Once a year, the nation honors the veterans it has lost. Each day the veteran honors them, and us all, with the fruits of that service. The Veteran internally recalls, reflects and remembers the very personal and unique aspects of that time served There. Together, all the Veterans have a binding thread we honor that only they can know and share–the knowledge that they were part of something larger than themselves, next to others who gave everything, over There.
The most important thing any Army Leader will ever do is lead their soldiers into war. It is the ultimate reason we exist. It can also be one of the most costly things one can do as a human being. Preparation is vital and lessons should be learned and shared widely. This is part one in a series of posts covering the hard lessons I’ve learned in combat.
Last night we lost a soldier. A Stryker rolled over his torso. Another soldier, Spc. Mike Powers, had his feet crushed. A third soldier was inches from having his skull crushed.
In the middle of the night, on September 14th, 2012, a team of Taliban fighters broke through the perimeter of Camp Bastion and began attacking the base. Bastion, later called Camp Shorabak, was located northwest of Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and housed Marine Corps Harrier Jump Jets. Marines and Royal Air Force personnel bravely defended their base and killed the Taliban intruders after a six-hour firefight. Over a dozen friendly personnel died or sustained wounds, and the enemy destroyed or damaged eight aircraft. The attack severely degraded Bastion’s ability to project combat power and support friendly ground forces. The Taliban gambled, correctly, that the best way to strike back against coalition airpower advantage was to attack the aircrafts in their most vulnerable state; on the ground.
It’s the middle of the training meeting. Two company commanders need the same range to qualify their companies. Unfortunately, there was a mix-up, and there’s only enough ammunition and range time for one company. Capt. Smith launches into an impassioned argument, explaining to Lt. Col. Jones why his company should get the range, how hard they’ve worked to plan it, and how it will just wreck his training progression if he has to shoot a month from now. He sits down confident he made his case… only to see the range go to Capt. Thomas’s company instead.
The U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) form the core of the Armored Brigade Combat Team’s (ABCT) striking power. They include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 120mm mortars, and infantry squads. This impressive grouping of combat platforms and soldiers requires the company commander to skillfully employ and integrate platoons. Company commanders enable the CAB commander to rapidly combine arms. Based on observations of CABs executing offensive operations at the National Training Center (NTC), numerous shortfalls exist at the company level that impact the CAB’s ability to maintain momentum and extend operational reach. Units that can’t perform fundamental company and platoon-level tasks during the plan, prepare and execute phases of an operation will stall the CAB commander’s efforts to synchronize actions and achieve desired effects against enemy formations. To minimize this degradation in combat power, armor and mechanized infantry company commanders should consider the following best practices.
Long-gone are the days of wide area security operations from static, built-up locations. The changing nature of war will reward flexibility and an expeditionary mindset, and punish conformists. Commanders and units have become comfortable with medical plans that assume very little risk regarding placement of the Battalion Aid Station (BAS). With the Army’s renewed focus on large scale combat operations (LSCO), leaders must consider employing the BAS and medical platoon in ways that have largely went untrained and unpracticed. To save as many lives as possible, commanders and leaders must consider placement of the BAS as far forward as tactically feasible.
On a cold and rainy day in October, the 504th Military Police Battalion and 66th Military Police Company personnel received the great opportunity to tour the BFI4 Amazon fulfillment plant in Kent, WA. Leaders focused on learning about sustainment and logistics. The personnel that went were all leaders in positions that dealt directly with logistics and sustainment. The group was able to gain a new and healthy perspective on their current job in the military and the cost of what it takes to be the greatest logistics company of all time.
Counseling is one of the most important tools given to Non Commissioned Officers in today’s Army. It allows us to provide valuable feedback to our subordinates, and allows us to map out development plans that will ultimately shape the Army of tomorrow. So why is it so rarely utilized in the National Guard and Reserves?
You’re standing in the dense vegetation of a land navigation course, frustrated and looking for your next point. “It should be here,” you say to yourself. You know your pace count and azimuth were accurate. Time passes, doubt creeps in, and you realize you might be off course. There’s nothing left to do but get your bearings, course correct, and try again. We’ve all been there. Land navigation is an essential military skill. A slightly incorrect azimuth, just a degree or two off course, has minimal effects in the short-term. But a small discrepancy, over time or distance, can lead you significantly off course. This is similarly the case in navigating ethical decision-making. Leadership requires an accurate moral compass.
