Clausewitz’s work to the military, as it is like “allowing a child to play with a razor blade.”[i] It is certainly not an endeavor to be taken lightly, as Clausewitz’s difficult writing style, which is full of metaphors and philosophy, is challenging and prone to misinterpretation to those not ready to wrestle with his ideas. Overcoming this requires serious preparation, repetition, and reflection to develop a personal understanding of Clausewitz’s insights on war.[ii] As growing professionals, it is important to understand the business of our profession–war–and wrestling with his ideas is a great place to start learning about war’s nature, despite claims to the contrary.

A grenadier with 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, strives for maximum lethality on the battlefield. Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii, April 3, 2019. T (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Geoff Cooper)
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Operationalizing the Battle Staff in Garrison

Part I: Train Like You Fight

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In the next Decisive Action (DA) conflict, we will be outnumbered, outgunned, and potentially matched in every other domain. If this is the case, then we can only win by synchronizing and massing combined arms at the decisive point faster than the enemy. We must anticipate the enemy’s scheme of maneuver, develop a collection plan to confirm it, synchronize fires and effects to attrit enemy forces, and provide subordinate commanders with a detailed plan to execute the enemy’s destruction–all while conducting protection and sustainment operations. To quote the 25thCommander of Operations Group, “We have to do this perfectly and continuously, every time.” Developing and retaining proficient and cohesive battle staff teams is essential to winning the next first fight.

1st Cavalry Division Troopers at NTC. Image retrieved from Twitter.
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Hitting the Mark

Teaching Unit Level Marksmanship

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Marksmanship in the Army is continually evolving, and everyone seems to be an “expert.”  Leaders at all levels tend to limit their teaching to the TTPs that they think work best. Individuality has its benefits, but we can’t rely on a “shooter’s preference” mentality when teaching marksmanship. Don’t become the NCO who says “this is how I did it,” or “this is how I was taught.” Learn the standard and know the doctrine. We need to balance hard-earned experience with an understanding of our constantly developing profession. TTPs and personal experience makes NCOs stronger as teachers and trainers. But if they aren’t built on a strong doctrinal foundation, we are setting our soldiers and future NCOs up for failure.

Soldiers with 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, prepare to qualify on the M240 and M249 in South Korea, Jan. 25, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alon Humphrey)